Survey uncovers what Russians really think about Ukraine conflict

The findings of a recent survey among Russian society have revealed that the majority worry about financial stability and uncertainty of the future, while at the same time regarding the invasion of Ukraine as having strengthened the country's standing in the world. The Times newspaper has published the results of this survey and what this tells about the Western understanding of the internal dynamics in Russia. Caliber.Az reprints this article.

"Many misunderstandings about Russia derive from a long-term reluctance in the West to grapple with how Russians see the world. There is a temptation to view the Russian information space as mere propaganda, not helped by a tendency to prioritise the thoughts of Muscovite liberals over more representative research.

Now, however, some Russian and Ukrainian organisations are trying to engage more robustly with Russian public opinion, using a combination of online polling, search engine results, focus groups and ethnographic approaches to build a more sophisticated picture of what people think. The results from organisations such as Russian Field and Chronicles do not tally with binary stereotypes of all Russians as either fascist automatons or repressed Westernisers dreaming of a Eurocentric future. What they do show, increasingly, is mounting concern among Russians about the impact of the war in Ukraine on their personal circumstances.

Most Russians still see their country as a great power

Two polling organisations – Levada Centre and Open Minds Institute [OMI] — have reported respectively that 74% and 79% of Russians are struggling with financial troubles caused by the conflict, which President Putin began in February last year. Anxiety over the deterioration of their financial situation rose 18 percentage points between May and September this year, according to OMI, and this anxiety affects pro and anti-war Russians fairly equally. The difference is that war supporters still have very hopeful views for the future and regard these economic troubles as temporary blips, while war opponents do not. Faith in Russian greatness, not the evidence of present struggles, is the key determinant of optimism, it would seem.

For many this faith is deeply entrenched. OMI has conducted several online polls on the question of Russia’s future. The most recent findings, weighted by age, sex and geography, indicate that most Russians see their country as an innately great power, with a right to assert its might over other countries. More than 60% believe that Russia will maintain a hegemonic position after President Putin. More than half [53%] think that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has bolstered its international standing and that other countries will now take Russian demands more seriously. These assertions challenge the mainstream Western assumption that the war has revealed to the population the country’s manifold weaknesses and shown Putin to be all emperor, no clothes.

The findings make bleak reading for anyone hoping to dislodge Russian support, or even acceptance, of the war. Anti-war liberal Russians are largely passive and express limited belief in their ability to effect change. Conversely, hawkish Russians report high levels of political agency, and are liable to dismiss negative consequences of the war as acceptable sacrifices on the path to national self-realisation. Underpinning both positions is a deficit of imagination on how a different path for Russia might be better, or indeed possible. When asked about the qualities of any future leader, most people described a politician similar to Putin, albeit a bit more caring. It is as if the terms “leader” and Putin have become synonymous.

Deep-rooted contempt towards the West

Few Russians of any persuasion are inclined towards a Western path. When asked to express their preferences for a post-Putin government, a strong majority opted for democracy, yet at the same time a “pro-Western” direction was the least desirable category — behind even totalitarianism. What may appear paradoxical is perhaps rather an expression of the Kremlin’s assertion that Russia does have its own kind of democracy, and that it enacts the Russian people’s wishes on a global stage. The attitude towards the West is unlikely to improve given the mass exodus of liberals since the war in Ukraine began. Moreover, anti-Western beliefs are not solely the result of propaganda or ignorance: many Russians simply disagree with Western cultural values, just as many in the West do, but also because of resentment rooted in the country’s brutal transition to a market economy in the 1990s in which millions were impoverished.

Rather than admiring or envying our achievements, there is a widespread contempt for the West that pulses through Russian politics. It is a common mantra among Russians that their values are superior, more spiritual and less material and individualistic than Euro-Atlantic values. This is a perception that the Russian Orthodox Church works hard to reinforce. 

Russians are also very concerned about stability. The FSB, the main successor agency to the KGB, enjoys an even higher trust rating than the church, behind only the Russian army and Putin himself. These institutions, backed by propaganda, have successfully exploited Russians’ sense of superiority, with the Kremlin feeding a societal desire for Russia to be feared, envied and respected around the world. As a result, evidence that Russia may be feared but not respected can sometimes fuel anger and aggression.

Difficulty of changing civilians’ opinions

On the battlefield, Russian troops have been repeatedly confronted by evidence that Russian military superiority is a myth. Their resulting frustration or sense of betrayal partially explains the nihilistic cruelty unleashed against Ukrainian civilians from Bakhmut to Bucha. On a recent trip to the borders of Kharkiv and Donetsk regions, in east Ukraine, villagers told me numerous stories of Russians deliberately destroying the nicest houses in the neighbourhood, as if taking revenge for the Kremlin’s lies about Ukrainians’ inferior living standards.
Twenty months into the war, it is not that Russians can’t know these truths. It’s more that many don’t want to accept them, because then they will have to do something about it.

Most have access to accurate information. Daily, 60% of the Russian population uses the encrypted social media platform Telegram to follow news channels. They can read a wide range of opposition and foreign Russian-language media, but the most popular political channels are pro-war. In Kyiv, the head of Ukraine’s defence intelligence, General Kyrylo Budanov, expressed his exasperation to me at the many Western commentators concluding Ukraine can’t win. He recognises that public opinion inside his enemy’s borders can still play an important role in the outcome. Few Russians are pro-Western liberals, but most aren’t genocidal maniacs either. Rather they are ordinary people, often indifferent to Ukrainian suffering, and keen to consume myths of their own greatness that justify the sacrifices they have to make to sustain the war effort.

To change those opinions, you need to change the facts as people experience them. Online search data shows that Russians are more likely to think critically of the regime or look for opposition movements when their own loved ones are at risk of conscription. Ukraine’s brief counteroffensive last year also had an impact: support for the war dropped inside Russia in response to Moscow’s retreats from Kherson and Kharkiv. This year, hampered by the West’s failure to provide promised F-16s and air defence systems, Ukrainians are bringing the war to Russians’ homes, via drone attacks on Russian territory, assassinations, and direct micro-targeting of soldiers’ families.
Coddled by excuses for their nation’s failings, Russians can tell themselves that nothing depends on them, everything will be OK in the end, and the people at the top know best. This inertia is the result of a deliberate depoliticisation of the Russian public space over the last 20 years that has worked well for the Kremlin.

Making Russians think twice about sacrifices

Ukraine’s task — and that of its allies — is to disrupt that comforting lie by forcing Russians to see the grim reality of what the war means for Russians. That approach appears to be having an effect. Recent Levada Centre polling shows that nearly half [45%] of women are worried about mobilisation, compared with 18% of men. This unusual discrepancy perhaps reflects Ukrainian success targeting the wives and mothers of serving Russian soldiers on social media to show them how badly their men are treated in the army. Likewise, 91% of Russians express fear about Ukrainian drone attacks and shelling. So far, Putin’s main response has been to duck responsibility by tasking governors with defending their regions from Ukrainian attacks. The Ukrainian drones are inflaming anxieties that the Kremlin is unable to assuage, leaving Russians feeling unprotected.

There are no grounds to suspect that Russians’ exposure to the horror of war will turn them against the myth of Russian greatness. But it might make them think twice before they agree to die for it, or push them to look for other ways to perform their superiority, in turn placing pressure on a Kremlin that cannot meet this demand. This will be a long war with an uncertain outcome but, as is becoming clear, Ukrainians will not allow Russians to pretend it is just a special military operation happening somewhere else".