The point of no return—with a comma Armenia’s CSTO backtracking

Against the backdrop of a slight warming in Armenian–Russian relations, Moscow appears to have decided to press one of the most sensitive issues on the bilateral agenda—the future of Armenia’s participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).

Thus, in a recent interview with a Russian media outlet, the organisation’s Secretary General, Imangali Tasmagambetov, once again expressing the CSTO’s readiness for full-fledged cooperation with Armenia, stated that the organisation’s doors remain open to the republic.

“Armenia was and remains our ally. We hope that Armenia will return to full participation in the CSTO in the foreseeable future,” he noted, while also highlighting a statement by the Armenian Foreign Ministry indicating that the issue of the country’s withdrawal from the CSTO is not on the agenda.

Here, it is worth emphasising that in late November, Armenia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Mnatsakan Safaryan assured that Armenia does not intend to withdraw from the CSTO.

“At this stage, such an issue has not been raised before Armenia’s foreign policy establishment. We have not been tasked with this; if there is such a development, you will naturally be informed,” he said in response to a question on whether the issue of the country’s withdrawal from the CSTO had been discussed.

Naturally, such a message from the Armenian side could not go unnoticed by the Kremlin, as Russia is seeking to restore its significantly weakened positions both in Armenia and across the region as a whole—among other means, through the full participation of its former outpost in the South Caucasus in the CSTO—for the following reasons. First, this would reduce the likelihood of Armenia’s definitive pivot towards the West; and second, it would help preserve the organisation itself under Russia’s stewardship.

In light of the above, it is quite logical that Moscow, responding swiftly to any messages coming from Yerevan on this matter, is attempting to elicit clarity from Armenia regarding the CSTO, while demonstrating particular patience and diplomatic tact. For example, after Yerevan ceased participating in the organisation’s activities, Moscow described this step as a sovereign decision by the Armenian authorities. Russia’s patience wore thin only after the republic refused to pay its membership contributions to the organisation—at which point the Russian Foreign Ministry’s official spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, stated that Armenia is obliged to make these payments and warned the Armenian authorities that failure to do so could result in the country being stripped of its voting rights.

However, the Kremlin’s irritation did not lead Yerevan to revise its position on the financial issue. On the contrary, Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan linked the refusal to pay contributions to the organisation with the freezing of Yerevan’s participation in it: “In connection with the freezing of our participation in the CSTO, Armenia did not pay the membership fee to this organisation in 2024.” In effect, under this pretext, the Armenian side has completely insulated itself from fulfilling its obligations within the framework of this structure—something that is, in itself, a non sequitur.

It is also worth noting that in March of this year, Armenia’s National Assembly, in its second and final reading, approved the law “On the Launch of the Process of Accession of the Republic of Armenia to the European Union,” which further heightened Moscow’s concerns about the reorientation of Armenian foreign policy. All the more so as prior to this, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, during a government question-and-answer session in parliament, had declared that a return to the CSTO was no longer possible, noting that “on this issue, we have passed the point of no return.”

All these rather contradictory statements by the Armenian authorities regarding the Collective Security Treaty Organisation indicate that Armenia is skilfully manipulating this issue, as it does not risk a complete break with Russia. This is precisely why official Yerevan currently prefers to manoeuvre between the European Union and Moscow.

As for the “fresh” statements by the CSTO Secretary General, they once again confirmed the Kremlin’s unchanged approach towards Armenia. It cannot be ruled out that, on this issue, Russia is—figuratively speaking—testing the waters in order to step up its diplomatic pressure on Yerevan at a later stage. For its part, the question of what Armenia’s final choice will be remains largely in the realm of rhetoric.