South Caucasus on tracks of geopolitics The battle of corridors

The Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway is set to begin operating at full capacity in the near future, followed by its official inauguration, Georgia’s Minister of Economy, Mariam Kvrivishvili, announced on Channel One.

“Very soon, Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Georgia will celebrate the opening of the historic Baku–Tbilisi–Kars project, which will play a significant role not only for our country but for the entire region. The ceremonial opening will take place shortly,” Kvrivishvili said.

The minister also noted that, over the coming years, the three countries plan to invest approximately 1 billion lari (around 370 million US dollars) in Georgian Railways to enhance Georgia’s role as a transit hub. This investment is expected to help the country remain competitive and a reliable partner, ensuring fast and high-quality cargo transportation.

The Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway was commissioned in 2017 but initially operated in a test mode with limited capacity. Between 2023 and 2024, repair and modernisation works were carried out on the line, increasing its throughput to 5 million tonnes per year. However, the railway is still functioning in a test format due to the combination of cargo traffic with ongoing construction work. In the future, throughput is expected to reach 17 million tonnes per year.

Amid growing transit along the Middle Corridor and the potential emergence of alternative routes, the Georgian authorities have a clear interest in accelerating the railway’s full-scale operation. Possible alternatives include a route via the Zangezur Corridor and its Armenian section (TRIPP), for which a project implementation agreement was signed on August 8, 2025, as well as projects to restore unused sections of the Kars–Gyumri and Gazakh–Ijevan–Dilijan railways.

Recently, special representatives from Türkiye and Armenia held the second round of technical consultations on the restoration and commissioning of the Kars–Gyumri railway. Officials from the relevant agencies of both countries met on November 28, 2025, at the Akyaka–Akhurik border crossing between Türkiye and Armenia, as well as in the city of Gyumri. The talks took place “within the framework of previously agreed arrangements by the special representatives as part of the process of normalising relations between Türkiye and Armenia.”

According to Armenian experts, restoring the Kars–Gyumri railway section will take approximately one year and cost around 32.4 million US dollars. This section was operational during the Soviet era and continued to be used afterward. In 1993, Türkiye suspended its operation and closed the border with Armenia in response to Armenia’s occupation of Azerbaijan’s Kalbajar region.

Overall, the restoration of the Kars–Gyumri railway is also advantageous for Georgia—particularly given that this section was originally part of the Tiflis (Tbilisi)–Alexandropol (Gyumri)–Kars railway, built during the Russian Empire. In other words, even after the Kars–Gyumri line reopens, transit flows would continue to pass through Georgian territory.

However, in Armenia, circles associated with the pro-Russian Republican Party, which held power during Serzh Sargsyan’s presidency, have recently been actively promoting the idea of a “complete bypass” of Georgia in railway transit. This topic was highlighted by Liana Gezalyan in an article published on October 28, 2025, in the newspaper Voice of Armenia. The headline itself is revealing: “Restoration of the Gazakh–Ijevan Railway — a Step Beneficial for Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia.”

The article’s central argument—the need to create a railway route between Russia and Armenia that bypasses Georgia—is based on the position of Gagik Minasyan, a member of the Republican Party’s executive body. According to him, transit through Georgia is acceptable for occasional shipments but remains “too vulnerable” for regular logistics due to political risks, multiple border crossings, and additional customs procedures.

The second drawback, according to Minasyan, is the length of the route: he estimates that the path through Georgia is approximately 160 km longer than a direct connection via the Gazakh–Ijevan line, which increases transportation costs. In this context, he proposes restoring the Gazakh–Ijevan railway, which operated during the Soviet period. Currently, traffic along this line is impossible due to a destroyed section near Ijevan. Nevertheless, Minasyan, citing “expert assessments,” claims that its restoration would cost roughly 10 million US dollars—a relatively modest sum for an infrastructure project.

“In this case, if Azerbaijan genuinely shows goodwill and unblocks this section, ensuring the unhindered passage of goods from Gazakh to Armenia, Yerevan’s reciprocal move—as an act of goodwill—could be mirrored: the opening of the Yeraskh–Sadarak road, connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan, immediately, rather than in several years as envisaged by the TRIPP project,” stated Minasyan.

According to Minasyan, the restoration of the Gazakh–Ijevan line has not only regional but also strategic significance. He argues that it involves the revival of a full-scale North–South railway corridor, which would connect Russia (via Derbent), Azerbaijan (Baku–Gazakh), Armenia (Ijevan), Nakhchivan, and Iran (Julfa). Notably, the Voice of Armenia article does not specify the state affiliation of Nakhchivan, which is an integral part of Azerbaijan.

In practice, within the Republican Party of Armenia, while demonstrating “polished” rhetoric and ostensibly “considering Azerbaijan’s interests,” there is an attempt to shift focus from the opening of a full Zangezur Corridor to the restoration of the Gazakh–Ijevan line—but as part of a North–South corridor running through Armenian territory. Instead of implementing the Zangezur Corridor in its full format, the Republican Party proposes limiting itself to opening the Yeraskh–Sadarak crossing, thereby ensuring railway transit through Nakhchivan to Iran—again reflecting a logic that prioritises the Armenian section of the North–South corridor.

