Türkiye-Sweden standoff over NATO membership not to disappear soon Ankara is sticking its guns

On June 12, Türkiye and Sweden gathered together again for renewed talks regarding the latter's NATO membership. However, despite earlier expectations of NATO, Ankara refused to give the green light to Sweden's membership bid, citing the country's refusal to cooperate with Türkiye against radical terrorist organizations, namely Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its affiliations in Europe. Western officials had hoped Erdogan would soften his position on the diplomatically charged issue after he secured a hard-fought re-election on June 28.

Sweden and Finland applied for membership together after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year, marking a dramatic pivot after decades of military neutrality. Finland became NATO’s 31st member in April after the Turkish parliament ratified its request, but Turkey has held off on approving Sweden’s bid.

Notably, NATO seeks to secure Sweden’s membership within the alliance during the upcoming Vilnius Summit in Lithuania in July 2023. However, Ankara's firm stance on Sweden's membership suggests that no confirmation will follow from President Erdogan sometime soon. Even NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg's face-to-face meeting with President Erdogan following his inauguration in Ankara did not yield a positive outcome.

Urging Ankara to ratify Sweden’s accession as soon as possible, Stoltenberg maintained that Stockholm had fulfilled its pledges on addressing Türkiye’s security concerns, such as stepping up counter-terrorism cooperation, including against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which is on the terror organizations' list of Ankara, Washington and Brussels. Also, a recent series of separate demonstrations in Stockholm, including a protest by an anti-Islam activist who burned the Quran outside the Turkish Embassy, also angered Turkish officials and postponed the membership talks.

On the other hand, Sweden claims that it has upheld its part of a deal struck with Türkiye in Madrid to address Ankara's security concerns, including bringing in a new anti-terrorism law in June 2023. Moreover, the fact that President Erdogan replaced his long-term foreign minister Mevlut Cavushoglu with the country’s top spymaster Hakan Fidan is a signal of Ankara’s unchanged visionary in its pragmatic foreign policy strategy. On the contrary, Türkiye's conservative agenda and policy at regional and international levels will likely become more assertive in the next five years.

Notwithstanding, the U.S. and other allies are still holding out hope that Sweden will join NATO by July despite Ankara's existing objections. The main narrative in the West is that blocking Sweden's ascension to NATO would play to Russia's hand to make the alliance weaker and split.

Considering Türkiye’s requirements regarding the regulations of Sweden's counter-terrorism strategy and measures against the local Kurdish Diaspora, Stockholm is unlikely to retreat from its long-term tradition of liberal democracy and start collective extradition of Kurdish activists to Türkiye in exchange for membership. Sweden justifies its stance by the fact that it had already cut all financial aid to the PKK-affiliated PYD and amended its constitution.

Sweden’s reluctance to cooperate with Ankara on the issue caused harsh criticism in Türkiye, while President Erdogan lashed out at Sweden numerous times, claiming that the lack of respect for Turkish security concerns and Muslim beliefs would cost Sweden Turkey's support for its NATO membership bid.

Indeed, President Erdogan largely capitalized on the process before the critical elections to gain the sympathy of more religious groups in the country. The result was satisfactory as Erdogan secured another term in office on June 28 runoff elections.

However, the prospect of Ankara further delaying Sweden's NATO bid is not just a problem for Sweden but for Türkiye as well. The image of Türkiye standing in the way of Sweden's historic decision to join the alliance against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine and related geopolitical paradigm shifts is not good. It feeds the perception of Türkiye as an unreliable and disruptive actor at a time when Euro-Atlantic security is being reshaped.

Sweden and Finland were worried about Russia's potential threat to the Nordic region at the beginning of the Ukraine war. However, considering Russia's mounting losses on the battleground and inability to seize full control over the Ukrainian territory and Finland's role in NATO, Sweden may soon drop its ambitions to join NATO swiftly. As for Ankara, it will further attempt to get political dividends regarding Sweden’s NATO bid, namely the U.S. approval of F-16 fighter jets sale to Türkiye, which will give it the upper hand in its efforts to tackle regional threats.