What Beijing will be looking out for in US-Russia Alaska summit

When Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin face each other today in Alaska, on August 15, for the long-anticipated summit to discuss “ending” the war in Ukraine, Beijing will be sure to study every gesture, phrase, and signal. For China, this is less about the optics of peace diplomacy and more about the shape of the global order that could follow. They will be interested in this key question: will the outcome help secure a Eurasian balance of power favourable to Beijing, or will it impose new constraints on sanctions, technology flows, and ties with Europe?

Since February 2022, Xi Jinping has walked a careful line—professing “neutrality” and respect for sovereignty while providing Russia with material and technological support. The “no limits” partnership between Beijing and Moscow has only deepened. According to an article published by The National Interest, Beijing would be satisfied with a scenario of a US–Russia bargain that freezes the frontlines and normalises some of Russia’s territorial gains. It would keep Moscow strong enough to serve as a strategic partner and avoid its dependence on the West.

The article identifies three interlinked imperatives that have shaped China’s conduct since the war began in 2022:

1. Ensure Russia’s survival as a strategic actor

Moscow is China’s only peer-level counterweight to Washington across Eurasia, a major supplier of cheap energy and raw materials, and a partner in building alternatives to the US-led order. This explains Beijing’s steady support through expanded trade, dual-use technology exports, and diplomatic cover in global forums. Xi and Putin present their partnership as a “civilizational” alternative to the West, extending cooperation into investment, space technology, and cultural exchange.

2. Erode US primacy without direct confrontation

China’s “peace proposals” call for ceasefires and negotiations while subtly shifting blame toward NATO enlargement and Western “bloc politics.” This rhetoric appeals to the Global South, where Beijing’s refusal to join sanctions and its economic ties with Moscow are seen positively.

China avoids events—like the Swiss peace summit—that might pressure Russia into unwanted concessions. In Western capitals, this stance is dubbed “strategic neutrality”: neutral in form, pro-Russian in practice.

3. Preserve diplomatic space in Europe rather than division

China works to avoid a full Cold War–style split, courting European leaders and positioning itself as a potential broker for Ukraine’s eventual reconstruction. This helps maintain its image as a pragmatic partner, though suspicion of Beijing’s role in prolonging the war has grown.

Opportunities and risks to Beijing that could stem from Alaska

The summit offers potential gains for Beijing to reap. As the article argues, the ideal outcome for China would be a frozen conflict with loosely enforced conditions, consolidating Russian territorial gains while lowering the risk of escalation. This could spur “sanctions fatigue,” especially in Europe, giving Chinese banks and tech firms more operational freedom. Beijing could also gain an image boost by appearing to welcome renewed US–Russia dialogue without changing policy.

The danger lies in an outcome that explicitly targets China’s role in sustaining Russia. Broad secondary sanctions could hit Chinese banks, logistics providers, and component manufacturers.

Stricter controls on critical technology—machine tools, semiconductors, optics, UAV parts—could force Beijing to choose between aiding Moscow and protecting its own industrial agenda. If such measures gain European backing and Ukraine’s cautious cooperation, they could undercut China’s claim to support “peace without Western diktats.”

According to the National Interest, Beijing will seek to gain the following from any Trump–Putin agreement:

-Incremental sanctions relief, or at least enough ambiguity to allow expansion of higher-value transactions with Russia.

-Reduced escalation risk, letting Beijing focus on domestic growth, industrial upgrades, and regional initiatives from the South China Sea to Central Asia.

-Recalibrated European ties, using targeted cooperation in areas like green tech and reconstruction to build goodwill while easing security concerns.

China’s worst-case scenario

The article suggests that Beijing worries about being singled out in the agreement, losing its role in the geopolitical narrative to a bilateral Trump–Putin “fix,” and facing the spread of sanctions logic to broader US technology controls in Asia. Should this occur, China is likely to mix symbolic compliance—tightening controls on a few niche exports—with quiet defiance, keeping critical flows moving through intermediaries and alternative channels.

As underscored in the publication's work, to Beijing the Alaska meeting is less about Ukraine’s battlefield and more about the architecture of power across Eurasia. Its challenge is to secure gains from a potential US–Russia thaw while avoiding becoming the next target in the evolving geopolitical contest.

By Nazrin Sadigova