How regional changes help explain Türkiye’s novel approach to PKK Article by Foreign Policy

In August, Türkiye’s parliament passed a law that will lay the ground for thousands of members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to lay down their weapons and political prisoners and exiles to return to normal life. Over the coming months, hundreds of PKK members are expected to travel to Türkiye to take advantage of the new law and reintegrate into a country that they left in order to fight it from abroad.

International politics experts note how the government’s willingness to make peace with the PKK goes beyond the political interests that the current government is pursuing and is driven by important national security concerns in light of regional realities.

The so-called National Solidarity Bill is a central legislative step in the government’s Terror-Free Türkiye initiative, aimed at ending the country’s decades-long terrorism problem. The bill was passed on August 11, with 468 lawmakers voting in favour, 88 against and six abstentions, clearing the way for the process to advance.

The legislation establishes procedures for suspending investigations, prosecutions, convictions and related legal proceedings once authorities determine that the PKK/KCK terrorist organisation and affiliated groups have ended their armed activities and surrendered their weapons.

The measure provides the legal mechanism for handling cases linked to membership in, aiding or promoting the terrorist organisation, as well as certain crimes committed as part of its activities and terrorism-financing offences carried out in its favour.

This was unimaginable only a few years ago, when Türkiye and the PKK were locked in a conflict that stretched across Türkiye, Iraq and Syria. Now, for the first time in 30 years of on-and-off negotiations between the PKK and the Turkish state, a legal basis for the end of armed conflict exists.

While opposition voices have argued that Ankara pushed the initiative in order to "extract domestic political benefit", an article by the Foreign Policy magazine explains why understanding the government’s international and regional outlook, shaped by the dynamic power developments in its neighbourhood, is crucial to gaining a better understanding of this policy.

According to its analysis, the main drivers behind Türkiye’s policy towards the PKK lie beyond the country’s borders. The piece points to "a cascading series of events that began with Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, attacks on Israel and led through the destruction of Hezbollah, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024, and the current war with Iran."

This view echoes what Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and Erdogan’s coalition partner, stated earlier this year, acknowledging that "the fire that began in Gaza spread to Lebanon, extended its shadow over Syria, reached Iraq, and ultimately produced a shock wave that penetrated the heart of Iran.”

The outlet’s analysis recalls how, in October 2024, shortly before the rebel assault that brought down Assad, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan spoke at the opening of parliament. In his speech, he warned that “Israel’s next target will be Türkiye” and called for the “strengthening of the home front.”

On the very same day, Bahceli shook hands with pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party representatives in parliament—something that he had previously refrained from doing with members of a party that he had called to be banned on multiple occasions. This action alone immediately sparked talk of a new peace process between Türkiye and the Kurds.

As the foreign policy journal argues, Erdogan’s domestic political concerns play a complicated role in the equation regarding the PKK. While the article acknowledges that he, naturally, will hope to secure Kurdish support for a new term in office, any concessions to the PKK or the Kurdish movement risk provoking an intense nationalist backlash at the same time.

"Indeed, it was precisely the same fears that led to the collapse of the last significant peace process between the two sides more than 10 years ago. In this context, Bahceli himself has often taken the lead in publicly promoting the process, working to overcome the delays by pushing for several measures that the government had been slow to implement," the article recalls.

The paper continues by highlighting that the argument of "fortifying the home front" against threats from abroad and threats by Israel, which have been openly voiced multiple times by Tel Aviv against the backdrop of the war in Gaza and the Lebanese conflict, has emerged as a central organising concept across the Turkish government’s public messaging.

While the Turkish government’s support for the Palestinian cause is driven by ideology for Erdogan, Foreign Policy argues that the widening instability in the region—and its implications for Kurdish aspirations—is a unifying concern for the entire Turkish political and security establishment.

By Nazrin Sadigova