Global consequences of Israel-Hamas war are just beginning An analysis by Atlantic Council

 Former US Security Advisor Kirsten Fontenrose has shared her views on the Israel-Hamas war and its implications for the region and global stability in a publication for the Atlantic Council. Caliber.Az reprints this article.

"With the conflict ignited by the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel still ablaze, it is difficult to predict what decisions the players will make tomorrow—let alone in a week or a month. That makes it challenging for other nations impacted by the conflict to craft their foreign policy. What we can know in these early days are the early warning signs that could indicate particular actions from the major players, or illuminate the thinking of parties to the conflict and external stakeholders.

Based on my experience serving in the White House and private sector, and my conversations with insiders in Washington and across the region in recent days, here are the issues worth watching as this conflict evolves and foreign policy decisions must be made.

A low but real risk of escalatory spillover

The critical variable in how this conflict will impact foreign policy in the United States, Europe, and the Gulf is whether it spills over to the broader Middle East. Will the war ignite beyond Israel and Gaza?

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian are doling out daily reminders that Iran’s 'friends' in the Middle East will respond to Israeli abuses of Palestinians. They have not offered a timeline or many specifics beyond threatening dire consequences for Israel. Iranian leaders said on October 15 that Iran will get involved if the Israel Defense Forces [IDF] roll into Gaza. We can assume based on past behavior that Khamenei and Amir-Abdollahian do not mean the involvement of the Iranian army [widely known as the Artesh] or even its expeditionary Quds Force. They mean their vassals in Lebanon and Syria, including Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. [A note that by making this statement, Tehran ceded plausible deniability when these groups use violence].

The United States, in turn, warns that it will act against Hezbollah if it opens a northern front in the war. And Iran’s militias across the Middle East vow to act against US soldiers and interests if the United States strikes Hezbollah. The Iraqi Shia militant group Kata’ib Hezbollah says that it will ramp up targeting of US bases in Iraq with missiles, drones, and what it calls special forces if the United States intervenes militarily. This puts roughly 2,500 US troops in the crosshairs, along with another nine hundred in Syria where Kata’ib Hezbollah also has reach. In recent days US troops stationed at Iraqi military bases have seen the first incoming fire in nine months. These attacks may be an attempt to exploit US fears of spillover to nudge Washington toward a decision to remove troops from Iraq—a stated goal of Tehran’s and the Iraqi militias it backs. Hadi al-Amiri heads the Iraq-based Badr Organization, which constitutes much of the Iranian-aligned Popular Mobilization Forces that, despite their alignment, are part of the official Iraqi military under the Ministry of Defense. Two days after the Hamas attack, al-Amiri said that his militia will stage attacks against US interests in Iraq if the United States enters the fray and that 'all American targets will be legitimate'.

In Yemen, the Houthi rebel group says that if the United States intervenes the Houthis will coordinate their military reaction with the 'Axis of Resistance', which generally refers to Iran, Syria, Palestinian militant groups, Iranian-aligned militias in Iraq, and Hezbollah. The Houthis did not specify what their targets would be, and have since launched a strike toward Israel that was intercepted by a US Navy warship. The Houthis’ vow to strike the United States’ friends was likely on the mind of Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has fought them since 2014, during his recent phone call with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi.

Hezbollah, on which a lot hinges

So far, the group has just dipped a toe in the water with, for example, tit-for-tat exchanges of shells with the IDF on the border, resulting in casualties on both sides. But Hezbollah has not brought out its big guns. These include suicide drones, precision-guided missiles aimed at Israel’s critical infrastructure, air-defense missiles, an IDF-estimated twenty thousand rockets, a bevy of small arms, and a group of trained fighters with recent and relevant experience in Syria.

Other than Hamas, nobody seems to want Hezbollah to enter the fight because that is the wick that would ignite regional escalation. Hezbollah’s deputy chief Naim Qassem says the group will not be influenced by calls for it to stay out of the war and that it is ready to join if necessary. Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s leaders are content to encourage Muslims globally to take to the streets through vague statements that don’t outright incite violence but are open to interpretation.

If the IDF stages a ground assault on Gaza, however, Hezbollah appears to be on the hook to jump in the deep end, which raises the question of why the group didn’t come in at the beginning and kick Israel while it was down. The answer is probably because Hezbollah has much to lose: War with Israel will mean massive destruction of infrastructure inside Lebanon that the Lebanese government cannot afford to rebuild. With Hezbollah currently calling the shots in that government, blame for willfully sacrificing infrastructure and lives will fall squarely on the group’s shoulders. Hezbollah can say it runs a country right now. Despite that country having a failed economy and no governance, that position is a lot for the group to risk.

