What Georgia’s fate teaches the West about postwar Ukraine

In a powerful and prescient Foreign Affairs article, the author delivers a sobering message: winning the war in Ukraine is not enough—the real challenge lies in securing the peace. Drawing a direct line between Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and its ongoing war in Ukraine, the piece offers a compelling warning: if the West repeats its past mistakes by prioritising a premature détente with Moscow over firm commitments to Kyiv, the consequences will be disastrous—not just for Ukraine, but for the entire Euro-Atlantic order.

The article begins by acknowledging the counterintuitive timing of such strategic thinking. With diplomatic overtures from Washington failing and the war in Ukraine grinding on, talk of postwar planning may seem premature. Yet the argument is clear: this is exactly the right moment to plan for “the day after.” The 2008 war in Georgia is used as a cautionary tale. Then, as now, the West reacted to Russian aggression with rhetorical support and vague assurances, but no real deterrence. Rather than punishing Moscow or bolstering Tbilisi, Western powers chose appeasement—re-engaging Russia diplomatically, restoring economic ties, and ultimately legitimising the Kremlin’s conquest.

The failure to provide Georgia with security guarantees or a clear path to NATO and EU membership left it vulnerable. Over time, Russia tightened its grip on Georgian territory and its politics. Through a mix of occupation, cyberattacks, disinformation, and influence-peddling, Moscow transformed Georgia from a beacon of democratic reform into a state drifting back into the Kremlin’s orbit. The author points out that this was not merely a regional failure but a strategic blunder that emboldened Russia to pursue a more ambitious war of conquest in Ukraine years later.

The piece also challenges today’s Western leaders, arguing that they risk falling into the same trap once again. If negotiations with Russia proceed without firm objectives, if cease-fires are signed without enforceable security guarantees, and if Ukraine is denied the tools it needs to deter future attacks, Moscow will see this as vindication—and prepare for the next stage of its campaign to dismantle the post-Cold War order.

What is needed, the author argues, is clarity, resolve, and long-term strategic thinking. NATO membership remains Ukraine’s most reliable security guarantee, but even short of that, the West must embed Ukraine within its defence and economic structures. This includes continued military support, NATO operational integration, defence industrial capacity-building, and the use of frozen Russian assets for Ukraine’s reconstruction. Anything less invites a repeat of 2008—and with it, another chapter in Russia’s serial aggression.

Ultimately, the article is a forceful call for strategic foresight. It warns that the worst outcome for Ukraine would be a negotiated peace that locks in territorial losses, lacks enforcement mechanisms, and leaves Kyiv exposed. The lesson from Georgia is clear: peace without protection is not peace—it is an invitation to further war.

By Vugar Khalilov