"Armenia's pivot towards the West may cause aggravation around Karabakh" Caliber.Az interview with Belarusian expert

Caliber.Az had a conversation with Yury Shevtsov, a Belarusian expert in international relations, and director of the Centre for European Integration Problems.

- Mr. Shevtsov, how would you assess the current level of regional security in the South Caucasus?

- Unfortunately, a hotspot is looming in this region. I will explain why. As Russia is distracted by the war in Ukraine, which takes all resources, its opponents are trying to open several fronts at once, which can divert Russian resources to themselves. Last year we saw such attempts, including in Central Asia, where every few months there were events that threatened to escalate into a major regional crisis. Similar things are happening in the South Caucasus, mainly around Armenia and Karabakh. Against the background of such external serious threats, the current situation in the South Caucasus could be even worse. For example, Georgia could have exploded if it had not shied away from aggravating relations with Russia, something the West had strongly hoped it would do. Nowadays, it is the Armenian-Karabakh direction that remains the hottest issue in the region.

- Do you envisage new military clashes in Karabakh?

- I cannot say explicitly what scenario awaits Armenia and Karabakh. But it is obvious that Armenia, especially during the last few years, has noticeably strengthened its internal orientation towards the West, so I admit a new military escalation around Karabakh.

- In the case of military developments in the region, will Russia stay aloof from what is happening?

- Although Russia is not interested in an escalation of tensions in the region, it will not be able to use all of its potentials. But Moscow can prevent Armenia from sliding into a military crisis thanks to its special relationship with Türkiye and good ties with Azerbaijan.

- Do you think that the catalyst of the regional crisis is the US and the West?

- This is the most interested party. But there are also local players who may also be interested in inflaming the regional situation and playing on Iranian and Israeli contradictions.

- Is Iran less interested in escalating tensions in the region?

- I do not think that Iran is interested in a serious confrontation in the Caucasus, because, in the current scenario, its outcome in favour of Türkiye and Azerbaijan is very likely, which is hardly in line with Tehran's policy. To a certain extent, Iran has always been interested in creating tensions in the region, but a major regional crisis is hardly attractive to it now that Russia is involved in another issue.

- However, Tehran has pursued an openly hostile policy towards Baku, literally since the emergence of a new military-political configuration in the region as a result of the Second Karabakh War in 2020.

- Let me explain why the aggravation of relations between Baku and Tehran is not in Iran's deepest interests. First, Iran has a lot of other, more serious problems. Secondly, Iran is very much interested in the development of the North-South corridor, it is dramatically building up its relations with Russia and is deeply integrated into the SCO, which, apparently, is of particular importance to it. The exacerbation of relations with Azerbaijan is destroying a part of the North-South Corridor project. Therefore, I am absolutely convinced that Iran does not need to break a significant part of the North-South Corridor project, which is under construction, at the expense of the crisis in relations with Azerbaijan.

- However, this does not prevent Iran from obstructing the opening of the Zangazur corridor.

- No doubt, this issue is important for Iran, and of course, it is not interested in the opening of the Zangazur corridor. But I do not think Tehran is ready to risk the fate of the North-South project for the sake of the Zangazur corridor.

- Is there a compromise solution to such a situation?

- I allow an attempt at a multilateral diplomatic settlement so that the situation around the Zangazur corridor does not turn into a big crisis, which would endanger the North-South corridor as well as the rapprochement between Russia and Türkiye. I think there is already a big diplomatic game going on at this level. For example, Moscow and Ankara are negotiating about a third nuclear power plant that Russia will build in Türkiye. It is very important for Ankara. And Russia has its own agreements with Iran on the North-South project, and the bilateral agenda includes issues related to Iran's full membership in the SCO, which includes the implementation of a number of important projects. In addition, Türkiye and the SCO have their own game. Türkiye has declared its desire to join the SCO, and it is likely that by the summer summit of that organisation, the issue of its membership could become an important subject of talks. That is, a big diplomatic game is unfolding in which the stakes are much higher than the Zangazur corridor, but at the same time, they may contribute to resolving this issue as well.

- Could joining the SCO exacerbate Türkiye's relationship with NATO?

- I think so. Such assessments at a very high level are already made in some countries. It is assumed that Türkiye will have to choose between the SCO and NATO. But it will hardly come to that, if only because Pakistan and India are members of SCO. Although, on the other hand, this issue is becoming quite serious against the background of the forthcoming elections in Türkiye.

- By the way, what is your forecast for the Turkish elections?

- It seems to me that Türkiye has an excellent foreign policy stance on Ukraine. Probably none of the external players have earned as much plus for themselves as Türkiye has gained from the Ukrainian crisis. And the Turkish voter should understand that. Also, in the current situation, a change of leader could mean a change of course for Türkiye in the Ukrainian war. It's hard for me to imagine a better Turkish policy than the one it's pursuing now. At the same time, I would not discount the fact that there are certain forces in NATO who are not happy with Ankara's independent course.

- What seems to you to be the most rational choice of the Turkish voter?

- I believe it will be in Erdogan's favour.

- And the last question is about the situation in Ukraine. How long do you think the war will last?

- The war has no end in sight. When it comes to the highest point of aggravation, that is, the real threat of nuclear war, which would be the modern equivalent of the Cuban Missile Crisis, I think everybody will stop at that 'red line'. But so far, this red line is very far away.

- Which side has a better chance of winning?

- I think Russia has a better chance. But the whole question is what will be the conditions for winning and what will be the parameters of this victory?