China-Japan rivalry deepens as Takaichi pushes Japan toward military reform

In his now-infamous speech at the 2026 World Economic Forum, the Canadian prime minister put forward a mechanism that has been quietly evolving on the global geopolitical stage: the rules-based international order is rapidly approaching an end, with middle powers increasingly forced to build strategic autonomy by working together to counter the rise of superpowers that have traditionally dominated global political and economic affairs.

While he was likely referring to Canada’s relations with the United States and the ongoing war in Ukraine, the same dynamic can be seen in the deteriorating relationship between China and Japan.

Relations between Beijing and Tokyo are arguably at their worst since the normalisation of diplomatic ties in 1972. The current crisis was triggered by remarks made by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi during a televised National Diet session on November 7, 2025, when she said a hypothetical Chinese naval blockade of Taiwan could constitute "a situation threatening Japan’s survival", potentially justifying the use of military force under Japan’s right to "collective self-defence".

Takaichi’s comments did not represent an entirely new position for the Japanese government. However, recent prime ministers have generally been more cautious, avoiding definitive statements on Taiwan in favour of strategic ambiguity.

By contrast, Takaichi’s reportedly unscripted remarks echoed the position of her political mentor and former prime minister Shinzo Abe, who said in a keynote speech in 2021, seven months before his assassination, that "a Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency."

As an analysis on these deteriorating relations published by the Canadian Policy Magazine recalls, China responded to Takaichi’s November statement with a sustained pressure campaign, restricting organised tourist groups travelling to Japan, cancelling concerts featuring Japanese artists, suspending academic and business exchanges, and imposing a series of export controls on dual-use goods, including rare earths.

Beijing has also escalated its military pressure. In December 2025, Chinese fighter jets reportedly locked their missile radars onto Japanese fighter aircraft near Okinawa during what Beijing described as a training exercise.

Taiwan issue as diplomatic powder keg

China’s opposition to foreign involvement in Taiwan is well established, with Beijing treating the issue as a fundamental strategic red line.

According to the article, few issues occupy a more important place in China’s foreign-policy calculations. However, the scale of the current crisis has surpassed previous periods of bilateral tension, including disputes in 2010 and 2012 over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and other longstanding disagreements.

A key factor is Beijing’s hostility towards Takaichi’s longstanding pro-Taiwan positions. Before becoming prime minister, she visited Taiwan in April 2025 and met Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, whom Beijing considers a dangerous "splittist".

Since Takaichi took office, China has focused heavily on her hawkish background within the right wing of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), as well as her history of revisionist views regarding Japan’s wartime conduct.

From Beijing’s perspective, a forceful response was necessary to send the Takaichi administration a message and constrain what it sees as an increasingly hawkish security agenda.

The intensity of the standoff also appears to be driven from the highest levels of the Chinese leadership, particularly President Xi Jinping.

During a closed-door meeting between Xi and US President Donald Trump in May, Xi reportedly surprised US officials by launching into an agitated criticism of Takaichi and Japan’s recent "remilitarization", according to a report by Financial Times at the time.

The reported outburst followed a series of attacks by Chinese officials over Japan’s record defence budget for fiscal year 2026, which has put Tokyo on course to reach its target of spending 2% of GDP on defence two years earlier than originally planned.

Militarisation of region

Beijing has argued that Japan’s defence expansion "shows that Japan’s ‘country for peace’ mask is coming off and it is slipping towards neo-militarism."

However, China’s increasingly confrontational approach could ultimately prove counterproductive, analysts argue, by creating additional political space for Takaichi to pursue her ambitious plans to transform Japanese security policy.

Takaichi has so far refused to retract her comments on Taiwan, while strong public support for a more assertive defence policy suggests she is unlikely to face significant domestic pressure to accommodate Beijing’s demands.

Opinion polling conducted in March found that 74% of Japanese respondents supported strengthening the country’s military capabilities, while 58% backed increased defence spending.

Takaichi is also seeking to create the political conditions for her longstanding goal of revising Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution. Revising the first paragraph, which renounces war as a sovereign right, still faces formidable political obstacles. Other proposed changes, however, including formally recognising the Japan Self-Defence Forces (SDF), have close to 50% public support and could potentially be within reach of the current administration.

The ruling LDP is also discussing changes to Japan’s three "non-nuclear principles": that the country should not possess, produce or allow nuclear weapons to be introduced onto its territory.

The principles have been in place since 1967 and remain deeply rooted in Japan’s anti-nuclear sentiment. However, recent polling suggests public opposition to revising them may gradually be weakening.

In March, Japan deployed domestically produced Type-12 missiles with an operational range of around 1,000 kilometres at a military base in the country’s southwest. The deployment gives Japan, for the first time, the ability to strike targets as far away as mainland China.

International factors

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which Japan imports around 93% of its crude oil, is likely to have reinforced Tokyo’s sense of vulnerability as an island nation dependent on major international maritime routes.

The disruption also underscores Japan’s strategic interest in maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait, through which around 32% of Japanese imports and 25% of its exports transit.

More recently, the Trump administration’s unprecedented pause of US$14 billion in arms sales to Taiwan, combined with Trump’s reported willingness to use the sales as leverage in negotiations with Beijing, has raised fresh questions about the strength of Washington’s long-term commitment to the region.

The United States also warned Japan in May that deliveries of 400 Tomahawk missiles could be delayed by up to two years because of depleted stocks following the war in Iran.

The policy journal argues, that the developments are likely to increase pressure on Japan to expand its domestic defence capabilities and deepen security partnerships with regional allies and partners, steps that could further inflame tensions with Beijing.

As a result, China’s hardline response to Takaichi’s Taiwan remarks and the Japanese prime minister’s increased willingness to stand firm following her party’s landslide election victory in February appear to have placed the two countries on a path towards a prolonged strategic standoff.

With neither side showing much willingness to compromise, the publication forecasts that the relationship appears to have few obvious off-ramps from the current confrontation.

By Nazrin Sadigova