The Lachin Road situation and its genuine implications Contemplations with Orkhan/VIDEO
We have entered Week 6 of the eco-protest organised by Azerbaijani environmentalists on the Lachin-Khankandi Road, in the Karabakh Economic Region of Azerbaijan. The pressing question of the time relates to what has changed. In other words, what is different now about the illegal exploitation of Karabakh’s natural resources that triggered the protest in the first place and regarding the way the Lachin Road functions? We also need to look at how the situation is now different for the Armenian residents of Karabakh, for the self-styled and discredited ‘first minister’ of the separatists and what bearing all of this has on the longwinded peace negotiations between Baku and Yerevan.
Responding to these questions is key to having a fairly lucid idea as to where we are now. So, let us examine them in turn. Firstly, as we know, the illicit extraction of the Gyzilbulag gold and Demirli copper-molybdenum resources of Karabakh by the Swiss-based Base Metal was halted. This is not a giant leap, but rather a considerable plunge, being to the credit of the eco-protestors.
What has yet not been achieved is access to ecological monitoring by Azerbaijani experts in the zone under the temporary control of the Russian ‘peacekeepers’, and this remains the central demand of the demonstration. In addition, now, we have the full list of foreign companies that illegally operated in the region. Legal consequences must and will follow.
Secondly, something has significantly changed about the movement along the Lachin Road. If, prior to 12 December 2022, the road, despite numerous warnings issued by Azerbaijan, had been used, in contravention of its humanitarian regime, for myriad illegal purposes, including the transportation of illicitly extracted raw materials, mines, weapons and munitions, the physical presence of the protestors on the ground has led this to be virtually curbed. But this is only virtually, and not completely. We can’t exclude recurrent instances of continuous misuse, for there is no permanent control by Azerbaijani authorities, to date.
One episode perhaps deserves a special mention. On 18 January, three vehicles, belonging to the Russian ‘peacekeeping’ contingent, carrying 26 civilians, including 20 teenagers, passed through the Lachin Road, totally unhindered, as was expected. Yet, the Armenian media claimed that the protestors shouted at the passengers, intimidating them. Nothing of the sort took place. Trust the videos, not the convenient prejudiced fantasies.
Thirdly, it seems that there is no uniform view amongst the Armenians of Karabakh as to how their present contrived predicament should be communicated to the world. Interestingly enough, Ruben Vardanyan himself, in a recent interview, dismantled the concept of alleged besiegement of the local residents due to the eco-protest, downplaying the severity of the situation. The Kremlin-backed tycoon stated that humanitarian aid was provided by the Russian ‘peacekeepers’ and seriously ill patients were being transported out of the territory via the intervention of the International Committee of the Red Cross.
Since it is self-evident that there is no “humanitarian disaster” in Khankandi and its outskirts, some Armenians now claim that it is simply abnormal that the residents of the region receive food supplies and other essentials via the Russian ‘peacekeepers’ and medical aid is provided by an international humanitarian organisation, stipulating that the situation should be reversed to the pre-12 December stage, being the date of the protest’s inception. Well, there is indeed an abnormality. But it has not been caused by the indefatigable Azerbaijani environmentalists. The eco-protestors are there to fix the abnormality, they want to ensure beyond doubt that the nation’s resources won’t be plundered with impunity against international law and environmental standards.
The abnormality is that Karabakh’s Armenian residents are currently being held hostage to Vardanyan and his mafia-style henchmen, and the separatists do not want vehicles entering Khankandi via the Lachin Road to be inspected by the Azerbaijani authorities as they wish to transport nefarious cargo. It is also abnormal that the Armenians of Karabakh should feel they are in limbo, with the prospects of their integration into wider Azerbaijani society facing an artificial challenge in the shape of a Russian billionaire of mendacious schemes and dubious pedigree.
And, when the denigrators of the eco-protest demand a reversion to the pre-protest state of affairs, they are effectively expressing a desire for the perpetuation of this abnormality, namely, the use of the Lachin route for illegal purposes and unchecked exploitation of Azerbaijan’s natural resources.
On a different note, the situation around the Lachin Road has considerably exacerbated frictions inside the illegal ‘NKR’, with Vardanyan facing calls to resign. Alien to the local population of the region, viewed by Baku as a Moscow-sent agent and treated with suspicion by the authorities in Yerevan, he was instrumental in derailing the nascent dialogue between Azerbaijan and its citizens of Armenian origin. Despite attempts to put on a very brave face, he is beleaguered, out on a limb, and impacted by an increased perception that he is an irksome spoiler of the highest order.
Fourthly, if to judge by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashanyan’s latest 10 January press conference, and the recent statement by Alen Simonyan, the Speaker of the Armenian National Assembly, it is apparent that Yerevan believes Baku should directly talk to Khankandi. As usual, the devil is in the details, and normally lives in the Kremlin. For Azerbaijan, the situation involving Karabakh Armenians is outside the interstate domain and therefore is not to be discussed with anyone, particularly external actors, the only permissible dialogue being with the representatives of the local community in the region.
In this sense, there is perhaps an emerging commonality between Baku and Yerevan. For all the confessions made by Pashinyan during the recent press conference to the effect that the recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity is inexorability, as otherwise, Armenia would be against the logic of world order, he has not yet completely freed himself from the shackles of ‘remedial secessionist’ hopes, which are still a corroded, insert or semi-inert component in his negotiating position. The Armenian Prime Minister continues to act within the same parameters: to his local audience, he is compelled to explain how hopeless it is to deny the criticality of recognising the Azerbaijani sovereignty of Karabakh, whereas his message to Baku is centred around the internal difficulties associated with agreeing with this without soliciting some treaty-based guarantees for the Armenians of the region. The probability is that he will continue to operate within the self-safe parameters, eventually ditching his reservations.