Why Israel’s 12-day war was a strategic calculation—not a misstep

In an article for Foreign Policy, Raphael S. Cohen, director at RAND’s Strategy and Doctrine Program, reflects on the aftermath of Israel’s short but intense air campaign against Iran—Operation Rising Lion—and the parallel U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites. While critics argue that the strikes didn’t fully eliminate Iran’s nuclear program, Cohen contends this misses the logic behind such limited wars: they are designed not for total victory but to reset the geopolitical landscape and prevent worse outcomes.

Cohen frames the campaign as a calculated middle ground between two undesirable extremes: a prolonged war and complete inaction. While Israel and the U.S. did not destroy Iran’s entire nuclear infrastructure, they inflicted significant damage—crippling missile launchers, eliminating senior personnel, and delaying Iran’s nuclear capabilities.

Critics who argue the campaign failed to end Iran’s ambitions overlook a key point: neither side intended to pursue full regime change or occupation, which would have required massive resources and long-term commitments. Cohen points out that Israel's success should be measured not by absolute terms, but by what it prevented—namely, a nuclear-armed Iran emboldened by diplomatic inaction.

Although Iran retained much of its missile arsenal, Israeli and U.S. strikes caused real setbacks. Israeli reports claim nearly half of Iran’s ballistic missiles and two-thirds of its launchers were destroyed. Yet prolonging the campaign risked diminishing returns, higher casualties, and possibly losing vital American support. Despite public backing at home, further escalation could have drawn Israel into a broader conflict it could not sustain alone.

The Fordow nuclear facility—deeply buried and partially intact even after U.S. strikes—illustrates the limitations of airpower alone. Cohen highlights that only American bombers with bunker-buster munitions had any real chance of reaching it, capabilities Israel lacks.

Cohen argues that diplomatic and economic measures had already proven insufficient. Sanctions failed to stop Iran’s uranium enrichment, which surged in early 2025, and Tehran’s refusal to negotiate—even on a deal similar to the Obama-era nuclear accord—left few options. Iran’s facility construction, like burying Fordow under mountains, showed clear military intent, regardless of public claims to the contrary.

Moreover, Iran’s history of direct and proxy attacks against U.S. and Israeli targets—including missile strikes in Iraq and recent drone attacks on Israel—cast doubt on the idea that Tehran could be deterred by words alone. Allowing its nuclear program to mature risked shifting the balance of power permanently.

Instead of solving the Iranian threat outright, Cohen suggests Operation Rising Lion served as a powerful demonstration of military resolve. As economist Thomas Schelling once argued, force can function as diplomacy in action. By showcasing their capacity to strike decisively, Israel and the U.S. have likely gained bargaining leverage for any future negotiations.

Cohen notes Israel has used this approach before—successfully halting nuclear programs in Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007) with targeted strikes. Although Iran’s program is more advanced and resilient, delaying its progress for even a few years creates space for diplomacy or further strategic adjustments.

The article closes with a call to better understand limited warfare’s role in modern strategy. Cohen argues that short, focused military campaigns are not failures just because they fall short of total victory. When full-scale war is unfeasible and diplomacy ineffective, limited war can serve as the best available tool—buying time, shifting dynamics, and preventing catastrophic outcomes.

In the case of Iran, Cohen concludes, a 12-day campaign may not have resolved everything—but it reset the strategic board, bought time, and signaled that military options remain on the table. And in a region where options are few and risks are high, that may be the most realistic path forward.

By Aghakazim Guliyev