Moscow and Yerevan are calibrating the situation Pashinyan on an imperial throne?

Recently, the issue of Armenia's participation in upcoming events within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has emerged in discussions about Russian-Armenian relations. It was revealed that Armenia, currently holding the presidency of the EAEU, requested that the organization's summit, scheduled for December 25, be moved from Yerevan to St. Petersburg. This request was granted, as announced by Russian Presidential aide Yuri Ushakov at a briefing. Exactly one month from now, we will witness Pashinyan presiding over the summit, potentially in a palace or hall once used by figures such as Catherine the Great, Alexander I, or Nicholas II.

However, not everyone in Armenia was enthused by this prospect. Seizing the opportunity, the Kocharyan-led "Armenia" bloc made its voice heard. "This is the second EAEU summit not being held in Armenia while the country is chairing the organization this year. This is a problem for our country's reputation," stated Arthur Khachatryan, a representative of the bloc, during a briefing. In this case, the opposition member clearly overstepped his loyalty to Russia. Moscow remains unfazed by Yerevan's whims on the matter. After all, why irritate the pro-Western part of the electorate over such a trivial issue? The location of the summit is not of major importance, and Russia is a sufficiently mature power not to be swayed by such cheap symbolism. For Moscow, the more important factor is Armenia’s participation itself.

However, while Armenia may have pragmatic reasons—such as a significant increase in trade turnover with Russia in the first half of this year (which grew two and a half times)—for not ignoring economic meetings, it is compelled to take a more categorical stance when it comes to participating in CSTO gatherings. It has been announced that Armenia will not attend the CSTO summit in Astana on November 28.

It would be incorrect to attribute this behaviour solely to Pashinyan's pro-Western leanings (though that is certainly part of the picture). The key issue here seems to be the desire not to alienate Armenia's pro-Western electorate, which has been steadily growing. It is no secret that there is widespread dissatisfaction in Armenia with this military-political bloc, mainly because it was seen as failing to protect the country during its war with Azerbaijan. The point here is not that the expectation of CSTO intervention was entirely realistic, but rather that any association of Armenia with this organization stirs anger within the country. This, in turn, could harm the popularity of the current prime minister, whose standing is already far from lofty.

Moscow is also demonstrating sensitivity on this matter. As Yuri Ushakov stated at the briefing: "Russia respects Armenia’s independent course, having suspended active participation in the CSTO. However, Yerevan remains a member of the organization, with all corresponding rights and obligations, and the doors to all CSTO events remain open. We hope that Armenian representatives will, sooner or later, resume their cooperation within the framework of the organization."

At the same time, Arthur Khachatryan, as mentioned above, shows no signs of backing down. "Membership in the CSTO is not like a chicken in the freezer that can be frozen and then thawed," he said. In this case, the pro-Russian Armenian hastily tried to appear more "Russian" than the Russians themselves, since, as we noted earlier, the Kremlin took a calm approach to Armenia's suspension of participation in the CSTO. This is not surprising for two reasons: first, Moscow finds it more beneficial to deal with a conditionally "multi-vector" Pashinyan rather than openly pro-Western forces. Secondly, and more importantly, Russia’s military presence in Armenia is ensured not by the CSTO, but by bilateral agreements, including the operation of the Russian military base in Gyumri. Thus, the analogy of a chicken being frozen and thawed actually quite accurately describes Armenia's relationship with the CSTO.

In this context, a far more significant development deserves attention: " Due to urgent work matters, the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) of Armenia,  Kristinne Grigoryan, did not participate in the meeting of the heads of security and intelligence agencies from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries held in Moscow Tuesday [November 26-ed.]," the Armenian agency reported, adding that a representative from the service attended the meeting, though their name was not disclosed.

This is truly a more serious signal. Armen Grigoryan, who oversees security issues in Armenia, is considered a direct and uncompromising representative of the West, which is evident in his and his subordinates' disregard for events and processes within the framework of the CIS.

In the end, we have the following picture: Armenia is deeply economically tied to Russia, but when it comes to security, the Western influence is tightening its grip on the country. What will this growing asymmetry lead to? And, most importantly, when? These are perhaps the central questions arising from the current situation.