The evacuation of citizens from Israel by Israel’s closest allies.

In light of the threat of full Hezbollah activation, the US government will not allow Israel to stage a massive ground assault without pulling families and non-essential personnel out of the crossfire. Charter planes full of American citizens are already leaving Israel. The Department of Defense is staged for a non-combatant evacuation operation, if necessary. Should an evacuation take place, it will indicate that the United States anticipates escalation.

The reaction of other extremist groups.

Outside of Iran’s militias, spillover risk seems contained. One indicator of this is the lack of large-scale violence that occurred on October 13, Hamas’s 'day of general mobilization for the Al Aqsa Flood operations'. Though the Hamas statement urging people across the world to come out in support of them only used the word 'protest', there was a very real risk that lone wolves could interpret mobilization to mean acts of violence. With two exceptions in Europe, the response was nonviolent.

Al-Qaeda’s network, including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al-Shabaab in East Africa, jumped on the Hamas verbal support bandwagon, but has not pledged military action at any threshold. That the al-Qaeda network hasn’t declared war is another reason spillover risk currently is more constrained than it could have been. The interest for al-Qaeda is in how perceptions of a brutal Israel can boost the terrorist group’s own recruitment and fundraising. Globally, collateral damage could shape the recruitment efforts of Islamic extremist groups, which will use footage of Israeli strikes in Gaza to enrage and enlist youth. Extremist recruitment has been on the downturn in the past five years, due to the failure of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham in Syria, but could spike again as a second-order effect of this conflict.

The United States ramps up force posture

To prevent the slate of Iran-backed militias from opening other fronts in the war, US leaders are carefully presenting their actions to beef up defense posture off the coast of Israel as a means of deterrence. Messaging through every channel to Iran and armed groups around the region reinforces that the United States is not looking for a fight and discourages others from seeking one.

But the impressively rapid movement of a second carrier group to the eastern Mediterranean proves that the United States does not need large numbers of forces on the ground in the Levant to be ready to fight there. The sea will be full of Aegis long-range air and missile defense capabilities, Tomahawk missiles, electronic-attack and early-warning capabilities, and specialized jets and helicopters. Two thousand servicemembers from the US Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines are on alert to deploy. The intent of this show of force is to disincentivize violent action by Iran’s threat network against Israel, Americans, and US partners across the region.

It is important to note that this posture increase is not an indicator of impending US military intervention in the conflict. As proof, look at the twenty thousand additional troops the United States sent to Europe last year in the event that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine expanded to other countries or otherwise required intervention. These troops remain in place but have not entered the conflict.

Also primarily in the interest of deterrence, the United States is breaking land-speed records in up-arming Israel. Why is this happening so much faster than it has for Ukraine? Because there is a lengthy track record of US security assistance to Israel, with longstanding mechanisms in place to enable it and a pipeline of foreign military sales already in motion that are now being expedited.

The United States positions stockpiles of military materiel in locations around the world, including Israel, should American forces need to enter combat abroad quickly. Israel is being given access to the US War Reserve Stockpile in Israel, though not all of the items in it are interoperable with Israeli platforms, and some of the stockpile was already poached to support Ukraine.

What to watch

Congress and those purse strings. Dipping into the US stockpile isn’t free, and the requisite funding can’t be found under a continuing resolution. As long as Congress can’t agree on a budget, the US Department of Defense can’t offer Israel everything it has the authority to offer, and foreign military sales will be hamstrung. Congress will have to muster a bipartisan prioritization of this issue to follow through on President Joe Biden’s promises of support to Israel.

The defense industry. The US government is pulling from stockpiles around the world, not just those in Israel, but will only release what it is confident it can replenish. This falls again on Congress to obligate funds, but also to industry. Supply chains and production timelines must be able to guarantee that replenishment is possible. Beyond government, watch the statements from and conversations among industry about how much is possible.

The reemergence of counterterrorism. Regardless of the success of IDF operations to eliminate Hamas, militant opposition to Israel’s control over Gaza—verily to Israel’s existence itself—will not go away. Grievances will remain in a Gazan population of over two million that is poor and stateless, and new militants will be radicalized by the gruesomeness of the conflict. Counterterrorism never fell off of US Central Command’s list of top objectives, but the focus in recent years has been on consolidating gains in that area. Counterterrorism may be about to make a comeback in the US policy lexicon.

Who wants a ceasefire?

