France’s vulnerability of operating one single aircraft carrier

France’s current and only aircraft carrier, the nuclear-powered Charles de Gaulle, remains Paris’ main asset for global power projection. Commissioned into service in 2001, it is the only operational carrier in a European navy today apart from the British Royal Navy’s two vessels. However, maintaining a continuous naval presence requires more than one aircraft carrier.

While the country joins the exclusive group of only eight countries in the world counting aircraft carriers in their arsenal, most members operate multiple vessels (with the exception of Russia and Spain which also count only one carrier.)

Even nuclear-powered carriers like those of the US Navy cannot remain deployed indefinitely, as they periodically need resupply of food, medical items, and other consumables. During regular maintenance or extensive overhauls, a sole carrier cannot be deployed. This was the case during the Charles de Gaulle’s midlife upgrade in 2017–2018, which left the French Navy without a deployable carrier strike group for 18 months, exposing the country to the potential of a series of vulnerabilities.

The 19FortyFive publication breaks down in one of its latest articles why investing into aircraft carriers in the future is crucial for the French state if Paris wants to honour its global commitments, which stretch  from the Atlantic and Mediterranean to the Indo-Pacific.

A French government leaflet on its Indo-Pacific policy records that 1.5 million French citizens live in the Indo-Pacific region, contributing to France having the world’s second-largest Exclusive Economic Zone. Protecting those territories is a high priority., not least because of France’s extensive Indo-Pacific network, including diplomatic and consular posts in 39 countries, and a wide array of French state agencies and research organizations present in the area. France also maintains a permanent military presence in the region. Economic interests present another crucial investment into this region, as over a third of France’s extra-EU goods trade is with Indo-Pacific nations, which has grown by 49% over the past decade.

As the article’s author argues, French strategy for maritime power projection, especially in the Pacific, hinges on sea-based air power and the ability to launch strikes under an effective air defence shield. Without an aircraft carrier strike group at sea, France’s expeditionary capability would be severely limited.

Such capability comes at a steep cost, though. The next-generation PANG (Porte-avions de nouvelle génération) aircraft carrier is expected to cost between €8–10 billion just to build. To put this into context, France’s total annual defence budget stands at around €50 billion. This price tag is substantial given other naval priorities, including modern frigates and other critical assets.

Operational costs for the carrier will further strain the defence budget—at a time when some argue that funds might be better spent on long-range anti-ship missiles, drones, or conventional systems like submarines, which offer different strategic advantages.

Despite these concerns, carrier construction supports France’s defence industry and bolsters national strategic autonomy. It fuels the nuclear and aerospace sectors and sustains shipbuilding jobs. The article also notes that investment in a new carrier would inject R&D into France’s nuclear sector, making the decision both a defence strategy and industrial policy move with wider economic and technological implications.

Although French shipyards can’t match the output of Chinese yards, being a carrier power in the Indo-Pacific—even with only one vessel—is an ambitious endeavour.

Still, like in the US and the UK, critics argue that aircraft carriers are too large, expensive, and vulnerable in an era dominated by long-range anti-ship missiles and advanced area-denial systems. Some contend that funds could be better directed toward submarines or unmanned technologies.

Nevertheless, France benefits from strong partnerships with other carrier-capable allies like the US and UK, which could provide operational support if needed.

Additionally, France possesses advanced underwater capabilities, including the Barracuda-class attack submarines and Triomphant-class ballistic missile submarines. In terms of cost-efficiency and deterrence, these platforms may offer greater value than carriers.

Despite vulnerabilities and costs associated with operating an aircraft carrier, the article’s author argues that there’s currently no substitute for the reach, staying power, and firepower of a modern aircraft carrier. For France to remain among the group of nuclear carrier powers, continued investment in carrier capability remains a strategic necessity.

By Nazrin Sadigova