Who’s running US foreign policy? The Atlantic warns: No one

In a blistering and at times darkly satirical piece, The Atlantic delivers a sobering assessment of U.S. foreign and defense policy under Donald Trump’s second term, painting a picture of a government adrift, driven more by impulsive politics and personal loyalty than by strategy or professionalism. The article’s core message is chilling: in a world growing more volatile by the day, the United States appears to be operating without a clear commander at the helm.

The author opens with a striking example of public amnesia—America’s recent airstrike in Iran that barely registered in the news cycle—before swiftly pivoting to an avalanche of crises that underscore a troubling vacuum of leadership. Arms shipments to Ukraine have been halted despite escalating Russian attacks. AUKUS, the critical security pact with Australia and the UK, is under unexplained review. North Korea may be preparing to send tens of thousands of troops to aid Russia. And yet, few Americans know who is making the decisions—or if anyone really is.

That’s precisely the author’s point. “Who’s running America’s foreign and defense policies?” they ask, and the answer is as fragmented as it is alarming. President Trump, despite bold campaign claims like ending the Ukraine war “in a day,” has grown disengaged, admitting recently that peace in Ukraine is “more difficult than people would have any idea.” Secretary of State Marco Rubio is barely visible. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth is more interested in ideological battles than briefing books. And in a strange twist, key policy shifts—like the freezing of aid to Ukraine—are being driven by little-known figures such as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, a longtime D.C. operative with a narrow strategic lens focused on China.

Colby’s apparent influence is used to illustrate a deeper structural problem. With senior leaders either unqualified or disinterested, lower-level officials and ideological loyalists are filling the policy vacuum, making decisions without meaningful oversight or coherent direction. “This is the type [of system] found in many authoritarian states,” the piece warns, “where the top levels of government tackle the one or two big things the leader wants done and everything else tumbles down to other functionaries.”

What Trump does focus on, the article explains, is not foreign policy but domestic theatre—irrational tariffs, extreme immigration policies, and media spectacle. Crucial geopolitical issues like Iran’s nuclear programme, the Ukraine war, or Asia-Pacific strategy are treated more like political props than real threats requiring steady hands and clear doctrine.

Even more concerning is the article’s suggestion that no one in the administration has the incentive—or perhaps the capacity—to fix it. “This administration was never directed or staffed with any coherent foreign policy in mind beyond Trump’s empty ‘America First’ sloganeering,” the author writes. Staff were chosen not for competence but for loyalty and “trolling efficacy.”

In the end, the piece does not offer easy solutions but rather a warning. While adversaries like Russia, China, and Iran are led by experienced, ruthless professionals, America appears to be run by ideologues and amateurs. “Undersecretary Colby has had some bad ideas,” the author concedes, “but Americans had better hope that he and the handful of other guys trying to run things know what they’re doing.”

By Vugar Khalilov