Japan at a crossroads: rebooting free and open Indo-Pacific

In a comprehensive analysis, Foreign Affairs charts Japan’s renewed effort to assert regional leadership under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, framing her early tenure as a potential turning point for the Indo-Pacific’s strategic landscape. The article situates Japan at the intersection of a rising China, a retreating U.S., and an increasingly volatile region, arguing that Takaichi has a unique opportunity—and responsibility—to reinvigorate the free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision first proposed by Shinzo Abe in 2016.

The article underscores Japan’s historical role as a stabilising force in the Indo-Pacific, tracing the development of the FOIP concept from Abe’s initial advocacy to a decade-long effort that established Japan as a credible alternative to a China-centric regional order. Japan’s priorities have consistently included freedom of navigation in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, conflict resolution through diplomacy, and the promotion of rules-based trade. Through trade agreements like the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and decades of strategic development assistance, Tokyo has cultivated goodwill and trust among regional partners, particularly in Southeast Asia, where surveys indicate Japan enjoys significantly higher confidence than China, the EU, or the U.S.

Yet, the article highlights growing challenges that have eroded Japan’s influence. Frequent leadership changes—Japan has had five prime ministers in as many years—and domestic political instability have distracted from foreign policy ambitions. At the same time, China’s economic and technological clout, exemplified by initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative and strategic control over critical minerals, has attracted regional partners seeking economic growth, creating a competitive environment for Tokyo. Russia’s alignment with China, global crises like Ukraine and Gaza, and a perception of U.S. disengagement further complicate Japan’s strategic calculus.

Foreign Affairs argues that Takaichi need not reinvent the FOIP framework but instead should focus on tangible, results-oriented policies. Suggested initiatives include deepening trade agreements, enhancing development partnerships, investing in human capital across Pacific islands, and bolstering contingency planning for a potential crisis in the Taiwan Strait. By prioritising actionable projects over abstract grand strategy, Japan can reinforce its credibility and leverage the goodwill built through decades of strategic engagement. Japan’s support for Taiwan, including information-sharing agreements and preparedness planning, is highlighted as a concrete example of practical leadership that balances deterrence with stability.

The article also emphasises the importance of Japan’s coalition-building, both domestically and internationally. Takaichi must navigate a fragile parliamentary majority while balancing fiscal constraints, an ageing population, and high debt. Yet FOIP offers bipartisan appeal: conservatives see it as projecting Japanese strength, moderates as a pathway to collaborative diplomacy. Japan’s commitment to doubling defence spending, strengthening alliances with Australia, the Philippines, and South Korea, and investing in strategic industries signals an understanding that regional stability requires both economic and security engagement.

In conclusion, Foreign Affairs frames Takaichi’s early months as an inflexion point for Japan’s regional leadership. By translating the FOIP vision into measurable results—trade, development, and security cooperation—Japan can reassert itself as a stabilising pillar in a volatile Indo-Pacific. The article positions Takaichi’s challenge as both domestic and international: securing the political will at home while demonstrating to the region that Japan remains the trusted custodian of a rules-based order in the face of Chinese assertiveness.

By Vugar Khalilov