Why will the IAEA's chief visit to Iran not solve the nuclear problem? Signature as a countermeasure to missile attack

On March 4, Rafael Grossi, the chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), wrapped up a two-day trip to Iran, during which he met with President Ebrahim Raisi, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, and AEOI chief Mohammad Eslami. Upon his return to Vienna, Grossi told reporters that Iran had agreed to restore key monitoring activities, apparently referring to cameras that were removed from several nuclear sites in June 2022.

Moreover, Grossi said Iran's assurances were "not words" but "very concrete" promises that would be fleshed out in detail during upcoming technical talks. However, the Iranian authorities were quick to refute Grossi’s statements, as shortly after the IAEA's press conference, the senior Iranian official stated that "there were no talks or agreements about installing cameras" during the recent talks and that the number of inspections at the Fordow plant had increased from eight to 11—less than a 50% increase, thus contradicting to what Grossi earlier mentioned.

Nevertheless, Iran expressed readiness to continue cooperation and provide further information and access to the Agency to address the outstanding safeguards issues. In addition, the US Special Envoy for Iran, Rob Malley, announced that the United States would decide its next steps on the back of the visit to conclude the level of compliance regarding its nuclear obligations.

In fact, the IAEA once reached a similar agreement with Iran in early 2022 based on pre-2003 allegations, when the nuclear threats and debates heightened in the West. However, the continuous destructive policy of Tehran and deteriorating relations with the West in light of mass riots in major cities broke down initial agreements in September 2022.

Following the new sanction package in November 2022, Iran increased enrichment to 60% at the Fordow nuclear site. Some argued that Grossi’s visit to Iran and some progress in nuclear talks renewed optimism in the West. Even though it is evident that there is a lot of work ahead.

Since the withdrawal of the US from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, the nuclear talks with Iran have been doomed to fail. Hence, in the last several years, Tehran ignited the situation with the West by issuing new threats and boosting its proxy warfare strategy against Western partners in the Gulf region. As such, the space for a diplomatic resolution of the nuclear issue began shrinking steadily under the Joe Biden administration and stalled.

Unlike the White House, the European Union (EU) did not lose optimism and avoided from open confrontation with Tehran. Considering the new realities, Tehran attempts to weaponize the current nuclear talk and trade more concessions, which could backfire soon.

Moreover, many Iranian experts are confident in claiming that Iran will desperately avoid signing a politicized nuclear agreement with the West. In this vein, Iranian foreign minister Amir-Abdollahian warning that Iran would consider an alternative approach—which he referred to as "Plan B"—if diplomacy fails to restore the JCPOA perfectly explains the nature of the talks and Iran’s vision of the possible new agreement. Such a position of Tehran is linked to its desire to get additional guarantees that similar harsh sanctions will not be imposed on the country again should a new political dispute occurs.

The long-term sanctions hammered Iran’s economy, with the national currency lowering unprecedentedly. As a result, the Islamist regime appeared to lack sufficient means to tackle severe problems.

Therefore, it is fair to note that due to the inability to solve domestic violence and socio-economic problems, the Tehran regime may be willing to strike a nuclear deal at the earliest convenience that will enable it to focus on internal issues. The growing level of violence of riots and brutal police crackdown on civilians, such as gas attacks on girls' schools, may create a dangerous precedent within the regime. Indeed, the potential nuclear agreement with the West will enable Tehran to return to the diplomacy track and seek new deterrence factors against possible missile attacks from Israel.

Unlike Western partners, however, Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu takes a firm stance, claiming that Iranian nuclear facilities are legitimate targets. Therefore, Israel would do a lot to prevent the West and the IAEA from reaching any consensus or compromise on the nuclear policy in the near future.