Inside the US–India defence dilemma Autonomy vs. alliance

The Council on Foreign Relations’ recent publication offers a compelling analysis of the evolving U.S.-India defence partnership, highlighting how shared strategic interests are often complicated by deeply ingrained differences in national priorities and operational norms. Despite expanding cooperation—most recently reaffirmed by U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore—the road ahead is far from seamless.

Since the early 2000s, the U.S.-India relationship has transformed from one of limited engagement to a cornerstone of the Indo-Pacific strategic architecture. Key milestones such as India's post-9/11 support for U.S. operations in Afghanistan and the 2005 civil nuclear agreement have underscored bipartisan political will in both countries to deepen ties. Today, this partnership is particularly driven by mutual concerns about China’s rise and the need to maintain a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.

However, the CFR’s featured expert analyses reveal that beneath the surface, fundamental differences persist. Sameer Lalwani points to divergent approaches to deterrence across three domains: capabilities, geography, and interoperability. While Washington seeks enhanced joint operational readiness and global responsiveness, India’s defence posture remains grounded in its pursuit of strategic autonomy, indigenous industrial development, and a more regional conception of security. This divergence is apparent in India’s selective engagement with conflicts like Ukraine, where it resists Western framing of the crisis as a global test of democratic solidarity.

In the space domain, Dimitrios Stroikos highlights India’s strategic recalibration—from using space purely for socioeconomic development to embracing space as a domain of national security and status. While there is strong alignment with the U.S. on civil and commercial fronts, India remains wary of multilateral initiatives led by the West. Instead, it champions Global South inclusion and often prefers bilateral frameworks that preserve its autonomy and leverage.

On the issue of export controls, Konark Bhandari shows how India walks a tightrope. Although it has joined three out of four major international export control regimes, New Delhi remains sceptical of the growing trend of U.S. unilateralism in imposing restrictions. For India, such controls threaten its strategic ties with countries like Russia and China—ties it considers vital within the frameworks of SCO and BRICS. The Trump-era push for bilateralism further underscored these tensions, raising questions about how future U.S.-India tech cooperation can reconcile differing expectations around compliance and reciprocity.

Ultimately, the CFR article paints a picture of two powers that share a strategic vision but often diverge on the means to achieve it. The resilience of the U.S.-India defence partnership lies in its adaptability—both nations understand that collaboration, even if imperfect, is preferable to strategic drift in a volatile Indo-Pacific. What remains to be seen is whether the institutional, normative, and political differences can be consistently managed without undermining the broader goals of the partnership.

By Vugar Khalilov