New geopolitical words we learned in 2023

FP has published an article noting the new geopolitical words entered the lives of people in 2023. Caliber.Az reprints the article.

Oxford University Press’s word of 2023 was “rizz,” which the publisher defines as “someone’s ability to attract another person through style, charm, or attractiveness”—a shortened version of charisma.

But geopolitics entered the world of buzzwords, too, and delivered a string of expressions that found enthusiastic use in the corridors of power and think tanks, not to mention the real world. There was the ubiquitous “de-risking,” but also “AIS gaps,” “subsea infrastructure,” and “maritime terrorism,” which similarly became words that the well-informed citizen should know.

The runner-up to rizz in Oxford University Press’s selection was reportedly “Swiftie,” and such is Taylor Swift’s global power that Swifties include British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak. But not even the American megastar has managed to divert the world’s attention away from the dark geopolitical clouds in the Black Sea and the Taiwan Strait, or at the Finnish border.

Indeed, in 2023, geopolitics came to dominate the news agenda. The year began with the swearing-in of Brazil’s returning president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and the subsequent storming of government buildings by supporters of the outgoing—and defeated—Jair Bolsonaro. Lula’s return to power and his swift outreach to Russia failed to deliver a new geopolitical term, though the anti-Western fraternity involving leaders eager to distance themselves from West indisputably deserves one—BRICSit, perhaps?

Another geopolitical development already underway did, however, deliver a new term: AIS gaps. As Foreign Policy readers will know from my columns throughout the year, gaps in merchant vessels’ automatic identification systems (AIS) occur regularly as a result of bad weather or mechanical errors, but during 2023, AIS gaps have become part of daily life in the world of shipping.

Ships carrying goods to and from Russia regularly turn off their AIS so as not to be spotted, which violates international shipping regulations and puts other ships at risk, but what can anyone do? The world doesn’t have maritime police. AIS gaps will be there as long as countries are at loggerheads.

2023 also brought de-risking into the mainstream. The term was picked up by countless academics but used rather less among the people executing this strategy of reducing exposure to various countries—especially China. The reason that de-risking established itself with such force during 2023 was, of course, that people realized that decoupling from China is not possible or even desirable.

During 2023, lots of Western companies announced plans to reduce operations in China, but even such a partial departure is complicated. Moving parts of the manufacturing process to a different country is like selling one’s house and buying a new one—times 1,000.

Then there was BRICS+, the constellation that emerged after the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) decided to invite another six countries, including Argentina, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, to their group. BRICS+, in fact, symbolizes a new kind of geopolitics. The group’s members don’t have a great deal in common, and they certainly don’t share the same deep values that form the basis of Western groupings. But they’re pragmatic and team up with allies for mutual benefit. Iran and South Africa can trade with each other and engage in other cooperation—and like the other BRICS+ countries, they’re in the group not because it represents anything unique, but because it’s a counterbalance to the West.

Subsea infrastructure was another geopolitical phrase that countless people discovered this year. Subsea infrastructure is an unsung hero of modern societies, operating day in, day out, without ordinary citizens worrying about it or even realizing it exists. But in 2023, many ordinary citizens heard of subsea infrastructure because it experienced mysterious malfunctions in different places.

First, the two undersea telecommunications cables connecting Taiwan’s Matsu Islands to the main island were severed by Chinese commercial vessels, leaving the islands isolated from the rest of the world. Then two undersea cables connecting Sweden, Finland, and Estonia were damaged, most likely by a well-connected Chinese container ship called NewNew Polar Bear, and the nearby Balticconnector pipeline was damaged around the same time. Last year, the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines were crippled by a mysterious blast—that some now attribute to Ukrainian operatives. Now subsea infrastructure everywhere has become the subject of activities that appear geopolitically motivated.

Then, starting at the end of November, Yemen’s Houthis provided the year’s final geopolitical word of the year: maritime terrorism. Though the term is not entirely new—remember the USS Cole and Somali pirates?—the Yemeni militia demonstrated that a nonstate actor can attack global shipping using statelike skills and equipment by carrying a string of attacks on merchant vessels it deemed were linked to Israel in the Red Sea. Such maritime terrorists are not like the privateers of previous centuries, because while they’re linked to a sponsor government, they operate on their own and are ideologically motivated. Money is not their objective.

That makes maritime terrorism a decidedly frightening scenario for global shipping, because other groups, whether supported by protector governments or not, are likely to want to imitate the Houthis. And because shipping is fundamentally global, with all manner of countries linked to a vessel through its flag, crew, owner, or manager, a militia can target a ship on the basis of any of those links.

These groups don’t even have to be very conscientious in establishing the details: By declaring a random vessel to be linked to the country it wants to target, a nonstate group will strike fear in vessels representing other nationalities, too. Just consider the prospect of a water-based Wagner Group.