Thus, it becomes clear that the pro-Russian Republican Party of Armenia consistently supports organising railway transit along the route Gazakh–Ijevan–Dilijan–Gyumri–Kars. This option is highly likely to enjoy support in Russia as well—a predictable outcome given the influence of the Armenian lobby in the Russian Federation, which maintains close ties with the Republican Party of Armenia.

There are also no financial obstacles on the Russian side for launching railway transit through Ijevan and Gyumri. As is well known, Armenia’s railway network is operated by South Caucasus Railway (SCR), a wholly owned subsidiary of Russian Railways (RZD), which does not face any shortage of financial resources. Moreover, RZD had previously planned the construction of the Vanadzor–Fioletovo section, which would significantly shorten the route between Gyumri, Dilijan, and Ijevan. Under current circumstances, there is even more reason to accelerate this project.

However, advancing the Gazakh–Ijevan–Dilijan–Gyumri–Kars route, bypassing Georgia, required a “push”—a reason to question Georgia’s reliability as a transit country. Paradoxically, such a reason was provided by the Georgian side itself, specifically by the bodies responsible for tariff policy in railway freight transportation.

On December 5, 2025, more than a month after the Voice of Armenia article highlighting lobbying within the Republican Party of Armenia for transit that bypasses Georgia, reports emerged that certain forces within Georgia were effectively playing into this logic. These concerns relate to tariff decisions that appear not only economically unfounded but also encourage partners to seek alternative routes that avoid Georgian territory.

According to the information disclosed, the Azerbaijani side submitted an official request to Tbilisi for railway freight tariffs on the Gardabani–Sadakhly section for the transportation of petroleum products to Armenia. A logical and expected approach would have been to set a tariff comparable to that applied by Azerbaijan on its own territory. For similar cargo over a distance of approximately 680 km, Azerbaijan charges 17 US dollars—equivalent to about 0.02 dollars per tonne per kilometre.

However, the Georgian side proposed a fundamentally different approach: a tariff of 92 US dollars for transporting one tonne of cargo over a section just 111 km long. In per-kilometre terms, this amounts to roughly 0.82 dollars per tonne per kilometre—around 41 times higher than the Azerbaijani rate.

It is difficult to explain what considerations guided Georgian Railways in setting such an inflated tariff—unless one assumes that certain decisions, whether taken deliberately or out of short-sightedness, are effectively contributing to the emergence of long-term transit schemes that bypass Georgia altogether, in favour of precisely those routes actively promoted by the Armenian side.

By demanding an overtly exorbitant tariff for the transit of cargo from Azerbaijan to Armenia, certain officials in Georgia effectively played into the hands of lobbyists within the Republican Party of Armenia who are promoting a railway project that would bypass Georgia. This is the same party which, while in power, consistently acted against Georgian interests—from providing political support to the separatist regimes in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali to repeatedly voting at the United Nations against the return of Georgian refugees to Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region.

Once the Georgian side’s “tariff demands” became public, Azerbaijan—much like Armenia earlier—was reminded of the existence of an alternative railway route running through Gazakh, Ijevan, and Dilijan. Faced with the resulting scandal, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze was forced to intervene promptly. Acting on his instructions, Georgian Railways took an emergency measure: a one-off shipment of petroleum products from Azerbaijan to Armenia was transported free of charge.

However, the process had already been set in motion. Lobbyists for transit through Armenian territory “bypassing” Georgia gained an additional argument, and the route via Ijevan and Gyumri began to attract supporters not only in Armenia. The accelerated implementation of this project is increasingly being viewed as a kind of “insurance policy”—in case “exorbitant” tariff demands from Georgia are repeated before the so-called “Trump Route” through the Zangezur Corridor becomes fully operational.

Under these circumstances, it is Georgia that objectively finds itself interested in the fastest possible and full commissioning of the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway and ready to invest state funds in completing the project. This decision should undoubtedly be welcomed. The construction of the BTK and its reaching of full design capacity have already been excessively delayed—largely due to opposition from the “pro-Russian” Armenian lobby, which is now actively promoting the route via Ijevan and Gyumri as an “alternative” to the opening of the Zangezur Corridor.

Russia’s interest—and that of pro-Russian forces in Armenia—in this project is also transparent: unlike the so-called “Trump Route,” the implementation of the alternative railway line would assign a key role to Russian Railways (RZD), and thus ensure direct control over the infrastructure.

Naturally, like the route through the Zangezur Corridor, the restoration of the Gazakh–Ijevan–Gyumri–Kars railway will be necessary in the long term. However, it is in Georgia’s strategic interest for the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway to remain the modern and priority artery of the Middle Corridor. Türkiye and Azerbaijan are guided by the same interests.

By Vladimir Tskhvediani, Georgia, exclusively for Caliber.Az