The cowboy duel between Washington and Tehran To be or not to be the nuclear deal?

The immediate instinct is to answer “no.” But there are nuances.

Every American western has a cowboy duel. The participants keep their hands near their guns, watching their opponent’s eyes closely. Whoever blinks first, showing weakness, usually loses. This kind of duel is a Hollywood invention. However, something similar is happening today between Washington and Tehran, and the Iranians won the first round. The second round has just begun.

Negotiations on the nuclear deal (lifting economic sanctions on Iran, allowing it to sell oil in exchange for abandoning attempts to develop nuclear weapons) took place under Biden for about three years and ended in failure, although the deal’s conditions were softer than under Trump. The latter also wants to make a deal, but with an additional condition — Iran must not have the capability to enrich uranium.

Let us recall that the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) is developing its nuclear energy program, which has important strategic significance, including but not limited to military purposes. Iran is facing an energy crisis, and the desire to build a powerful nuclear industry is justified and driven not only by attempts to develop nuclear weapons. Uranium enrichment up to 3.67% is necessary for civilian energy purposes, while the 90% level is intended for creating nuclear warheads. Currently, Iran has accumulated about 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 per cent. This amount is enough to produce 9 nuclear devices, and the leap to 90% enrichment would take several weeks—if, of course, the leadership decides to proceed. Integration with a delivery missile (the second most important component of nuclear weapons) would take about a year.

Iran, however, is willing to abandon the pursuit of nuclear weapons. It has even expressed readiness to transfer its stockpile of 60-per-cent-enriched uranium to third countries in exchange for the lifting of U.S. sanctions, which have been devastating for its economy. The Iranians are also open to allowing American inspectors access to all—or nearly all—of their nuclear facilities.

U.S. President Donald Trump initially set tough conditions. In exchange for lifting sanctions, he demanded that Iran not only cease uranium enrichment, but also abandon its missile programme and stop funding its allies in the Middle East—namely the Palestinian group Hamas, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the Iraqi militias of Hashd al-Shaabi, and the Houthi rebels in Yemen. Otherwise, the United States threatened to strike Iranian nuclear and other strategic facilities using its air force. A large U.S. naval and air force presence was built up around Iran, including several carrier strike groups, an armada of heavy bombers and refuelling aircraft stationed on Diego Garcia island in the Indian Ocean. In addition, Israel openly prepared to join the U.S. in any potential strikes, deploying its air force—considered the most powerful in the region, with around 300 combat aircraft. Plans were even discussed for strikes on Iranian command centres and political leadership, and a possible landing by Israeli commandos to destroy Iran’s underground uranium enrichment facility beneath Mount Fordow. This was the shape of America’s carrot (sanctions relief in exchange for giving up nuclear weapons) and stick (the joint U.S.–Israeli air and naval armada).

But Iran did not back down. On the contrary, it threatened retaliatory strikes against U.S. bases and other targets in the region. For example, it could, like the Yemeni Houthi rebels—and even in coordination with them—launch cruise missile and drone attacks on commercial vessels and oil tankers in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, through which 20 percent of the world’s oil supply is transported. As the Houthis have demonstrated, such attacks can be quite dangerous and sustained over time.

In this cowboy-style standoff, the key question was: who would blink first? It was Trump who blinked. He unexpectedly softened his demands, dropping the toughest conditions—namely Iran’s abandonment of missile development and support for regional proxies. Moreover, he prohibited Israel from striking Iran. As a result, U.S.–Iran negotiations over a nuclear deal began, and Trump made this announcement during a visit by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (“Bibi”) to Washington—to Bibi’s considerable astonishment, as he had flown in to coordinate the timing and parameters of a joint strike.

The U.S. began negotiations with Iran. The first round took place on April 12 in Muscat, the second on April 19 in Rome, and the third and fourth on April 26 and May 11, again in the Omani capital. The fifth round of U.S.–Iran talks aimed at resolving disputes over Iran’s nuclear programme began on May 23 in the Italian capital, with the Iranian delegation led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and the American side headed by President Trump's special envoy, Steven Witkoff.

However, everything then stalled. The U.S. put forward a demand that Iran refused to accept, calling it a “red line.” Trump wants Iran to abandon all uranium enrichment activities and instead import enriched uranium from abroad for its civilian energy needs. Tehran responded with a firm “no.”

