Ankara pursues its own policy, independent of Washington, Brussels - Russian expert Ivan Andrianov on Caliber.Az

Russian political scientist, director of the Centre for Geopolitical Forecasts Ivan Andrianov's interview with Caliber.Az

– Some time ago, the deputy chairman of Türkiye's Vatan [Motherland] party, Ethem Sanjak, suggested that the country could withdraw from the North Atlantic Alliance because of provocations against Ankara. Do you think there is such a possibility?

– The topic of Türkiye's possible withdrawal from NATO appears on the agenda, not for the first time. Some experts made similar assumptions even when Ankara launched the Euphrates Shield military operation in Syria in 2016. It rose more actively in 2019 when Ankara decided to buy S-400 air defence systems from Russia. Then French President Emmanuel Macron took care of this issue.

Today, Türkiye's likely withdrawal or exclusion from the bloc is raised in the context of the intention to accept Sweden and Finland into the alliance.

Despite the significant contradictions, primarily between Ankara and Stockholm on the Kurdish issue, they are mainly a negotiating card, an excuse for Türkiye to bargain. So [Turkish President Recep Tayyip] Erdogan has already been able to knock out Eurofighter Typhoon fighters from the UK for himself. Earlier, Ankara wanted to buy the F-16 [jets] from the United States for $20 billion, but American lawmakers promised to block the sale due to Türkiye's apparent unwillingness to ratify the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO.

Therefore, the contradictions that exist today in the alliance on the Turkish issue should not be considered as an insurmountable conflict, this is an attempt by Ankara to get better conditions for itself. Moreover, this will continue at least until the end of the elections, and most likely a little longer.

After the Quran burning actions in Copenhagen and Stockholm, the level of distrust and aggressiveness both in Turkish society and in the country's leadership will increase. Moreover, these, without a doubt, criminal actions to insult the feelings of Muslims took place under the protection of local police, that is, they were and, judging by the statements, will be sanctioned by the authorities…

Nevertheless, returning to your question, I will say that, in my opinion, Türkiye's withdrawal from NATO should not be expected in the medium term. Firstly, this country has a really special location on the world map. It allows the US to continue to conduct limited operations in Syria. The Alliance, thanks to Türkiye's membership, de facto controls the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits. The republic is also convenient for conducting intelligence and other activities of both NATO as a whole and the United States separately in Iran, and Syria, to exercise control over the Black Sea and have at least some kind of counterweight to the Russian fleet in Novorossiysk and Crimea.

Secondly, it is unprofitable for Ankara to leave the alliance itself, at least for now. After the purchase of the Russian S-400 [missiles], it became obvious how much the Turkish military-industrial complex depends on foreign components. Let me remind you that then, after the introduction of Western sanctions, Türkiye began to have problems with the production and maintenance of drones, helicopters, airplanes and other, primarily military, equipment.

Undoubtedly, the Turks are actively working on the production of their own weapons. The T-129 ATAK and T-70 attack and transport helicopters, as well as the MILGEM-class corvette, are already being produced, and its own fifth-generation fighter is being developed. However, they are all dependent on Western components, as are drones, including the well-known Bayraktar [drones]. In 2020, due to US sanctions, problems arose with modern optics, avionics, video cameras and other equipment.

So, despite all the contradictions and regular loud statements, today Türkiye's withdrawal from NATO would be a big blow for both Ankara and the alliance. I suspect that in the long term, we will still see how countries will begin to leave this military-political bloc, especially given its incapacity, which can be observed in the example of many conflicts - in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Ukraine, but we still need to live up to that time. In the meantime, it's too early.

– How, in your opinion, would Türkiye's possible withdrawal from NATO be perceived in Russia?

- In general, I would say that for Moscow, Ankara's membership in the North Atlantic Alliance is not a key moment in bilateral relations. Of course, this fact limits the two countries' interaction, but Ankara pursues a fairly independent policy, frequently disregarding the positions of Washington and Brussels. This enables Moscow to collaborate with Türkiye in a variety of fields. The problem is rather the stubbornness of the Turkish authorities and the desire to achieve more favourable conditions for themselves, but this is characteristic of many countries and is normal, I would even say the right approach.

In general, Türkiye's withdrawal from NATO would be very positively perceived in Russia. First of all, because the alliance is an enemy, an enemy of Moscow. It was created for this purpose. The loss of one member implies that something is not going as planned in NATO, and this is a good sign for us. But the Russian leadership is ready, even in today's conditions, to work with all countries, regardless of their membership in various associations - the main thing is that relations are built on trust, mutually beneficial and honest terms.

– Do you think Türkiye benefits from integration with Western countries?

