South Korean shipbuilders try to secure order for future Canadian submarines 19FortyFive lays out why they aren’t built for Canada

The Royal Canadian Navy is currently evaluating options to acquire 12 new conventionally powered attack submarines to replace its aging Victoria-class fleet—a government-declared priority. Among the proposals under consideration are South Korea’s KSS-III, Japan’s Taigei class, Spain’s S-80 Plus, France’s Scorpène by Naval Group, and Germany’s U212/214 by TKMS. Earlier this month, reports emerged that three South Korean firms had joined forces to present a bold proposal to the Canadian military: between CAN$20 and $24 billion (roughly US$14 to $17 billion) in submarines, which is being backed by the South Korean government, which seeks to expand the base of global operators using military equipment and platforms developed and manufactured in the country.

Despite being bordered by three oceans, an article by the 19FortyFive publication establishes that Canada has long failed to act like a maritime power. Now, with the previous Trudeau administration finally acknowledging the urgent need to replace the outdated Victoria-class subs, a major procurement effort is at last taking shape.

The article argues that submarines are more than naval assets—they are tools of diplomacy and deterrence. They can show resolve, gather intelligence, strengthen defences, and, if necessary, block adversaries from vital waters. As threats mount in the Arctic, North Atlantic, and North Pacific, Canada urgently needs robust underwater capabilities. The question now is whether South Korea’s submarines are the right fit—and whether Canada should make the leap.

South Korea’s KSS-III (Dosan Ahn Changho class) submarine is a technologically advanced, diesel-electric vessel with air-independent propulsion, a 3,400-ton displacement, and impressive blue-water range—making it a tempting option for Canada as it seeks to replace its aging Victoria-class submarines. For a country without a domestic submarine-building capacity, buying off-the-shelf from a democratic ally appears cost-effective and convenient. However, the article warns that deeper analysis reveals several critical strategic, operational, and industrial concerns that complicate the appeal.

Submarines are more than naval hardware; they are strategic assets that must integrate with a nation’s defense doctrine, geography, and allied partnerships. Canada’s maritime environment is vastly different from Korea’s. While South Korea designs its submarines for coastal scenarios in the Yellow and East China Seas, Canada must operate across the Arctic, North Atlantic, and North Pacific—vast, frigid, and unforgiving waters where NATO anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations are increasingly vital. Canadian submarines must be interoperable with U.S. and NATO systems, down to the software, sensors, and logistics chain. South Korea’s platforms, though advanced, are not designed with Five Eyes or NATO integration in mind.

Canadian shortcomings

The article points out that Canada also faces a long-standing strategic identity problem. It has often treated defence procurement as a cost to be minimised, rather than an investment in national power. Choosing South Korea’s KSS-III might look financially prudent, but it risks being a strategic misfit—more a budgetary decision than one aligned with Canada’s geopolitical needs.

Industrial concerns add further complexity. Canada’s defence procurement record is plagued with delays and cost overruns. Any foreign-built submarine must offer long-term lifecycle support, supply chain compatibility, and economic benefits like tech transfers or in-country maintenance. South Korea has never exported a KSS-III submarine, and no Canadian infrastructure currently exists to support it. Maintaining such vessels over decades could prove logistically and financially untenable.

How competing offers compare

According to the article, the alternative options have their own drawbacks. Japan’s Soryu and Taigei class submarines, while air-independent propulsion (AIP)-equipped and technologically sophisticated, face similar interoperability challenges as South Korea’s offerings. Their systems are not optimised for seamless integration into NATO or Five Eyes networks, posing long-term operational hurdles. Australia’s AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine initiative is another option in theory, but remains years from delivery, cost-prohibitive, and nuclear-powered—rendering it politically and logistically unsuitable for Canada’s current needs. Sweden’s Blekinge-class submarines, though advanced and well-suited to littoral operations, lack the endurance and blue-water capabilities necessary for Canada’s vast oceanic responsibilities in both the Atlantic and Pacific theatres.

Conversely, Germany’s Type 212CD submarines—designed for Arctic conditions and already selected by Norway—stand out as a strong contender. These boats are built for NATO compatibility and proven under cold-water operational demands. This makes them well-matched to Canada’s strategic needs in terms of interoperability, regional adaptability, and logistical support. France, too, the author argues, remains a viable option, with the Scorpène-class submarines offering similar integration potential, though possibly requiring greater customisation.

Among the field of competitors, the author argues that these European partners present the best balance of capability, alliance compatibility, and support structure. The South Korean KSS-III, for all its merits, ultimately remains a mismatch for Canada’s specific strategic and operational requirements.

By Nazrin Sadigova