"Türkiye will become a key player in the region as Russia weakens" Ankara, Brussels, and Moscow in 2023

Caliber.Az presents an interview with Pavel Usov, Belarusian political analyst and head of the Center for Political Analysis and Forecasting.

- What will the confrontation concept between the EU and Russia look like in 2023? Are there any prospects for improvement in their relations?

- Despite the sabotage of sanctions by some members of the European Union, for example, Hungary, the latest aid package of 23 billion euros to Ukraine, the policy model towards Russia in the West has been worked out 100 per cent. It is unambiguous: no negotiations, no easing of sanctions until Moscow stops the war and liberates all the occupied territories. There is a so-called minimum and maximum formula at work here.

The minimum formula is for Russia to withdraw to conditional positions on February 24, 2022, and to compensate for all the damage caused to Ukraine during the war, as well as various geopolitical concessions. And there are plenty of threats in this "minimum" for Russia as well because it will be seen by the West as a loser. And even the fulfillment of all these conditions does not mean the complete removal of all sanctions on Russia. But there is a "maximum" approach, and it is the dominant one for the EU since Ukraine is unlikely to agree to the minimum option in view of the damage it has suffered, the number of victims, and the war crimes committed on its territory by Russian troops. Therefore, the EU is now dominated by the "maximum" approach, which envisages the complete liberation of all Ukrainian territories, even Crimea. The last condition, by the way, is the so-called American approach. This one provides for full reparation at the expense of frozen Russian funds in European and US banks. It is also the acceptance of conditions to disarm Russia, which, one way or another, according to the masterminds of this plan, should lead to a change in Russia's own political system.

At the moment, these two approaches are defining attitudes of the West. And at the moment all its resources are aimed at making sure that Ukraine wins this war. Here, too, two strategies stand out: the first is a complete comprehensive arm and financial aid, while the second is more and more sanctions, which will only increase, up to the complete cessation of EU trade relations with Russia.

Intensive efforts are now being made to make Europe completely independent of Russian gas and Russian oil. According to the latest figures, German consumption of Russian coal and gas has been reduced to almost zero. The Yamal-Europe pipeline is almost non-operational, Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 are idle. And I want to remind you that Germany was the main consumer of Russian energy resources. Nevertheless, Europe's rejection of Russian gas is not fatal for Russia because it is now redirecting gas supplies to Asian markets. However, the blow is profound: the European consumer was generating enormous revenues for Russia - almost a billion dollars a day.

- How do you see Türkiye's role in the new geopolitics of Eurasia?

- Türkiye's role is key in the new global geopolitics, even in the war in Ukraine. Supplies of Bayraktars, largely gratuitous, were a lifesaver for Ukraine in the first, key weeks of the war. "The Bayraktars, like the HIMARS today, were an important tactical weapon for the Ukrainian army and essentially changed the course of events.

Secondly, Türkiye is now a powerful guarantor of security, for example, for Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus and for other Turkic states, say, Kazakhstan (let us not forget that Kazakhstan had signed agreements with Türkiye from the beginning of the war, which gave Astana certain security guarantees). I think Kyrgyzstan will also be oriented towards Türkiye, which will be a counterbalance not only to Russia but also to China, which in turn has an active presence in the region.

The second component of Turkish leadership is how active Ankara has been in negotiations, incidentally in the same grain deal. Here I think Erdogan did not even convince, but rather threatened Putin that tangible sanctions could follow if the deal is rejected: for example, the complete closure of the Bosphorus to Russian merchant ships and other transport, which would be a serious blow to Russia.

However, Türkiye is keeping its doors open to Russian tourists, which is extremely important in the current situation of the European Iron Curtain for them. Türkiye's policy at the moment is almost unique: on the one hand, it supports Ukraine by any military means, being a NATO country, and on the other it does not participate in full-scale sanctions against Russia, while trying to win various economic benefits for itself, such as providing Europe with gas through South Stream in cooperation with Azerbaijan, becoming a large-scale gas hub for the EU. In other words, Erdogan has played the situation in such a way that Türkiye wins in any scenario.

It is therefore quite safe to say that Erdogan is the undisputed leader in the region and clearly dominates in ties with Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus, disarming Russia's political influence in the region. And Pashinyan's demarche for refusing to sign the final resolutions at the CSTO summit is the best proof of that.

So, given Russia's weakening, Türkiye will soon become a key player in the region, even in Russia itself, given that the idea of pan-Turkism, which was proclaimed in the 1990s, envelops some of its regions. Today, we can say that Türkiye, as a geopolitical player, as a geopolitical nexus, is successfully re-establishing its geopolitical, imperial grandeur. This is the reality. I think that even after the end of the war, the issue of Crimea will be open, and Ankara's influence in resolving the Crimean issue and the status of the peninsula will be key.

- Can we expect the end of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2023?

- Alas, I do not think 2023 will be the year of the end of the war - Russia intends to mobilise all resources and pelt Ukraine with cannon fodder. We are talking about a possible mobilisation of about 2 million people - at least that information has just come out. And this gives no hope of the war ending this year. And we cannot but underestimate the mobilisation potential of Russia. We have to take into account that despite the sanctions its military industry is not destroyed like the Ukrainian one, and despite the huge losses in equipment and ammunition, we cannot yet confidently say that Russia is exhausted.