Israel – Iran: A war without declaration Dismantling the Islamic Republic?

During the Iranian weekend, on the night from Thursday to Friday, Israel carried out a large-scale operation against Iran. The main outcome of this operation should be recognised as the creation of new trends in international politics. It is now possible to speak of the legitimisation of operations aimed at eliminating the leadership of a foreign state and destroying its infrastructure without declaring war. This precedent became legitimate for modern politics not because of any particular justifications presented. It is legitimate precisely because these actions were carried out in full coordination with the United States and a number of other Western countries. This was openly stated by President Trump.

This precedent of eliminating leadership and infrastructure continues a series of similar operations that are leading to a complete shift in the perspective of international politics. Examples include the Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon — which would hardly have been possible back in the 2010s. All this is driving a change in the concept of international relations among global players. Since, as mentioned, Israel acts in close coordination with the United States, and also in cooperation not only with other Western collective states but with Russia as well. However, it is still too early to assess the consequences of these actions. The only thing that can be said with confidence is that they were not intended to halt Iran’s nuclear program and objectively could not achieve that.

The operation may accelerate political processes in Iran

The current Israeli operation against Iran is indeed different from the previous demonstrative exchanges of strikes between the two countries. This operation is strategic and even existential in nature. Here, it makes sense to highlight three key points.

The first and key point for understanding the situation is that the current operation, even if it continues, cannot objectively stop Iran’s nuclear program. Recalling Israel’s successful experience in destroying the nuclear programs of Iraq and Syria, it should be immediately noted that in both cases it involved single facilities and essentially fully imported nuclear technology. As a result, in 1981 in Iraq and in 2007 in Syria, Israeli air forces, with the support of the United States, were able to simply bomb them. This is not possible in Iran due to the complexity and advanced development of its program.

There is no nuclear bomb in Iran because, for a long time, the Iranian leadership — primarily Supreme Leader Khamenei and his inner circle — opposed its development for various reasons. Perhaps they still do, but in the past, this was a clear and firm position. The reasons may have been diverse — some theological, others economic. Developing a compact nuclear warhead and the necessary delivery systems (there is no point in making a bomb without missiles — carriers are absolutely essential) is extremely expensive. When Pakistan’s leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto began developing nuclear weapons, he openly said that for a while they would have to “eat grass.”

Additionally, it is possible that some important external partners, such as China, urged Iran not to pursue a bomb. There could also have been domestic political reasons why the Iranian leadership avoided creating a bomb. Given the involvement of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in nuclear and missile affairs, investing in such weapons would have instantly increased the IRGC’s influence and that of its affiliated political forces, marginalising other government structures, for example.

The current operation may slow down technological processes at Iran’s nuclear facilities but accelerate political processes — specifically, the decision to cross the nuclear threshold. There is precedent for this. The IRGC tried to launch a nuclear program as early as the late 1980s, but the then Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khamenei, along with other leaders such as President Rafsanjani, opposed it. Rafsanjani bet on a “deal” and ushered the first wave of “reformists” into Iranian power. However, by the late 1990s, instead of a “deal,” Iran faced a policy of “dual containment” and witnessed firsthand the events unfolding in neighbouring Iraq and distant Yugoslavia.

After another failed attempt to reach a “deal” immediately following the events of September 11, the paradigm in Tehran shifted. The leadership likely set the goal to create the capacity and potential to quickly cross the nuclear threshold (i.e., to develop nuclear weapons) without actually doing so until given the appropriate order. It was then, in 2003, that nuclear disputes between Iran and the West began. The current situation is unclear, but there is little doubt about Iran’s ability to rapidly produce a bomb even under bombing conditions. Under such circumstances, Tehran will likely set aside the economic and domestic political arguments against developing a bomb.

Destabilising and toppling part of the political system

It is impossible to stop the Iranian state without reaching a political compromise that its opponents find unacceptable. As a result, some strategists have long considered the possibility of causing the state's collapse, believing it cannot be halted by any other means.