All the talk of a possible ceasefire centers on whether Israel would agree to one. But what about Hamas? Hamas expected, invited, and now needs a brutal Israeli retaliation to render Israel untouchable to Arab governments and unsupportable at the United Nations. In Hamas’s strategy, the more civilian Palestinians who are implicated in Hamas’s attack and suffer while the world is watching Israel’s response, the closer the group is to achieving these goals. Why would Hamas agree now to a ceasefire that would make Israel look reasonable—even benevolent? That would fall far short of its goals.

A ceasefire and negotiated agreement that simply returns hostages to Israel and returns power and electricity to Gaza would essentially return the situation to where it was the day before Hamas’s October 7 attack. Neither side would be satisfied with that. Neither side is likely to cede these key points of leverage that easily. A ceasefire agreement will have to grant more to both sides. Hamas’s recent release of two Israeli-American dual citizens was intended to send a signal to Washington that the group’s beef is with Israel and not the United States. This move will reinforce US resolve to keep humanitarian aid moving into Gaza, but it will not change Washington’s calculus about protecting Israel from terrorism.

Saudi-Israeli normalization, delayed but not dead

Israel’s eventual integration or normalization of ties with Saudi Arabia is delayed but not dead. Like Israel, Saudi Arabia perceives Hamas [and its brethren in the Iranian embrace, Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad] as a threat. The kingdom insisted on concessions for the Palestinians in its negotiations with Israel and the United States on what it calls 'regional integration', and it is freezing those discussions to reevaluate what concessions might be necessary in the eyes of global Muslim public opinion and possibly in the eyes of the Israeli populace now. But make no mistake: Saudi Arabia will not allow Hamas to dictate the speed of the kingdom’s long-term, strategic goals, nor to limit them. Israeli ideas in areas as diverse as irrigating the desert and establishing an indigenous defense industry are central to those goals. Saudi Arabia needs Israeli technologies that will help prepare its economy for the post-oil world, and it needs them in the next two to four decades.

When talks about some form of normalization resume, the starting point from which Saudi Arabia will have to negotiate the 'path forward' for Palestinians will be set back much farther than it was just several weeks ago. In this way, Hamas has grossly undermined Palestinian goals. One example of why: Until the October 7 attacks, over twenty thousand Palestinians from the Gaza Strip were transiting to Israel every day to work, supporting their families. That is over. The new starting point for negotiation will presumably be zero residents of Gaza permitted to work in Israel, forcing Saudi Arabia to bargain for even the first.

The timeframe for normalization will certainly be impacted by the scope of Israel’s response to the Hamas attack. Israel says retaliation against Hamas is just beginning and will continue over the coming days and weeks. Its intent in exploring a ground incursion into Gaza is to root out Hamas leadership and establish deterrence against other anti-Israel groups joining Hamas’s operation. Israeli intent is also to minimize mass civilian casualties that would make it politically implausible for Saudi Arabia to be in public talks with Israel about normalization. But Hamas’s use of the residents of densely populated Gaza as human shields for its operational planning centers and arsenals makes civilian casualties inevitable. Israeli leaflets alerting residents of incoming strikes on Hamas targets will not reach everyone.

European opinion splinters over aid

In Europe, expect the continued splintering of opinion on this crisis—and expect the debate about aid to get heated soon. An EU Commissioner’s rushed, unauthorized announcement of the suspension of $730 million in EU development aid to the Palestinians immediately sparked a debate among members. Each country is making independent decisions on its bilateral aid and relations. Germany, by far the largest individual European donor to the Palestinians, froze development aid and plans to conduct a review of how aid received by the Palestinians is used. Austria, Denmark, and Sweden also froze their development funds. Italy says it will not. The United Kingdom has not frozen its aid but is submitting it to review. Amid all this activity, the needs of those uprooted by the Israeli counteroffensive in Gaza will only grow, and current humanitarian aid pledges can’t meet them.

A distracted Congress offers near-unanimous support

On October 11, National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby noted that 'We’re certainly running out of runway' to fund both Ukraine and Israel with what the US Congress has already provided. On paper, the US commitment to Israel is stronger than the commitment to Ukraine, but whether the worldview of Hamas or of Russia is a greater existential challenge to the US worldview is a question of perspective—and will be the root of unhelpful public debates within the US government. Sustained US assistance to Ukraine and Israel could become a tug of war, and that’s between those members of Congress who don’t oppose both.

Russia will interpret this conflict as a widening window of opportunity. While Middle East watchers in the West have tunnel vision on Israel, Moscow is working to strengthen relations with Iraq, the second-largest oil producer in the OPEC cartel. If Russia has the bandwidth, expect it to expand operations against Ukraine and test NATO, because the threat to Israel distracts the United States politically and militarily and will be a major draw on US weapons stocks and funds for foreign military aid.

