Why won't Israel supply arms to Ukraine? Mikhail Shereshevsky's analysis

"I am the Minister of Defence and I am responsible for the export of Israeli arms. I want to make it clear that we will not sell arms to Ukraine," Israeli Defence Minister Benny Gantz said.

The influential Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported, "A day before Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid is scheduled to meet Ukraine's foreign minister, Israel continues to rule out arms sales to Kyiv, despite Russian attacks using Iranian-designed combat drones."

"I want to make it clear that we are not selling weapons to Ukraine," Defence Minister Benny Gantz told Kol Chai radio on October 18 evening. He also pointed out that only medical and humanitarian aid had been sent, and that this would continue.

The statement was made in response to speculation by Ukrainian politicians and journalists that "it would be nice if Israel helped Ukraine in a situation where Russia is using Iranian weapons against it."

Israel and Iran are major rivals in the Middle East. The countries are in a low-intensity armed conflict and occasionally strike at each other. In that case, why wouldn't Israel respond to Iranian involvement in the Ukrainian conflict? In fact, why wouldn't it sell arms to Ukraine for its own benefit? After all, Israel has such military technology, which, if it got to the Ukrainians, could seriously influence the course of events. We are talking, for example, about kamikaze drones, which played an important role in the 44-day war in Karabakh, becoming one of the main high-precision weapons of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces. Other types are Spike anti-tank missile systems, Iron Dome missile defence systems, various types of cruise missiles, etc.

Earlier, Russian military expert Vladislav Shurygin considered the probability of Israeli arms supplies to Ukraine quite low, pointing out that Russia was not conducting hostile activities against Israel by buying missiles from Iran, and even less using them against Israeli interests, adding: "This fact may cause discontent among a certain part of Israeli society, but to use it in relation to Russia is extremely dangerous. Russia plays an important role in ensuring security in the Middle East. It has excellent relations with Palestine, Iran, and the Arab countries. This shows that it is Russia that provides stability and peace to Israel on its borders, so it is unlikely that, even in the foreseeable future, Tel Aviv will join anti-Russian sanctions or supply arms to Ukraine."

His words need clarification. The fact is that Russia controls a large part of Syria, along with its allies - the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, the Iranians and the pro-Iranian Shia militias (from Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi groups to the battalion of Afghan Shia Hazara Fatimiyoun) that Tehran has sent to help Assad from across the Middle East. However, there are different zones of influence within Syria. Russia is to some extent securing Israel's northern borders by preventing large Iranian, Hezbollah, and other pro-Iranian groups, which are extremely hostile to the Jewish state, from being deployed near it. How effective this policy is, and to what extent the Iranians do manage to infiltrate the area, reach the Israeli border, and form cells there with fighters from friendly groups, is debatable. But, in any case, Moscow is doing some work to prevent this. In other words, Russia is to some extent, perhaps to a very large extent, ensuring the security of the Israeli north. But most importantly, it is Russia's non-participation in the military campaign that Israel is waging against the Iranians in Syria - it is called the "War Between the Wars".

Iran sees Syria as a bridge between two other states where there is strong Iranian influence - Lebanon, and Iraq. It is about an Iranian sphere of influence, the "Shiite Crescent" countries, where the Iranians can pass through themselves or move and amass militia forces friendly to them anywhere from Beirut to Tehran. The new Iranian empire, which stretches from the borders of Afghanistan to the Mediterranean, is capable, for example, of supplying the Iranian-friendly Hezbollah (the party that practically controls Lebanon) with precision-guided weapons and sending its fighters into Syria or Iraq or even its own territory to suppress anti-government demonstrations there. This is exactly what has been happening in recent days: protesters in Iran have spotted Arab-speaking fighters among the special forces quelling the riots.

Israel does not like any of this and is extremely uninterested in strengthening Iran and Hezbollah. So about once a week the Israeli air force strikes Iranian and pro-Iranian positions in Syria. It is especially important for the Israelis to destroy high-precision weapons depots - Iranian missiles and drones. Everything Iran is building in Syria in terms of military infrastructure, the Israeli air force seeks to destroy.

Meanwhile, Russia is not using its air defence systems deployed in Syria to repel Israeli attacks on that country, which allows Israel to bomb Syria regularly, knocking out Iranian formations and pro-Iranian forces there. These Russian services come at a high cost. Israel has to do Moscow favours in return, from refusing to supply arms to Ukraine to not complying with certain anti-Russian sanctions. In addition, Israel has advanced medicine, which is as advanced as weapons development, making it highly attractive to wealthy and influential Russians in the face of Western sanctions. Simultaneously, Israel is the most important strategic partner of the US in the Middle East, and the pro-Israeli lobby has considerable influence in America, so the country is immune to US sanctions in light of this policy.

There is another factor. On November 1, 2022, legislative elections will be held in Israel, at which members of the Knesset (parliament) of the twenty-fifth convocation will be elected. Some opinion polls show that the leader of the opposition right-conservative bloc, Benjamin Netanyahu, and his coalition have a chance of success. Netanyahu has stressed that he considers Israel's current policy towards Russia and Ukraine "prudent". However, he is closer to the Kremlin than current Israeli officials and diplomats. It was Netanyahu who was the architect of Israel's secret agreement with Russia. He does not hide his closeness to Moscow at all. Thus, he attended, at the invitation of the Kremlin, the military parade marking the 73rd anniversary of Victory on May 9 and took part in the "Immortal Regiment" procession in Moscow, a rare gesture for modern Western politicians.

Of course, neither Netanyahu, Lapid nor other Israeli politicians will pursue a fully pro-Kremlin course. For example, they will not supply Moscow with modern technology or weapons. Israel is also, like its ally India, a military, political and economic partner of the Americans. These three countries are much more dependent on the US than Russia.

Still, as far as Moscow is concerned, the three states are influential enough to maintain some degree of independence from the US and the collective West. Israel has a strong influence on US domestic politics and is its armed outpost against Iran. Türkiye is a member of NATO and covers the southeastern flank of that organisation. India is a key partner of the Americans in terms of the containment policy against China and a gaining potential superpower. And Türkiye, although it is a US partner and supplies arms to Ukraine, is in no hurry to quarrel with Russia and is developing an economic partnership with it, while India buys large quantities of oil from Russia. Relations between Moscow and Tel Aviv have their own specifics, but nevertheless, certain parallels can be drawn here.