How geography continues to trap China in strategic straitjacket

In an era defined by artificial intelligence, long-range missiles, and naval modernization, it may seem that geography is no longer a limiting factor in statecraft, a relic overshadowed by technological prowess. Yet for many countries, geography continues to exert a profound influence over strategic choices, shaping both ambition and policy. Nowhere is this more evident than in China’s maritime strategy, where geography remains a decisive constraint despite Beijing’s unprecedented economic and military rise.

This enduring influence of geography aligns with the observations of geopolitical analyst Robert D. Kaplan as laid out in an article published by Geopolitical Monitor. His work emphasizes that physical landscapes still define the limits of strategic ambition—a concept the article's author terms “Kaplan’s Revenge.”

In the case of China, geography restricts maritime ambitions through a combination of natural chokepoints, regional states, and established great power presence in the Indo-Pacific. Despite advances in military capabilities and assertive foreign policy, Beijing cannot simply erase these constraints.

China’s maritime domain is bounded by the so-called “first island chain,” a series of islands stretching from Japan to Taiwan and the Philippines, many of which are occupied or supported by U.S. allies. Taiwan, often described as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” by General Douglas MacArthur, exemplifies the geographic hurdles China faces. Even with its growing anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) remains constrained by these physical barriers, limiting its freedom to operate in the wider Indo-Pacific.

The South China Sea, often cited as China’s natural sphere of influence, further illustrates the challenges posed by geography. This shallow, congested, and politically sensitive body of water resembles the Mediterranean for Rome or the Caribbean for the United States. Yet, unlike those historical cases, the article notes, that the South China Sea already hosts competing great powers and regional claimants. Efforts to assert dominance risk confrontation not only with neighbouring states but also with the United States, which maintains significant naval presence and conducts Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) to challenge Chinese claims. Artificial islands extend China’s tactical reach, but do little to enhance strategic freedom, as ASEAN nations remain wary of Beijing’s ambitions.

China also faces the “Malacca Dilemma,” a vulnerability highlighted by former President Hu Jintao, reflecting the nation’s dependence on the narrow Strait of Malacca for over 80 percent of its imported oil. While overland pipelines and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) offer alternatives, maritime trade remains the cheapest and most efficient method of transporting energy and exports, leaving China exposed to potential blockades in this critical corridor, which narrows to just 2.8 kilometers at its most constrained point.

Beyond the South China Sea, China’s so-called “string of pearls” in the Indian Ocean—ports and partnerships in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan—illustrates efforts to expand influence. However, the article recalls that these sites are often politically contested, underdeveloped, or vulnerable, limiting their strategic reliability. Even with these investments, geography continues to impose limitations, dictating where and how China can project power effectively.

Kaplan’s insight—that geography may not determine all outcomes but defines the realm of the possible—remains highly relevant for China. Technological sophistication and military assertiveness can enhance reach, but the country’s maritime strategy is ultimately shaped by the realities of its surrounding waters. The Indo-Pacific is not an open theater of unlimited possibility, rather the article highlights its complex, tightly constrained space, that is defined by chokepoints, contested islands, and strategic fault lines.

By Nazrin Sadigova