– Türkiye's candidacy for EU membership is the same negotiating card for Ankara as for NATO. At the same time, as you know, the process has been dragging on for a long time. Of course, Türkiye benefits from economic integration with Western countries, but the Turks are increasingly pursuing an independent policy, without looking back at the reaction from Washington or Brussels. They think more broadly, they propose the concept of "The world is more than five" (a very unambiguous hint at the desire of the Turkish Republic to join the permanent members of the UN Security Council), they want to rebuild virtually the entire system of international politics. However, today almost all major states claiming a key role in the world are engaged in this, which is undoubtedly undergoing the most global transformations since the creation of the United Nations and the end of World War II.

Europe has always been considered for Türkiye only from the point of view of benefits: the supply of hydrocarbons, the latest technologies, trade turnover, and obtaining loans in exchange for controlling migration processes. The EU also undoubtedly understands this. So Ankara's possible membership in the European Union has been considered by the Turkish authorities for decades exclusively from the point of view of national interests and state benefits. They are well aware that full–fledged entry into the association will hit many areas of the Turkish economy - automotive, agriculture, metallurgy and so on.

Anyway, the Philippines also signed a Framework Agreement on Partnership and cooperation with the EU in 2012, and Chile signed an Association Agreement directly, like Türkiye, in 2002. This does not mean that these countries will also become full members of the European Union… At some point, such arrangements are simply mutually beneficial.

– How important are relations with Türkiye for the United States?

– Ankara is important for Washington at least from a geopolitical point of view. These are the same factors that make Türkiye important to NATO. At the same time, there is no doubt that dissatisfaction with the policy pursued by Türkiye has been growing in the United States lately. This includes the fight against the Kurdistan Workers' Party, the issue of Sweden and Finland joining NATO, and cooperation with Russia. Just recently, Erdogan allowed the possibility of negotiations with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, which also hit American interests in the Middle East.

In general, extremely interesting processes are going on in the region today, which sometimes seem incredible to many. Major countries are probing the ground for the formation of a full-fledged regional security system, opponents are ready to sit down at the negotiating table so that the Middle East ceases to be the world centre of chaos and wars, which the Americans have been forming for many years. At the same time, Washington is gradually being removed from the brackets of this process, which, apparently, extremely irritates the White House.

In this context, the United States is interested in Türkiye as "its own person" in the Middle East, but Ankara is less and less focused on the interests of Americans. Many experts state that Washington is very closely watching the upcoming elections in Türkiye, and it is possible that anti-Erdogan sentiments will be pumped into the republic from the outside. It is difficult to argue with this thesis. But Türkiye is a large and multifaceted country, where such a thing is unlikely to be of any decisive importance, although it can create a lot of difficulties for the republic. However, such actions of the Americans did not lead to anything good anywhere. Everyone will determine the results of the presidential elections in Türkiye, which will be held in May.

– How will the results of the upcoming elections in Türkiye affect Russian-Turkish relations?

– Frankly speaking, I doubt that Erdogan will miss the victory. By the way, a number of Western experts also point to such a positive outcome for Erdogan. For example, according to analysts of Business Monitor International Ltd. (BMI), the economic situation in Türkiye and around it as a whole can give a favourable background for the current Turkish leadership, on which the election campaign will develop. In this regard, attention is drawn to the fact that in December last year, the growth rate of prices in the consumer market amounted to 64.3 per cent (compared to December 2021), while in October they were at the level of 85.5 per cent.

Americans predict that, while maintaining the current rate of inflation growth, consumer prices will increase by 49.7 per cent by the end of 2023, while the average annual figure for 2022 will be about 71.7 per cent.

As for the opposition to the current government, it is still fragmented. Its leaders are not yet able to create a real association, to develop a single program to seriously compete with the current government and its charismatic leader. According to polls, the growing popularity of opposition politicians has not yet shown any significant dynamics, and they also cannot agree among themselves.

To win Erdogan in the presidential elections, the opposition needs not only to present a united front, rallying around a single candidate, but also to win over some of the undecided voters and, more importantly, those who are still inclined to cast their vote for the incumbent head of state.

It seems that this is partly why the elections were postponed to an earlier date – this deprives the opposition of the time it needs today to consolidate in the fight against Erdogan.

For Moscow, there are no really profitable candidates among the opposition candidates. For example, the head of the Republican People's Party (CHP) Kemal Kilicdaroglu, on whom, most likely, the main bet of Erdogan's opponents will be made, sharply criticizes not only the current authorities but also Russia. Especially after the Syrian government launched an airstrike on 36 Turkish soldiers a couple of years ago. "Anyone who shoots at my soldiers is my enemy," the newspaper Sözcü quoted Kilicdaroglu in 2020, who meant not only Bashar al-Assad but also Vladimir Putin personally.

If we still assume that the president's chair will be occupied by a representative of the opposition, then two main scenarios are possible. The first is that Türkiye will start to drift sharply towards the United States, reducing interaction with Russia and, probably, even imposing Western–style sanctions. The second is that the new authorities will not abandon the idea of the country becoming an important player on the world stage. Then, of course, relations with Russia will undergo changes, but there will most likely not be a sharp deterioration.