Another cowboy duel is underway! But this time, the situation has changed. Why? Because Iran already won the first round. Now its position has hardened, as its chances have improved. It appears more confident, having already witnessed its opponent’s weakness—and has decided to play the same game again. The U.S. showed weakness the first time by backing down; so why not try to pressure them again? At least, that’s how the Iranian leadership sees it.

This assertiveness was recently reflected in a series of sharp statements by Iran’s leadership. On June 4, the country’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who wields near-absolute power, wrote the following on his official website:

“What’s the point of having even hundreds of nuclear power plants if we don’t have the ability to enrich uranium and supply our own nuclear fuel? These power plants require fuel, and if we can’t produce it domestically, we’ll be dependent on the United States. And the United States can impose countless conditions on the supply of that fuel. We’ve already experienced this…

In the 2000s, the United States—through a number of friendly intermediaries—offered Iran a deal: we would provide a sample of our 3.5%-enriched uranium in exchange for an equivalent amount of 20%-enriched uranium, which we needed at the time. Our authorities accepted the proposal. However, I told our government: ‘Let them deliver the 20%-enriched uranium first… we’ll inspect it to verify its quality. Once we’re certain it’s what they claim, we’ll hand over our 3.5%-enriched uranium in return.’ When they realised we were serious, they withdrew the offer and failed to deliver anything…

The Americans are essentially saying: ‘You should not have a nuclear industry at all. You must remain dependent on us for nuclear medicine, energy, desalination, and so on.’ These impolite American officials have the audacity to repeat this demand in different forms. They are against progress—specifically, the progress and independence of the Iranian nation. Our response to the irrational and aggressive rhetoric of the U.S. government is clear—and it will remain clear…

Who the hell are you to interfere in whether Iran has uranium enrichment capabilities or not? What concern is it of yours? You have nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and the power to destroy the world in your hands. What business is it of yours whether Iran has enrichment capabilities or not? Who the hell do you think you are, and what legal basis do you have for making such claims?”

These words sounded like a challenge. Such harsh rhetoric points to Iran’s true intentions. It is not merely rejecting the U.S. demand to abandon uranium enrichment—it aims to humiliate the American administration by forcing it to once again soften its position and withdraw what Tehran considers an unfeasible demand.

In short, the ball is now in Washington’s court. What will it do? Perhaps the United States, reluctant to get directly entangled with Iran, might instead allow Israel to act—a country that has long been preparing for strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and decision-making centres.

There are hints this scenario is being considered. For example, Saudi Arabia recently sent a direct message to Iranian officials, urging them to take President Donald Trump’s proposal for nuclear talks seriously. For Iran’s leadership, the message implied, engaging in negotiations could be a way to avoid war with Israel.

Concerned by the unfolding situation, 89-year-old King Salman bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia dispatched his son, Prince Khalid bin Salman, to deliver a warning to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The confidential meeting took place on April 17 at the presidential residence in Tehran and was attended by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff Mohammad Bagheri, and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.

Yet Iran offered no response. The country clearly feels stronger than it did before the negotiations began and is now hoping to break the will of the American administration. The logic is simple: it worked the first time—perhaps it will work again.

Tehran is playing with fire — and not just because the U.S. might eventually give Israel the green light for strikes. The Iranian economy is growing increasingly unstable under the weight of sanctions. The rial is now trading at around 1.2 million to the dollar, inflation is surging, and nearly 70 per cent of Iranians are living at or below the poverty line. Recently, the country was shaken by a powerful strike by truck drivers, who carry the bulk of domestic freight. The protest swept through more than 130 towns and cities and lasted over a week, with participants taking a hardline stance — even attacking drivers who refused to join. Mass demonstrations have long become routine, fuelled by a collapsing economy, unpaid wages, rolling blackouts, and deepening crises in both the energy and environmental sectors.

But what if, at some point, the government proves powerless to contain yet another wave of protests — just as Israeli warplanes strike at Iran’s leadership and security command centres? What if this double blow, from within and without, leads to the collapse of the regime? That’s exactly what happened in Libya in 2011, where the uprising was supported by NATO airstrikes. Israel could well assume a similar role. And it is precisely this “Libyan scenario” that Tehran fears most.

Iran’s leadership has shown remarkable resilience in facing both external foes and domestic unrest. But it is now playing a dangerous game.