How Trump’s tariffs could push India closer to China Foreign Affairs insight

A recent analysis in Foreign Affairs highlights the delicate balancing act India faces between Beijing and Washington, showing how U.S. policy under President Donald Trump could unintentionally reshape Asian geopolitics. Five years after deadly border clashes with China, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Tianjin for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit marked a thaw in Sino-Indian relations. Images of Modi smiling and interacting closely with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin sparked Western speculation that India was succumbing to Chinese influence in response to Trump’s aggressive tariffs. However, Foreign Affairs contends that this interpretation misses the deeper strategic calculus: India is not pivoting toward China out of necessity, but rather cautiously recalibrating a longstanding rivalry while safeguarding national interests.

The article traces the evolution of India-China relations since 2020, beginning with incremental steps to reduce border tensions. Modi and Xi’s bilateral meeting at the 2024 BRICS summit led to troop disengagement and subsequent border talks, with China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi visiting New Delhi in 2025. Beyond security, both nations have explored economic and cultural reengagement: reopening pilgrimages, restoring tourist visas, resuming direct flights, and reviving civil society exchanges. India is also considering selective economic collaboration, particularly in sectors where Chinese technology or investment could enhance domestic manufacturing, create jobs, or reduce long-term import dependence. Yet, sensitive sectors such as telecommunications, strategic technologies, and critical infrastructure remain off-limits.

Foreign Affairs underscores that these conciliatory gestures do not signal a shift from rivalry to partnership. Border disputes remain unresolved, and China continues leveraging India’s economic dependencies—from rare-earth magnet exports to water resource management and military support for Pakistan. India, aware of this, maintains strategic hedges: it continues to cultivate relationships with East and Southeast Asian nations, uphold its position on Taiwan, and resist anti-Western blocs promoted by Beijing. Modi’s careful avoidance of trilateral China-Russia-India summits and selective participation in BRICS initiatives further illustrates New Delhi’s determination to retain autonomy.

The Trump administration, according to the analysis, complicates India’s calculations. Aggressive tariffs and a perceived tilt toward Beijing weaken U.S.-India cooperation, undermining the strategic partnership that had been developed to counter China. Indian policymakers see the coercive approach as destabilizing, increasing incentives to engage with China to preserve economic growth and regional security. Corporate India, in particular, is lobbying for eased restrictions on Chinese investments, a pressure point that could realign India’s economic engagement in ways contrary to U.S. objectives.

Ultimately, Foreign Affairs frames the dilemma as a lose-lose scenario for the United States. Persisting tensions with Washington may prompt India to hedge further with China, diversify partnerships, and limit cooperation with American businesses and government initiatives. The article concludes that while Modi’s engagement with Beijing reflects pragmatic diplomacy rather than alignment, U.S. policy under Trump risks undermining the very partnership that had positioned India as a counterweight to China, potentially reshaping the strategic landscape in Asia.

By Vugar Khalilov