Germany’s SPD struggles to navigate its Russia dilemma Cracks in the compass
Germany’s centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) is once again facing a strategic and existential reckoning. As Foreign Policy outlines in a detailed analysis, the party’s post-Zeitenwende realignment—meant to bury its Cold War instincts of dialogue with Moscow—is being undermined by internal dissent, ideological inertia, and historical baggage.
The SPD’s poor showing in the February 2025 election led to a forced coalition with the conservative CDU under Chancellor Friedrich Merz. But as Germany embarks on a sweeping rearmament programme in response to rising geopolitical threats, the SPD’s internal contradictions are being exposed. A recent manifesto signed by over 100 party veterans—including high-profile figures like Ralf Stegner and Rolf Mützenich—calls for renewed diplomacy with Russia, echoing the party’s legacy of Ostpolitik. Yet, as Foreign Policy argues, this appeal dangerously misreads both the historical roots and current realities of that policy.
Chancellor Scholz’s Zeitenwende speech in 2022 was meant to mark a clean break from Germany’s reliance on Russia and its post-war pacifism. The party leadership, including SPD Defence Minister Boris Pistorius and co-chair Lars Klingbeil, embraced a more security-focused agenda, acknowledging past mistakes. But the re-emergence of the pacifist wing—criticising increased military spending and calling for dialogue with a still-aggressive Kremlin—threatens that course correction.
The report highlights deep structural weaknesses in the SPD. Leadership instability—11 chairs in 20 years—underscores a lack of strategic cohesion. While Klingbeil has thus far kept the pro-Russian flank at bay, his fragile mandate and weak re-election result point to growing discontent within the party ranks. The fear is that should public support for military aid to Ukraine falter, this dissenting bloc could regain influence, weakening Germany’s foreign policy resolve at a critical juncture.
Ultimately, Foreign Policy suggests that today’s SPD risks repeating the mistakes of the past—confusing diplomacy with appeasement, and moralism with strategy. Unless it fully internalises that modern deterrence and dialogue are not mutually exclusive but sequential, the party may not only lose relevance but also endanger the stability of the coalition government it now helps anchor.
By Vugar Khalilov