What lies behind Yemeni Houthis' restraint in joining wider conflict

Since the United States and Israel launched major airstrikes against Iran on February 28, Tehran-aligned militias in countries such as Iraq and Lebanon have intensified their retaliatory attacks. Yet nearly two weeks later, one of Iran’s most capable regional partners — Yemen’s Houthi movement — has not entered the conflict. Although the group has deployed missile launchers along the Red Sea and warned that its “fingers are on the trigger,” it has so far refrained from launching strikes.

The Houthis’ relative restraint amid escalating regional tensions has puzzled many analysts. However, while some observers find the lack of military response surprising, others see it as part of a broader strategy orchestrated by Tehran. Security analyst Nadwa Al-Dawsari argues that the group’s inaction reflects deliberate planning by Iran. In an article for the Washington-based Middle East Institute, she writes that the Houthis’ restraint "reflects a strategic calculation by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)."

As Al-Dawsari notes, decisions about when and how to intervene are coordinated through the Axis of Resistance Joint Operations Room, overseen by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’s Quds Force, which manages Iran’s foreign military operations, intelligence activities and unconventional warfare networks.

In response to the US–Israeli campaign, Iran has expanded the confrontation across numerous countries in the region, including several Gulf states and neighbouring Azerbaijan, targeting energy facilities and other civilian and military sites.

"For Tehran, the overriding objective is regime survival," Al-Dawsari argues, suggesting that Iran’s leadership hopes to increase the economic and political costs of the war by widening and prolonging the conflict. The strategy, she says, is to apply sustained pressure that could eventually compel Washington to seek an off-ramp.

Unnamed sources told the author that there are disagreements among IRGC operatives working with the Houthis inside Yemen. Some advocate entering the conflict immediately, while others believe the group should be preserved for a later and more decisive stage.

Al-Dawsari suggests this caution stems partly from fears within both the IRGC and the Houthis that renewed involvement could expose the group to another wave of sustained US military strikes. She recalls that airstrikes carried out by the United States and Israel during Operation Rough Rider inflicted heavy losses on the Houthis, killing senior commanders and missile and drone specialists, disrupting communications and command structures, and destroying important military infrastructure. Particularly significant was the killing of Mohammed al-Ghamari, the Houthis’ top military leader and a key liaison with the IRGC.

Despite those setbacks, the Houthis managed to withstand the bombing campaign and avoided the level of leadership decapitation and organizational disruption suffered by Hezbollah during Israeli operations. Since then, the Iran-backed Yemeni movement has focused on regrouping and rebuilding its military capabilities.

"Given Israel’s renewed, high-tempo campaign to militarily neutralize Hezbollah, and as the Iraqi militias themselves come under intense suppressive airstrikes, the Houthis are now Iran’s last major proxy standing and best positioned to restore Iran’s regional leverage. As such, the Houthis are not only Iran’s final line of defence but potentially also the IRGC’s strategic lifeline should the Islamic Republic regime itself collapse," the article states.

Over the past decade, the Quds Force has helped the Houthis establish an increasingly sophisticated military-industrial and smuggling network. This system allows the group to produce certain weapons domestically while sourcing components through global procurement channels and illicit trade routes.

Maintaining this infrastructure is considered critical for Iran as it seeks to strengthen its asymmetric influence across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. The Houthis’ position inside Yemen and their ability to project power in surrounding waters form a central pillar of this network.

Beyond providing Tehran with a capable proxy force, the infrastructure also offers a platform for influencing maritime routes that connect the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Europe. Escalating the conflict prematurely could therefore expose and jeopardize this system.

For these reasons, the Houthis may represent far more than just another Iranian proxy. They may instead be Iran’s most strategically positioned regional partner, one that Tehran is likely to deploy carefully and selectively. 

"Their eventual entry into the conflict may therefore say less about the Houthis’ own ambitions and more about Tehran’s assessment of how the war is unfolding," Al-Dawsari writes.

Exactly when and how the Houthis will respond remains uncertain. What appears clearer, however, is that their actions will likely be determined by Tehran’s evolving strategy rather than purely local calculations in Sana’a.

As long as Iran believes it can impose economic and political pressure on the United States and its allies through broader regional escalation, the Houthis may remain largely on standby. Nevertheless, analysts agree in their warning that the longer the conflict continues, the greater the likelihood that the group will be drawn more directly into the fighting.

By Nazrin Sadigova