Are wealthy European democracies keeping their distance from Brussels?

Nine candidate countries are seeking to join the European Union, while three of Europe’s wealthiest democracies have chosen to remain outside the bloc. Iceland’s recent rejection of a proposal to resume EU accession talks has prompted experts to question whether the EU’s appeal seems to be weaker among the continent’s richest countries.

Iceland, which is wealthier and more stable than many existing EU member states, voted against reopening accession negotiations by 52.8 per cent to 47.2 per cent. The country remains part of the European Economic Area and the Schengen Area, maintaining access to the EU single market without becoming a member.

At the same time, Ukraine and Moldova have completed the screening of their legislation against EU rules. Montenegro has closed 18 of its 33 negotiating chapters and is pursuing its self-declared “28 by 28” target for membership, while Albania hopes to conclude accession talks by 2027. Expert opinions cited by Euronews have examined the reasons behind the contrasting approaches.

These candidate countries generally have lower GDP levels than Iceland, while many face greater institutional and geopolitical challenges. They are also closer to Russia, yet continue to seek EU membership, the article notes.

For candidate countries, EU membership can be transformative. “The benefits of EU membership are different for wealthy, already integrated countries,” said Tinatin Akhvlediani, head of the enlargement programme at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS).

Aspirant countries such as Ukraine and Montenegro can gain a geopolitical anchor, access to EU funding and a reform framework that makes political backsliding more difficult.

Iceland, however, already has much of the economic case covered through the EEA, while its security is underpinned by NATO membership. What remains is largely political: gaining a seat in EU institutions in exchange for pooling some national sovereignty.

“These benefits are less tangible to voters than economic convergence or democratic consolidation,” Akhvlediani said. “For countries that already have prosperity, stability and market access, the EU has to make a stronger political case for membership.”

Iceland's referendum has therefore become a test of that argument, and Akhvlediani said the EU did not make the case convincingly enough.

What pushed Icelanders away

Iceland's “yes” campaign had several arguments in its favour. The country's central bank interest rate stood at 8 per cent, compared with 2.25 per cent at the European Central Bank, while rising tensions in the Arctic intensified following Donald Trump's renewed interest in acquiring Greenland.

Those factors were not enough to secure a majority. Even security concerns, which had helped return Iceland's EU question to the political agenda, failed to close the gap.

“Security concerns helped bring Iceland’s EU question back onto the agenda, particularly given the shifting transatlantic relationship, Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and the Arctic increasingly becoming contested,” Akhvlediani said. “But security alone was not enough to win the referendum.”

The decisive issue, according to analysts, was fisheries. Around 90 per cent of Iceland's fishing companies opposed EU membership, largely because they did not want the country's waters to come under the bloc's Common Fisheries Policy.

Akhvlediani described fisheries as “not just an economic sector” in Iceland but something “closely linked to national identity.” That, she argued, helped determine the outcome.

“Voters ultimately weigh geopolitical risks against very concrete private and domestic interests. For Iceland, fisheries and sovereignty were more immediate and politically salient than the broader strategic argument for deeper European integration,” she said.

Crushed aspirations

Brussels had hoped for a different outcome. Diplomats viewed a potential Icelandic “yes” as a test of the EU's attractiveness — evidence that the bloc could appeal to wealthy, well-functioning democracies rather than primarily to countries seeking economic assistance or institutional reform.

Akhvlediani had made a similar argument before the vote, saying a “yes” would have demonstrated that the EU could attract countries beyond poorer or less stable candidates.

The rejection complicates that narrative, although she cautioned against interpreting it as a broader rejection of European integration.

“It is not good news for the enlargement narrative, but not a rejection of the European project,” she said. “The no means the EU cannot use Iceland as evidence of that additional attractiveness.”

Iceland is also not alone among Europe's wealthy non-EU countries. Norway has incorporated roughly three-quarters of EU legislation into its own laws through the EEA while remaining outside the bloc. Polling this year has shown 37 per cent support for EU membership in Norway, compared with 49 per cent opposition.

That reflects a long-standing pattern. Norwegians rejected EU membership in referendums in 1972 and 1994. Switzerland has likewise opted to deepen its bilateral relationship with the EU rather than seek membership.

Wealthy European countries have something many other candidates do not: workable alternatives to full EU membership that provide much of the economic benefit while avoiding some of the political costs associated with joining the bloc.

Enlargement plans

For countries such as Norway, and potentially other wealthy European democracies, the question is what additional value full EU membership would provide compared with the arrangements they already have.

For Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkan candidates, the answer is more apparent: security, access to funding and a framework for locking in reforms against future political backsliding.

For Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, the calculation is different. Akhvlediani does not believe the solution is to create a special membership track for wealthy democracies. Instead, she argues that Brussels needs to make a stronger case for what full membership offers.

“What Brussels can improve is how it communicates and explains the benefits of membership: political influence, participation in decision-making, deeper economic integration and strategic weight in European security architecture,” she said.

By Nazrin Sadigova