While eyes were on Greenland, Russian ambitions in Norwegian-controlled Svalbard brew

Tensions between the United States and Denmark over Greenland have recently taken center stage in Arctic geopolitics, raising alarms over regional security. Although the dispute has cooled in recent months, the diplomatic row has already triggered ripple effects beyond Greenland—namely, by emboldening Russia to assert itself more forcefully in the Norwegian-controlled Svalbard Archipelago.

According to a detailed analysis by GIS Reports Online, Moscow appears to have seized upon the American discourse around Greenland’s strategic value as a cue to ramp up its own claims in Svalbard. Positioned about 1,000 kilometers from Norway’s northernmost city of Tromsø and halfway to the North Pole, the area historically remained on the periphery of global attention.

That changed, however, as Arctic ice receded, exposing new opportunities for energy resource extraction. Russia has consistently accused Norway of exploiting its position to dominate access to the continental shelf surrounding Svalbard. But the analysis emphasizes that these resource disputes are secondary. The central issue lies in Svalbard’s location, which offers even more strategic leverage than Greenland.

Much attention has been paid to the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap—an important maritime chokepoint separating the Norwegian Sea from the broader Atlantic. In a crisis scenario, Russian ballistic missile submarines would need to navigate this narrow corridor. As the article highlights, control of Svalbard, particularly Bear Island at its southern end, would give NATO superior visibility over these routes and thus a crucial military advantage.

Moscow fears that Norway and its NATO allies might eventually militarize the archipelago, utilizing its limited infrastructure to support alliance operations. The airfield at Longyearbyen, the main settlement on Spitsbergen, could serve as a staging ground for strike aircraft and surveillance missions over the Barents Sea and Russia’s Novaya Zemlya—home to strategic missile testing facilities. Advanced radar and air defense systems could also be deployed there to protect allied assets.

As a founding NATO member, Norway is generally assumed to benefit from robust U.S. backing in any potential confrontation. However, GIS Reports Online raises the possibility that this assumption may be less reliable than believed. The report speculates about a hypothetical bargain in which Washington informally concedes influence over Svalbard to Russia in return for a freer hand in Greenland.

“Although President Trump’s approach may encourage speculation,” the report notes, “active coordination isn’t even required. If President Putin perceives a lack of U.S. resolve, he may be tempted to test NATO’s boundaries.” A Russian move on Svalbard would force the alliance to confront a direct challenge to Article 5 and determine how firmly its collective defense commitments hold. As Moscow continues hybrid tactics elsewhere in Europe, Svalbard could therefore become a proving ground for probing Western red lines.

The article identifies two distinct vulnerabilities that Norway faces, unlike neighbour Denmark, in regards to its Arctic presence that Russia has long exploited. First is the limited scope of Norwegian sovereignty under international law. The 1920 Svalbard Treaty, ratified in 1925, granted Norway control over the archipelago—but under strict conditions. Svalbard must remain a demilitarized zone, and all signatories (now nearly 50 countries, including the U.S., Russia, and Japan) are entitled to equal commercial access.

Svalbard’s strategic relevance first became evident during World War II, when German submarines used the islands as a base to target Allied convoys headed for Murmansk. Since then, the area remained relatively quiet. The population hovers just below 3,000—roughly matching the number of polar bears. Though Norwegians are the majority, residents from around 50 nations also call it home.

The other pressing issue is the critical role fisheries play in Norway’s economy, one of the world’s top fish exporters. This economic reliance was, as the article suggests, a major factor behind the Norwegian public's decision to reject EU membership. With many key fish breeding grounds located in waters near or under Russian control, rising tensions could lead Moscow to threaten or disrupt this essential industry.

Russia maintained a longstanding presence through coal mining operations, with two small towns—Barentsburg and Pyramiden—once serving as Soviet outposts. During the 1980s, Moscow reinvested in these settlements, but they declined sharply after the Soviet collapse, becoming near-abandoned relics. Norwegian coal mining ceased entirely by 2020.

Even before that, Russia’s focus had shifted from economic activity to security concerns. In its 2016 national security doctrine, Russia explicitly named Svalbard as a potential naval flashpoint. During the 2017 Zapad military exercises, there were credible reports of simulated Russian airstrikes on the archipelago.

The GIS report outlines a number of incidents that suggest deliberate Russian probing. These include Chechen special forces transiting through Longyearbyen’s airport for a polar drill, unexplained appearances of Russian special ops under the Arctic night, and an incident in 2022 in which a Russian trawler allegedly dragged its anchor over undersea communication cables, severing them.

Symbolic gestures have also escalated, with the article recalling the Russian Consul General organizing a Victory Day parade in May 2023 in Svalbard. In 2024, three Soviet flags were reportedly raised—one in Barentsburg and two in Pyramiden—in open defiance of Norwegian sovereignty. Additionally, Moscow has initiated plans to modernize infrastructure in its Svalbard settlements.

More significantly, Russia intends to build a research center on the archipelago and extend invitations to BRICS member states. The article believes this move could mark the beginning of a broader diplomatic and geopolitical effort to entrench Russian influence under the guise of scientific cooperation.

Although Russia’s specialized Arctic forces have suffered major losses in Ukraine and its amphibious fleet has been diminished by drone attacks, the report stresses that overt military action is unlikely for now. However, political and psychological pressure is expected to grow and the article's author believes Moscow will continue to test the limits of NATO’s response—how far it pushes may depend heavily on the stance of a second Trump administration.

So far, Oslo has responded with calm determination. While maintaining that it does not seek a renewed cold war in the Arctic, Russia has dangled the prospect of a comprehensive bilateral agreement. If Washington shows openness to such a deal, GIS warns that Norway may soon face a more intense and uncomfortable geopolitical squeeze.

By Nazrin Sadigova