French nuclear doctrine topples European autonomy An article by War on the Rocks

Despite occasional shows of ambition, Europe’s role in France’s nuclear strategy remains mostly symbolic and undefined, constrained by long-standing Gaullist traditions. This was made clear during President Emmanuel Macron’s March 5, 2025 speech, where he firmly reiterated that France’s nuclear deterrent is entirely national and sovereign. His remarks came after a heated political debate in which numerous factions strongly resisted any movement toward a Europeanized deterrence strategy. As a result, the idea of “Europeanizing” French nuclear deterrence remains more rhetorical than real—still as hollow today as it was when Charles de Gaulle first laid down the doctrine nearly 60 years ago.

In a May 13 live interview on French television, President Macron then went on to double-down on this point: "Ever since there has been a nuclear doctrine since Charles de Gaulle, there has been a European dimension of [France’s] vital interests. I have remained ambiguous on what those vital interests are, just like all my predecessors. Yet, in today’s context, I wish to engage with all partners that are interested, and see if we can go further. Though under some conditions, France will not pay for others’ security, it will not subtract from any security meant for France, and only the French President would decide of its use."

But when asked directly if he would accept the additional risk of defending allies, an article delving into France's contemporary nuclear strategy by War on the Rocks points out that Macron dodged the question, citing the broader strategic environment and denying that it was a matter under serious consideration. This approach stayed consistent with France’s legacy of strategic ambiguity.

Unlike the United Kingdom, whose nuclear forces contribute to NATO’s collective deterrence, France maintains a separate path. In the eyes of NATO and potential adversaries alike, France’s nuclear force remains distinct from broader alliance structures. The ongoing question is whether France’s nuclear umbrella extends to cover Europe—an unresolved debate that has persisted for decades.

European vs French sovereignty

In the article's author’s view, therein lies a paradox. France’s nuclear doctrine currently fails to align with another goal: European strategic autonomy. If France truly aims to “go further” in its engagement with European allies, its nuclear doctrine must evolve. The discussion is not limited to France’s capabilities or building a “Euro-bomb”—it’s also about whether the existing doctrine remains suitable in today’s context.

Historically, France has used white papers to define and reform its defence strategies. The first, in 1972, aimed to lay the foundation for nuclear doctrine. While it emphasized national sovereignty, it also vaguely suggested that French vital interests could extend beyond its borders. It even drew comparisons to the US security guarantee, suggesting that France’s ambiguity made its deterrence more credible to both friends and foes, as it didn’t rely on direct neighbourly reassurance. This ambiguous doctrine, first forged under de Gaulle, became formal policy.

From the author’s perspective, that foundation reflected a political stance more than a military one. France agreed to NATO’s nuclear deterrence under the 1974 Ottawa declaration, even as domestic policymakers and analysts faced backlash for advocating a pro-European stance. In 1976, Guy Méry, President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s chief of staff, introduced “extended sanctuarization”—a concept that pushed past Gaullist ambiguity by explicitly stating that France’s deterrent had a European dimension. Gaullists lashed out, accusing the president of betraying de Gaulle’s legacy and arguing that France’s nuclear protection should never be shared. Under Gaullist logic, only the French president could define “vital interests,” with no room for shared control or European consultation.

After the Cold War, France’s nuclear posture began to soften. In 1992, President François Mitterrand floated the idea of a “European nuclear doctrine.” France didn’t stop at rhetoric—Paris and London explored ways to coordinate their nuclear strategies. President Jacques Chirac later picked up this thread. After the 1994 White Paper and the 1995 election, he suggested “concerted deterrence,” linking France’s nuclear role more directly with European allies. While France ended the Hadès short-range nuclear missile system—designed as a final warning before full nuclear retaliation—it did so without consulting Germany first.

Despite talk of cooperation, France’s doctrine of “strict sufficiency”—keeping only the smallest arsenal needed for deterrence—became more rigid, and post-Cold War disarmament momentum took hold. Chirac retained full control over vital interests, and enthusiasm for European deterrence withered. While some European nations criticized France for wanting to resume nuclear tests, it was Gaullist hardliners who blocked a potential Franco-German agreement in parliament.

Ambiguity to throw adversaries off tracks

The perceived steadiness of French doctrine has led many to call it “chemically pure.” Elements like strategic ambiguity have evolved since the Cold War but remain rooted in “Gaullist inspiration,” ensuring consistency over decades. Yet the author argues these core tenets now hinder France’s ability to support a European deterrent role—especially if it wants to help prevent nuclear proliferation among anxious allies.

Advocates of strategic ambiguity argue it strengthens deterrence by keeping adversaries guessing. But ambiguity conveniently avoids confronting hard questions about France’s real commitments. For example, would France defend Poland with nuclear force? That remains deliberately unanswered. While ambiguity might deter foes, it doesn’t reassure allies—something essential for non-proliferation. Clear promises are what give allies confidence they won’t be left vulnerable. This is why doubts over US nuclear guarantees have recently grown in Europe. Repeating the same vague approach while expecting different results—especially ahead of the 2027 French presidential election—risks failure. In the author’s view, if France hopes to reassure neighbours and confront multiple nuclear powers, ambiguity alone no longer fits today’s multipolar world.

Ultimately, French deterrence remains the sole decision of its president, who can stick to existing doctrine or forge a new path. But doctrine still matters. The author believes that the collective understanding of French nuclear posture has often clashed with its ambition for a stronger European strategic identity. Rather than rethinking the basics, French leaders have so far chosen to follow the established line.

By Nazrin Sadigova