Armenia again resorts to double game while Azerbaijan demonstrates patient diplomacy What will Pashinyan's Moscow trip result into?

Following his unsuccessful trip to the Czech Republic, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has decided to go to Moscow, although recent events in the region are unlikely to do him any good. Even though the press service of the Armenian premier presents his visit to Moscow as a sign of Putin's goodwill towards the Armenian leadership, since Pashinyan is expected to participate in the Victory Day celebrations on May 9, it is nevertheless clear that an intense conversation with the Russian president cannot be avoided in any case. If only because Moscow clearly disapproves of Pashinyan's "stunt" and his attempt to play a double game.

The Armenian leader will have to clarify a number of unpleasant issues for him, for example, Yerevan's attempt to discredit the Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh. It should be noted that some time ago Pashinyan himself accused Russian peacekeepers "in non-fulfillment of their obligations on control over Lachin corridor". However, later he actually retracted his words, stating that he was not criticizing Russian peacekeepers, but was "expressing his concern about their activities". It is beyond doubt that Yerevan seriously hoped for Moscow's support, but did not receive any "condemnation of Baku" from Moscow.

To Yerevan's great disappointment, the Russians pointed out that Armenia needed to follow the clauses of the Trilateral Statement, not Baku, which rigorously abides by its commitments.

It is possible that in Moscow Pashinyan will be forced to give a reason for his rhetoric against CSTO. In January this year, Armenia refused to carry out military exercises "Unbreakable Brotherhood-2023" on its territory, and just two months later (in March) it rejected the quota of its deputy general secretary. Thus, Yerevan once again expressed its opposition to the CSTO. The last time this happened in November last year at the organisation's summit in Yerevan, where the Armenian prime minister refused to endorse the declaration of the Collective Security Council. Overall, the Armenians have taken a stand, arguing that their CSTO allies "have not given a political assessment of Azerbaijan's actions".

Lastly, the Armenian prime minister will have to clarify the reason for Yerevan's double game, in particular its flirtation with the West. For the time being, Moscow, busy on the Ukrainian front, has not reacted much to this. The Armenian media had earlier reported that during Putin's recent phone conversation with Pashinyan (on April 26), the sides discussed the regional situation, stressing the problems of ensuring stability and security in the South Caucasus and that the meeting would probably focus on the results of the recent Armenian-Azerbaijani talks with the mediation of the US, as well as their new round, which, according to press reports, will be held between the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia in Brussels with the participation of European Council President Charles Michel.

However, against the background of the notable activation of Washington and Brussels in the Armenian-Azerbaijani contacts, Moscow, despite the focus of its energies and resources on Ukraine, as before, shows a clear interest in the region. This is evidenced by Russia's (also announced by the media) intention to bring together the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia in Moscow at the end of May. It is clear that Russia wants to show the West that the South Caucasus is in Moscow's interest orbit and that it does not intend to cede its place here to Washington or Brussels. And Moscow's main argument in the negotiations remains the agreements on the Trilateral Statement of 2020, which the Russian side considers to be the only real basis for the settlement of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations.

During the Kremlin meeting, Pashinyan will probably be reminded once again that it was thanks to Moscow that Armenia was able to avoid even greater human losses. After all, if the hostilities in Karabakh had not been stopped in the autumn of 2020, the scale of Armenia's defeat would have been much more tangible. Yerevan must realise that Moscow can at any moment increase its economic leverage on Armenia, including through the CSTO, and this will aggravate the already fragile situation of the country. And these are not all the "arguments" that Moscow has at the moment. "Arguments", which in case of continuation of anti-Russian hysteria there can very seriously hit all areas of life of the country.

In this situation, Azerbaijan demonstrates patient diplomacy and flexibility towards both Moscow and the Western partners represented by Brussels and Washington. Baku is confident that the negotiation process must be comprehensive to yield positive results. Azerbaijan is ready for the normalisation of relations with Armenia, which will ultimately lead to stability and security in the region.