ISW: Russia fails to counter Ukraine's partisan attacks

The US-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW) said in its most recent report that effective Ukrainian partisan attacks are forcing the Kremlin to divert resources away from frontline operations to help secure rear areas, degrading Russia’s ability to defend against ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensives, let alone conduct their own offensive operations. Poor Russian operational security has enabled Ukrainian partisan attacks. Russia’s increasing manpower shortages are likely degrading Russian forces’ ability to effectively secure Russian rear areas against partisan attacks and simultaneously defend against Ukrainian counteroffensives. The Kremlin still has not effectively countered Ukraine’s organized partisan movement and is unlikely to have the capabilities to do so.

Russian forces have so far failed to neutralize Ukraine’s organized partisan movement as of November 2022 and are unlikely to possess the capability to do so. Ukrainian partisans began targeting pro-Russian Ukrainian collaborators and Russian personnel less than one week after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24. Ukrainian partisans have conducted dozens of confirmed attacks across occupied Ukraine and have assassinated at least 11 Russian occupation officials and prominent collaborators as of November 1.

Poor Russian operational security has enabled Ukrainian partisan attacks. Russian forces have not effectively concealed the identities of pro-Russian collaborators and have failed to provide basic security to Russian occupation officials at their homes and places of work. Russian forces have failed to protect vulnerable sections of critical Russian ground lines of communication, such as rail line junctures and bridges, particularly in rural areas. Ukrainian partisans freely collect targeting information on Russian military and occupation authority targets and pass this information to other partisans and the conventional Ukrainian military.  

Russian sources have openly criticized the Kremlin’s failure to provide additional security against Ukrainian partisan attacks in occupied Ukraine. Prominent Russian milblogger (military blogger) Alexander Kots suggested that Russian occupation authorities are not taking Ukrainian partisan attacks seriously—comparing Ukrainian partisans to insurgents of the Chechen wars of the 1990s. Kots advocated for Russian forces to begin an “anti-terrorism campaign” in Ukraine alongside Russia’s existing “denazification” and “demilitarization” efforts on August 25. Russian milblogger Rybar criticized Russian occupation forces’ failure to take the initiative in the information space, including against “information operations” about Ukrainian partisan attacks. Russian state media largely ignores these attacks and sometimes falsely frames them as conventional Ukrainian military attacks to downplay the effects of partisan warfare in Russian-occupied territory.

Russia’s increasing manpower shortages are degrading Russian forces’ ability to effectively secure their rear areas against partisan attacks. Russian forces occupy approximately 85,300 square kilometres of mainland Ukrainian territory, excluding Crimea, as of November 1. Russian manpower shortages are inhibiting efforts to secure this area. Ukrainian intelligence reported on October 28 that the Russian military has concentrated 40,000 personnel—most of Russia’s remaining conventional forces—in Russian-occupied Kherson Oblast, where Russia occupies roughly 23,000 square kilometres.

The Russian military’s prioritization of Kherson Oblast has likely degraded Russian security forces in Zaporizhia (a notable hotbed of partisan activity), Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts. Partisan attacks have persisted in Russian-occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts even following Russia’s annexation of those regions on September 30, indicating Russian forces continued inability to secure occupied territory.

Ukrainian partisan attacks have diverted Russian resources away from the front line to help secure rear areas, degrading Russian capabilities to defend against Ukrainian counteroffensives, let alone conduct their own offensive operations. Russian occupation authorities have tasked Rosgvardia and Federal Security Service (FSB) special forces elements—elements that have participated in combat operations in Ukraine—to conduct rear security in occupied Ukraine. Moscow reportedly deployed unspecified special anti-partisan elements to Kherson City in response to partisan attacks targeting occupation officials at an unspecified time before June 12. Russia deployed special Rosgvardia police units to provide security in occupied Starobilsk, Luhansk Oblast on August 22. The Russian Interior Ministry sent personnel from St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast to conduct patrols in Starobilsk, Shchastya, and Stanystia Luhanska in Luhansk Oblast to “prevent and suppress provocations to destabilize the situation at an unknown time before August 23.” Russian sources also confirmed that Russian Spetsnaz detachments, possibly from the FSB Special Purpose Center, conducted spot checks and other law enforcement tasks in formerly occupied Kharkiv Oblast on August 24.

Elements of Rosgvardia, FSB special forces, and Russian private military companies—notably the Wagner Group—also serve as part of Russia’s frontline combat power in Ukraine. These elements’ participation in rear area security precludes them from participating in combat operations. Ukrainian officials have explicitly stated that Ukrainian partisans aim to exhaust Russian forces and force Russia to redirect frontline forces toward occupied territory.