Empty streets, fading protests Tbilisi’s opposition movement in decline

Recent events show that the protest movement led by the pro-Western opposition has largely “run out of steam” and lost public support. As a result, the Georgian government is increasingly unconcerned about “revolutionary” scenarios or attempts by street activists to seize power by force — and even goes so far as to permit such demonstrations.

Initially, the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) granted permission for protests near the parliament building until January 9, 2026. The ministry later approved another march and protest in Tbilisi announced by the opposition for December 27, 2025.

Under the new rules, the participants notified the MIA of marches from the first building of Tbilisi State University to the parliament building, as well as from the Philharmonic Hall to the parliament. The MIA allowed the processions to move exclusively along sidewalks, and when crossing from the Philharmonic, protesters were instructed to use underground passages. Regarding the gathering at the parliament, participants were advised to assemble on the steps without obstructing pedestrian traffic.

The evening of December 27, 2025, demonstrated the extreme sparsity of the opposition’s protest compared to rallies and marches a year ago. The protest potential had clearly “deflated.” As a result, opposition online resources did not even publish photo or video materials from the event — there were no angles that could create the illusion of a “mass protest.”

At the same time, the authorities are taking steps to prevent repeated attempts to use street demonstrations to storm government buildings, as occurred on October 4, 2025.

On December 25, 2025, the State Security Service of Georgia (SSSG) detained Bacho Akhalaia, former Minister of Defence during Mikheil Saakashvili’s presidency, and subsequently released certain details about the coordination of opposition actions on that day. According to Lasha Maghradze, the First Deputy Head of the SSSG, Bacho Akhalaia directed the opposition’s actions during the events on the day of the local elections on October 4, 2025.

In particular, hundreds of online communications were recorded with those detained in the case of organising the unrest — Paata Burchuladze, Murtaz Zodelava, and Irakli Nadiradze. This included contacts made just minutes before the announcement of the plan to “take” the presidential palace. On October 4, 2025, coordination was conducted online via an IP address registered to Bacho Akhalaia’s spouse.

Bacho Akhalaia was charged under Part 1 of Article 225 of the Criminal Code of Georgia — organisation and leadership of group violence — which carries a prison sentence of up to nine years.

In this way, Georgian law enforcement has signalled to opposition leaders still at large that all their communications and negotiations are being “monitored,” tracked, and, if necessary, wiretapped. The new leadership of the State Security Service of Georgia, headed by Mamuka Mdinaradze — who took charge in September 2025 and successfully prevented the attempted coup on October 4, 2025 — has demonstrated a zero-tolerance approach toward anyone attempting to organise a violent change of power.

Symbolically, on December  25-26, 2025, by decrees of Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, SSSG head Mamuka Mdinaradze received two early promotions — first to Captain and then to Major of State Security. These promotions followed another high-profile detention: former SSSG head Grigol Liluashvili, who was charged with corruption.

According to the prosecution, Grigol Liluashvili, in 2021–2023, provided protection to “scammers” — internet fraudsters and their organised call centres — and received a bribe of $1.365 million for doing so. In this way, the Georgian authorities have demonstrated their intention to take a tough stance not only against corruption but also against potential internal “traitors.”

It is no secret that, in planning their “revolution,” the opposition and its Western backers counted on winning over the leadership of the security forces. Such a scenario could occur either through bribery or by pressuring officials via threats to expose their corruption. If the head of a security agency had previously accepted bribes for turning a blind eye to illegal “earnings” by scammers, then, in this logic, it would be easier to “buy” him on political matters as well.

Under the new conditions — the consolidation of the ruling party Georgian Dream and the firm stance of the new law enforcement leadership — the opposition will find it extremely difficult to organise new attempts at a “revolution” or coup. At the same time, protests “within permitted limits” are still allowed for the opposition. However, attendance at such events continues to decline, as clearly demonstrated on the evening of December 27, 2025.

By Vladimir Tskhvediani, Georgia, exclusively for Caliber.Az