Why interception costs are shaping the US-Israel conflict with Iran

The February 28 joint strikes by the United States and Israel on Iran were widely seen as an attempt to end the conflict quickly through shock and leadership decapitation. Early reporting already confirmed that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed during the opening attacks, while the military campaign rapidly expanded in scale. However, the initial phase of the conflict has revealed two major lessons: complex systems often matter more than individual leaders, and missile defence alone cannot guarantee protection.

Modern missile warfare increasingly revolves around saturation attacks, where waves of drones, rockets and missiles are launched to overwhelm defensive systems. In such scenarios, as highlighted in an analysis published by Modern Diplomacy, defenders must constantly decide which threats to intercept, which to absorb and which resources to conserve for later stages of the conflict.

The core challenge facing Iran’s adversaries, the article argues, is simple arithmetic. Each missile interception consumes expensive defensive resources, meaning that even relatively unsophisticated weapons can impose heavy costs if they force defenders to fire large numbers of interceptors.

Rajeev Agarwal, a former Indian Army colonel, described the conflict as a contest where cost per shot has become nearly as important as accuracy. In a commentary for NDTV, he noted that US interceptors and strike systems such as the Patriot missile system and Tomahawk missile fall into the million-dollar price range, while many Iranian ballistic missiles are believed to cost less. Iranian Shahed drones can reportedly be produced for only a fraction of the cost of advanced American platforms like the MQ-9 Reaper.

Even if exact price estimates vary, the overall trend is clear: defending against attacks is often more expensive than launching them, particularly when an attacker mixes drones, rockets and ballistic missiles to overwhelm defences.

This dynamic has prompted renewed debate about whether traditional air defence systems are becoming obsolete. The issue, analysts argue, is not that systems like Patriot are ineffective, but that they were designed for a strategic environment where defenders could control the rate of incoming threats.

In large-scale conflicts, the limiting factor often becomes the number of interceptors available. Estimates suggest a single Patriot PAC‑3 interceptor can cost several million dollars, and multiple interceptors may be fired against a single incoming missile. If attack waves continue for extended periods, defensive stockpiles can be depleted faster than they can be replaced.

"A defence system can be tactically effective and still strategically unsustainable if the burn rate outruns resupply," the article highlights.

Another major uncertainty concerns the size of Iran’s missile arsenal. Public commentary sometimes cites figures ranging from 20,000 to 50,000 missiles, though many independent estimates place the number of operational ballistic missiles in the low thousands. Analysts caution that the exact figure matters less than Iran’s ability to sustain launches through dispersal, redundancy and potential underground storage sites.

Despite ongoing strikes, Iran appears capable of continuing missile launches longer than some observers initially expected, particularly if it relies on mobile launch platforms and hidden stockpiles.

At the same time, the technological response from the United States and Israel is evolving. Reports indicate that both countries are increasingly relying on a combination of advanced sensors, cyber operations and emerging defence technologies to counter missile and drone threats.

Among the systems being explored are ship-based laser defences and Israel’s Iron Beam laser interception project. These technologies are designed to complement traditional missile defence systems such as THAAD and Arrow missile defence system by providing lower-cost options for destroying drones and rockets.

Such layered defences could help reduce the need to expend expensive interceptors against low-cost targets.

The broader lesson emerging from the conflict is that logistics and sustainability may determine the outcome as much as battlefield performance. As the article notes, if Iran can maintain launch rates faster than its opponents can intercept and replenish their defences, it may impose significant strategic costs despite losing infrastructure and launchers. Conversely, if the United States and Israel can sustain their defensive supply chains and gradually degrade Iran’s launch capabilities, the financial and logistical burden of missile warfare could eventually shift back onto Tehran.

By Nazrin Sadigova