Gulf states nervously eye Washington, Jerusalem, and Tehran

The United States’ Arab partners in the Gulf are closely watching the speedy deployment of arms to Israel. They have been at the frontline of Iran’s proxy group attacks until now and have asked the United States for upgraded armaments since the start of the Biden administration, when US arms sales to Saudi Arabia were frozen. But despite other indications of US commitment to their security, there is a newly reinforced feeling in the Gulf that they are the partners that haven’t merited a rescue.

The United Arab Emirates issued two statements after the Hamas attack, one calling it a 'serious and grave escalation' and another stating that the UAE is 'appalled' by Hamas kidnappings of Israeli civilians. Bahrain made similar statements condemning kidnappings. These attracted criticism from Iran-affiliated militias across the Middle East. That puts the United States’ Arab partners at heightened risk of attack.

It is possible at this juncture for the United States to protect its interests in the Gulf and its partners. If Iran fully activates militias in Yemen or Iraq against Arab neighbors in retaliation for their condemnation of Hamas, Gulf nations will expect the United States to defend them. The United States moved the USS Bataan and the USS Carter Hall with elements of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit to the Gulf in August, as part of a US response to Iranian naval operations. That was a significant action to establish deterrence in defense of Gulf partners. Now that deterrence message must be sent from the eastern Mediterranean. But Iran interprets the movement of a US ship away from its shores as a sign that the risk to its homeland is lowered, and could still encourage or direct Houthi attacks on the UAE or Saudi Arabia, or sleeper-cell attacks inside Bahrain, while believing that Middle East watchers in the United States are fully focused on Israel. It would be wise to preempt such temptation in Tehran by making it clear through diplomatic channels that Iran will be held accountable for attacks on Gulf partners by any of the militias it supports.

Qatar carefully balances its relationships with the United States and Iran. The only favor Tehran does Doha is not attacking it—a pretty valuable favor, if you ask Saudi Arabia or the UAE. With Israel’s blessing, Qatar functions as the home base for a cadre of Hamas leadership, including the pro-attack political head, Ismail Haniya. But the October 7 attack challenged the logic behind Israel’s support for Hamas’s posh life in Doha.

Iran sees its investments in Hamas paying off

The regime in Tehran, which has armed Hamas for the greater part of two decades, perceives the conflagration in Israel as a win. Iran’s leaders will happily fight Israel to the last civilian Palestinian [or Lebanese, Iraqi, Syrian, Yemeni, etc].. The knock-on effects of this conflict line up with the interests of the Iranian regime: The conflict stalls Saudi-Israeli normalization talks. It degrades Israel’s reputation for vigilance and military readiness. It distracts the United States and Europe, creating space for Iran to press its proxies into attacks on Iran’s adversaries elsewhere. It spikes anti-Israel and anti-Western sentiment in many Muslim communities. It provides a second battlefield laboratory in addition to Ukraine to test Iranian drones and rockets. Finally, it puts Washington in a tough position, taking on a high reputational risk by sending arms to an 'ironclad' partner facing an existential challenge without real control on the ground over how these arms are used. All of these wins come with a low risk of serious blowback to Iran even if the United States finds a smoking gun linking Tehran to the planning of the October 7 attack; Congress isn’t whole enough to process a declaration of war.

The factors influencing Gaza’s future

Even as the world anticipates the next phase in the war, Israel, Europe, Iran, the United States, Arab states, and Palestinians in and outside Gaza all face the same question: What happens the day after the conflict ends? It’s likely each actor will answer differently. Those varying answers, as they become clearer, will give a sense of the consensus and the parameters of a possible plan.

Who will lead an eventual peace process?

As all these players weigh their next moves, expect international calls for a renewed peace process. The Biden administration won’t be able to sit this round out, but when the US government reenters the game it won’t be as team captain.

US officials are already stressing to their Israeli counterparts the need to start thinking concretely about the future of Gaza. The United States can bring to that effort lessons learned the hard way in the post-conflict era in Iraq, but Washington does not have a workable model to share for mapping the future of Gaza.

For a while, it was a truism of international affairs that the general contours of a peace plan for Israel and the Palestinians were known but just needed to be agreed upon and implemented. If that was still true on October 6, it isn’t now. A plausible plan for a stable, well-governed Gaza—one that is also not a haven for extremists—seems far over the horizon at this point. A lesson drawn from previous wars is that a lack of planning for immediate post-conflict governance is a recipe for more conflict. With that in mind, the most critical item to watch as this crisis continues to unfold is the conversation about how Gaza will be governed".