How Poland, Ukraine could undermine Russia’s imperial dreams Analysis by Foreign Policy

The Foreign Policy magazine has published an article claiming that historically, both countries formed their national identities in defiance of Russian imperialism, and together they can defeat it today. Caliber.Az reprints the article.

Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine has caused unimaginable suffering for millions of people and overturned Europe’s security architecture. With little end to the fighting in sight and Ukraine’s armed forces poised to go on the offensive with more arms coming from the West, there is a silver lining to the conflict. Warsaw and Kyiv have become strong allies.

The declaration that “there’s no free Poland without a free Ukraine”—often attributed to Poland’s founding father, Jozef Pilsudski—that bound Poles and Ukrainians to stop Soviet imperialism in 1919 rings equally true today. At the time, the Red Army was planning on igniting world revolution but was stopped and turned back by Polish and Ukrainian forces.

Then, as today, the slogan proves that the notion of a Europe without a sovereign Ukraine is no longer conceivable. For Kyiv and Warsaw, the prosperity of one is pinned to the success and stability of the other. The opening lines of the two countries’ national anthems are nearly identical: “Poland/Ukraine is not yet lost,” conveying a unique characteristic of national obstinacy to survive partition, occupation, or enemy aggression. Both were penned in defiance of Russian imperialism.

Despite episodes of friendship, relations between Poles and Ukrainians in the 20th century were marked by animosity and ethnic cleansings. Soviet and Nazi German occupations turned borderlands into bloodlands, with mutual grievances and stereotypes leaving lasting scars. After 1945, the communist regime in Poland internally displaced Ukrainians to fulfill objectives set out to “resolve the Ukrainian problem once and for all.” Civilians, suspected of nationalistic tendencies, were regarded as sympathizers of “bestial” Ukrainian insurgents, who slaughtered thousands of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia in 1943-44.

Collective responsibility was applied in 1947, when more than 140,000 Ukrainians were driven from borderland regions in the southeast to postwar territories in the north and west (onetime German lands that had become part of Poland). The goal of this military operation (code name ‘Vistula’) was to destroy Ukrainian identity and culture in communist Poland.

Regime propaganda in film and literature cultivated a harmful image of Ukrainians as bloodthirsty fascists. Even though Poland was the first country, along with Canada, to recognize Ukraine’s independence in 1991, public polling showed that negative views toward Ukrainians lingered throughout the 1990s. This difficult history makes Poles’ solidarity with Ukraine today even more remarkable.

Poland knows that when given the tools and know-how, Ukraine will quickly shift from being a consumer of Western security to a critical provider of it for the Euro-Atlantic community. These like-minded anti-imperialists not only threaten to upend Russian President Vladimir Putin’s revanchist drive once and for all but are accelerating the shift of Europe’s political and military center of gravity east, something that will redefine the European Union and NATO for decades to come. The West should prepare for contingencies following the fall of Putin’s empire—one of which is a postwar Europe underpinned by a Polish-Ukrainian strategic alliance.

Nothing irritates Putin more than close relations among the nations of East Central Europe that were once part of the Soviet bloc, opposed Russian expansionism in the past, and contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union, which Putin bemoaned was the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.” Strategic measures such as the recent joint declaration by the presidents of Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine reaffirming their readiness to continue strengthening Kyiv’s defense capabilities and promoting more support in NATO and the EU drive him mad.

In his eyes, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Belarus constitute a gray zone of small states within Moscow’s sphere of influence, the so-called near abroad, that remain up for grabs in the global contest between superpowers. Putin regards their Euro-Atlantic membership and aspirations as a dangerous impediment to overcome; without keeping them under Russia’s boot, he doesn’t see a way to rebuild and expand Moscow’s influence.

It’s no surprise then that these countries are the targets of Russian cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, political meddling, and armed aggression. To counter Putin’s ambitions, they have launched various multilateral frameworks. These include the Lublin Triangle, a trilateral platform designed to build stronger political, economic, infrastructure, security, defense, and cultural links among Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine, and the Riga Format between the Baltic states and Poland. Given Hungary’s pro-Russian attitude and France and Germany’s initial wavering on helping Ukraine, these multilateral forums have eclipsed the influence and importance of previous Eastern European blocs, such as the Visegrad Group.

Strategic ties between Warsaw and Kyiv are developing pragmatically. Criticized at one time by partners as a political laggard, Poland recognized the threat posed by Putin’s neoimperialist rhetoric to Ukraine and the Euro-Atlantic alliance, in which Warsaw is securely anchored. It is Europe’s leading security entrepreneur, modernizing its armaments to meet its commitments of defending allies and deterring threats—rising to the rank of key ally against a revanchist Putin.

The outpouring of solidarity shown by everyday Poles toward Ukrainians seeking refuge from war goes without saying. Since Feb. 24, 2022, more than 9 million Ukrainians have entered Poland, with as many as 1.5 million to 2 million staying and others returning home. While millions fled to Poland seeking safety, there was no need for refugee camps. Instead of makeshift tents and temporary U.N. campgrounds common during refugee crises, Poles opened their homes to their Ukrainian neighbors. Considered an outlier by some European partners on its refugee positions in the past, Poland is now the continent’s unquestioned humanitarian giant, suggesting a sense of moral obligation that coincides with a fraternal affinity with Ukraine.

More than 1.3 million Ukrainians have received the Polish equivalent of a Social Security number, which allows them to find legal employment. They are given access to public health care, kindergartens, schools, and direct financial assistance. According to the Polish Economic Institute, between January and September 2022, 3,600 companies with Ukrainian capital and 10,200 Ukrainian sole proprietorships were established in Poland; 66 percent of the businesses surveyed declared that they would continue operating in Poland regardless of the situation in Ukraine.

Moreover, individuals returning to Ukraine after the war are likely to remember the hospitality shown to them by Poles and will be influenced not only by Russia’s war of extermination but also by positive experiences in Poland. Having been part of the workforce, a large number of adults will be able to communicate in Polish, while their children will be fluent after having spent a few months or years in Poland’s educational system. Already, the number of Ukrainians interested in learning Polish is rising (36 per cent) and will continue to do so.