Macron stumbles: Local resistance threatens New Caledonia’s Bougival Accord Analysis by The Lowy Institute
In a dramatic unfolding of political tension in the South Pacific, New Caledonia’s local Congress has highlighted the fragility of France’s authority over the territory, revealing deep divisions over the Bougival Accord and casting doubt on President Emmanuel Macron’s plans for the region. Despite months of careful negotiation and high-level diplomacy, the latest congressional vote has exposed eroding support for France’s strategy to grant the territory greater autonomy, demonstrating that local resistance continues to shape the island’s political future.
Caliber.Az presents an adapted version of a detailed analysis published by the Australian think tank, The Lowy Institute.
Despite sustained efforts by the French government to build local support for a referendum scheduled for March 2026, designed to implement the Bougival Accord granting New Caledonia enhanced autonomy within France, the December 8, 2025, vote in the territory’s Congress revealed sharp and widening divisions. The vote delivered only minimal endorsement, signalling that backing for the Accord, originally signed in June, has weakened substantially.

Initially, Macron had envisaged a national constitutional amendment preceding the referendum. However, with declining support in New Caledonia and no clear parliamentary majority in France to secure approval from both legislative houses for constitutional change, the French government reversed the timeline. The revised plan now calls for the referendum to be legislated directly for 15 March, coinciding with municipal elections, while deferring the more complex constitutional amendment to a later date.
Support for the Bougival Accord was already fragile. Only one month after its signing, the core independence coalition, the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS), withdrew support. Additional groups, including the Customary Senate, the major Kanak union, and the Kanak Protestant Church, publicly rejected the Accord.
The French government’s decision to postpone overdue local elections until June 2026 further inflamed opposition across New Caledonia. As the vote approached, even moderate parties previously aligned with the Accord—including one loyalist party and two moderate independence groups—raised concerns. Mayors across the territory also opposed holding the referendum concurrently with national municipal elections.
To bolster support, France delayed the vote by one week and made several concessions. In a significant move addressing FLNKS demands, FLNKS President Christian Tein, previously arrested and deported to metropolitan France over alleged involvement in 2024 unrest, was allowed to return to New Caledonia. Additionally, Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu dispatched a delegation led by Thierry Lataste, a respected negotiator of the 1998 Noumea Accord, to engage with local stakeholders and explore modifications to the Bougival Accord that could secure broader backing.

Nevertheless, France’s National Assembly, lacking a natural majority and facing evident local reluctance, is unlikely to pass enabling legislation for the referendum without substantial difficulty. In a further effort to encourage compliance, the French government announced €22 billion in economic aid over five years, tied to local economic reforms and an increased financial contribution from the territory.
The Congress debate underscored persistent divisions over New Caledonia’s future. FLNKS speakers, who voted against the referendum, denounced the Bougival Accord as imposed by France and referenced violent episodes from the 1980s and Macron’s 2024 unilateral changes to voter eligibility, which had sparked months of unrest. Two moderate independence parties abstained, citing unresolved questions regarding Kanak identity and the path to full sovereignty, and challenging the French government’s procedural reversal. The loyalist party Calédonie Ensemble abstained as well, questioning the legal basis of a referendum without prior constitutional change, while the small influential party Éveil Océanien abstained, advocating consensus and caution over the referendum under the current circumstances.

The resulting tally from New Caledonia’s 54-member Congress was stark: only 19 pro-France members supported the referendum, all 14 FLNKS members opposed it, and 19 members from various parties abstained. While the official count nominally favored the referendum 19 to 14, the high number of abstentions demonstrated that a majority of members harbored strong reservations—reminiscent of the 2021 independence referendum, which returned a decisive rejection of independence largely due to an independence-party boycott, leaving a deep political impasse.
France’s National Assembly, still lacking a natural majority and with crucial socialist partners essential for passing the national budget already voicing opposition, faces formidable challenges in legislating the referendum. The debate signals that Paris would be prudent to engage in further consultations, modifying the Bougival Accord to build genuine, broad-based support—or ideally, a consensus—to ensure enduring stability in New Caledonia.