Indeed, a number of actions carried out even during the first phase of the current Israeli operation point in this direction. Most notably, the scale of this phase — it targeted not only, and not primarily, nuclear facilities. Various state institutions and economic infrastructure sites were destroyed — according to video evidence, very different symbolic targets were hit not just symbolically. These ranged from a local social services office in the small regional town of Qasr-e Shirin to the oil refinery in Abadan — the heart of Iran’s vital oil industry.

Given the crucial role that Iran’s social system — funded by oil revenues — plays in maintaining stability in a society accustomed to subsidies and state support, these were not mistaken strikes but deliberate attacks on the very foundations of the Iranian state’s domestic legitimacy. The same applies to the civilian population. Until now, one of the Iranian government’s unspoken strengths in the face of internal protests was the relative safety and security inside the country. Compared to the situations in Iraq, Syria, and especially Afghanistan, this was a persuasive argument for many Iranians.

The architects of the current Israeli operation appear to have deliberately sought to undermine that sense of security — even creating conditions in the capital that resemble the early stages of the Syrian government’s collapse. Some liberal media outlets reported that strikes in Tehran hit the "elite Mahallati neighbourhood," implying it is where the leadership lives. While Mahallati is indeed a relatively upscale district in the north of the city, it is not some Iranian equivalent of Russia’s Rublyovka, walled off from ordinary citizens. It is a residential area home to many people, not just top officials, and is surrounded by more modest neighbourhoods.

That’s why, domestically, this strike will be interpreted as a clear message: no one is safe.

There are certainly questions to be asked — but overall, Israel’s logic in choosing another primary target is understandable: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). So far, all of the high-ranking casualties reported are IRGC members. It’s not just the death of the IRGC's top commander, the head of the Corps' engineering division ("Khatam al-Anbiya"), and the commander of its aerospace forces — along with around 15 lower-ranking officers.

Consider this: even General Staff Chief Mohammad Bagheri is seen in the IRGC’s green uniform, not the sand-coloured uniform of the regular army. Also killed in his own home was Ali Shamkhani — one of the Islamic Republic of Iran's key strategic figures. A former IRGC Navy commander and later Defence Minister, Shamkhani served for years as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and in recent years was a senior adviser to Supreme Leader Khamenei.

This context also helps explain the targeting of Iranian nuclear scientists — as discussed earlier, the country’s nuclear programme originally grew out of the IRGC’s domain.

This focus on the IRGC also explains the timing of such a large-scale operation. Carrying it out earlier would have been too risky — hence Israeli officials' reference to it being long in the making. But now appears to be the perfect moment to strike at the IRGC, given Iran’s current political climate.

Following the death of President Raisi, the country has entered what could be described as a slow-moving second attempt at perestroika, with reformist President Pezeshkian coming to power alongside Supreme Leader Khamenei, who has traditionally been open to compromise. Iran’s reformist forces have recently pushed the IRGC to retreat from its most critical external ventures — including support for Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Assad regime — in their effort to pursue a broader deal with the West. They have also resumed negotiations over the nuclear programme.

This has significantly weakened the IRGC. Not only did it lose thousands of fighters in the Syrian campaign, but it also effectively lost Syria itself — along with its key ally in the Arab world, Hezbollah.

Another major blow to the IRGC has been its strategic miscalculation in betting on Russian support. The IRGC has long been the primary force in Iran pushing for an alliance with Moscow — repeatedly burned in the process.

Examples of this include the covert allowance of Russian forces onto Iranian airbases in 2015, a move orchestrated by the Guards; the well-known secret visits to Moscow by Qassem Soleimani; and more recently, the large-scale delivery of Iranian drones to Russia — a programme entirely overseen by the IRGC. These drone shipments, which directly linked Iran to the war in Ukraine, triggered the largest wave of domestic unrest in a decade, galvanised under the slogan “Woman, Life, Freedom.” For Iran’s reformists, this served as potent political ammunition — evidence of the IRGC’s failed policies and of the dangers inherent in deeper cooperation with Russia.

The signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement between Iran and Russia in January further exposed this imbalance. Despite Tehran supplying Moscow with valuable military assets, the agreement lacked any binding commitments to mutual defence — a provision that was included even in Russia’s recent pact with North Korea. This glaring omission underscored Iran’s weak bargaining position, and marked yet another lost round for the IRGC and its hardline allies in their foreign policy ventures.

And now, the IRGC finds itself with few viable options to respond to Israel’s assault. Russia — once seen as a potential strategic ally — has already distanced itself, condemning the “escalation” in a clear signal of its unwillingness to be drawn into Tehran’s confrontation. Meanwhile, Iran’s traditional tools of deterrence and retaliation — Hezbollah and the Assad regime — have effectively been abandoned by the Iranian government itself, in part to curb the IRGC’s regional influence and pave the way for renewed negotiations with the West.

As for the Houthis in Yemen, who have watched Tehran sideline major allies in recent years, they are unlikely to take significant risks on Iran’s behalf.

Israel, however, has now gained additional opportunities to address the “Iranian question.” First, U.S. President Trump, in his escalating struggle against the liberal elite, increasingly needs support from the Israeli leader and pro-Israel forces in the United States. Second, Israel has just neutralised Hezbollah, is making successful inroads into Syria, and has nearly dealt with the Gaza Strip.

A Libyan–Syrian scenario for Iran

It appears that the goal is to dismantle Iran’s nuclear programme along with the Islamic system of governance in the country. At present, key figures known to oppose the rollback of the nuclear programme are being systematically eliminated. After several rounds of such attacks, targeting layer after layer of newly appointed officials, it may be possible to bring down parts of the Iranian state tied to anti-Western elements. Simultaneously, by striking nuclear facilities, efforts can be made to delay the nuclear programme until Iran’s pro-Western liberal reformists agree to some sort of deal.

However, given Iran’s large pool of specialists, existing infrastructure, and stockpiled materials, even such a deal might prove insufficient — and the liberals, like the late Shah, may also become interested in acquiring nuclear weapons. A more “reliable” option, in some eyes, could be a conditional Iraq–Libya–Syria-style scenario — i.e., weakening the central government and supporting the opposition.

There are prerequisites for its implementation. There are reports of Iranian fighter jets being shot down, hundreds of Israeli aircraft entering Iranian airspace, and systematic destruction of radar and missile air defence positions. Some experts point out that the Israeli Air Force has focused much more on destroying Iranian air defences than on demolishing nuclear facilities — which have mostly only been destroyed in their ground-based parts.

If this is true, Israel and the West may be considering creating a no-fly zone over part of Iran’s territory, similar to the Iraqi scenario of the 1990s, where opposition groups could establish themselves. This would weaken the central government and fragment the country. They might try to do this in the Kurdish regions adjacent to the pro-American Iraqi Kurdistan. Kurdish groups within Iran have been considered the vanguard of the local opposition since the late 2010s — a striking example being the “Women, Life, Freedom” campaign in 2022, in which they played a leading role.

Everything seems to look quite smooth on the surface. But Iran is a country with significant strategic depth, socio-economic resilience, and a fairly developed state. Historically, it has also been consolidated; attempts to fragment it in recent history have been made repeatedly — most recently after 1979 — and each time such efforts have failed.

Therefore, the implementation of a forceful scenario against Iran—even in the most extreme case—appears risky, despite the weakening of the Iranian state in recent years. Moreover, pursuing such a forceful approach could destabilise the region and lead to unforeseen global consequences. In fact, the new trends emerging from the current operations against Iran, which we began this article with, do not contribute to lasting peace.

The only sustainable solution to the issues surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme—in the interest of peace in the Middle East—is the path of negotiations and providing security guarantees for all peoples and countries in the region within internationally recognised borders.