Taliban’s expanding network of international relations Will others follow Russia’s example of formal recognition?
Russia has become the first country to formally accept the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan since the group seized control in 2021, deepening years of informal contact. The move stands in contrast to the international consensus, as the global community— including the United Nations—continues to refer to the Taliban as the “de facto authorities” rather than the legitimate Afghan government.
While formal recognition remains rare, several countries have increased diplomatic engagement with the Taliban. Analysts shared their perspectives with Al Jazeera on the state of the Taliban’s international engagement and whether Russia’s decision could prompt others to follow.
China: Long before the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Beijing began cultivating ties with the Taliban, notably hosting its representatives in 2019 for peace talks. These relations strengthened following the Taliban's return to power. In 2023, a subsidiary of China’s state-owned CNPC signed a 25-year deal to extract oil from the Amu Darya basin, the first major foreign investment post-takeover. In 2024, China acknowledged former Taliban spokesperson Bilal Karim as an envoy in an official event, though Beijing emphasized it was not a formal recognition of the Taliban government. China also hosted a trilateral summit in May with Pakistan and Taliban representatives.
Pakistan: Once the Taliban’s most prominent international ally, Pakistan’s relationship with the group has worsened significantly since 2021. Islamabad accuses the Taliban of harboring fighters from Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), who launch deadly attacks across the Afghan border. Afghanistan denies these accusations. In December 2024, Pakistani airstrikes targeted what it claimed were TTP hideouts in Afghanistan’s Paktia province, but the Taliban said 46 Afghan civilians were killed. Tensions escalated further when Pakistan began mass deportations of Afghan refugees, aiming to expel three million by early 2025. Still, dialogue continues: Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar met Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Muttaqi in Kabul in April and spoke again in May. Border clashes persist, however, including a recent skirmish in which Pakistan claimed to have killed 30 TTP-linked fighters.
India: New Delhi, which shuttered its Kabul embassy in 1996 when the Taliban first took over, long accused the group of being a Pakistani proxy. After reopening its embassy in 2001, India faced repeated Taliban-linked attacks on its missions. However, amid strained ties between Pakistan and the Taliban, India has shifted tactically. It reopened its embassy—temporarily closed in 2021—and began engaging with Taliban officials. In January 2025, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met Muttaqi in Dubai. By May, Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar held his first publicly acknowledged call with the Taliban minister.
Iran: Hostile to the Taliban in the 1990s—especially after the 1998 killing of Iranian diplomats in Mazar-i-Sharif—Iran has reassessed its stance, largely due to the shared threat posed by ISIS-K. Since the Taliban’s return, Tehran has engaged with them behind closed doors. On May 17, Muttaqi visited Iran for the Tehran Dialogue Forum and met top Iranian officials, including President Massoud Pezeshkian.
What comes next?
While formal recognition remains rare, many states now work with the Taliban in a manner that verges on de facto acceptance. Kabir Taneja of India’s Observer Research Foundation noted that Afghanistan’s neighbours engage with the Taliban more out of necessity than preference. He suggested that Russia’s move could encourage Central Asian states and China to follow, calling the recognition a geopolitical manoeuvre that strengthens Moscow’s leverage in Kabul and offers the Taliban a crucial diplomatic victory.
By Nazrin Sadigova