How appeasing Trump weakens EU Europe’s politics of submission

An in-depth Foreign Affairs analysis paints a bleak picture of Europe’s response to Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025. Faced with aggressive US demands on defence spending, punitive trade threats, and open challenges to democratic norms, European leaders chose accommodation over confrontation. What is striking, however, is not merely Europe’s caution, but how this strategy of appeasement has evolved into a self-reinforcing political trap—one that strengthens the very nationalist forces hollowing out the European project from within.

At first glance, Europe’s behaviour appears pragmatic. Trump’s willingness to abandon Ukraine, undermine NATO, or unleash a full-scale trade war loomed large. Against that backdrop, placation seemed like damage control. European leaders raised defence spending targets, accepted unequal trade deals, and largely stayed silent on Washington’s democratic backsliding. In doing so, they claimed to have avoided catastrophe.

Yet Foreign Affairs argues persuasively that this view ignores Europe’s internal political dynamics. The far right is no longer a fringe phenomenon across the continent; in many EU states it is either in power or the strongest opposition force. These parties thrive on narratives of national sovereignty, Brussels’ weakness, and admiration for strongman politics—precisely the themes amplified by Trump. By yielding to US pressure, European governments have not neutralised these forces; they have legitimised them.

Nowhere is this clearer than in defence policy. The pledge to raise military spending to five per cent of GDP was driven less by strategic assessment than by a desire to appease Trump. Many governments privately admit the target is fiscally unrealistic, yet they endorsed it anyway. This has handed far-right parties a potent weapon: the “guns versus butter” argument, particularly resonant in southern and western Europe. Ironically, Europe’s failure to build a credible, autonomous defence posture has made it more dependent on the United States—reinforcing the political appeal of nationalist actors who oppose deeper EU integration.

Trade policy reveals an even sharper contradiction. The EU, an economic heavyweight with a vast single market, was well positioned to resist US tariffs. It had tools ready, including retaliatory measures and the Anti-Coercion Instrument. Instead, internal divisions—fuelled by nationalist governments and populist pressure—paralysed Brussels. The result was a trade deal worse than the one secured by post-Brexit Britain, badly undermining the core promise of European integration: that unity delivers leverage. As Foreign Affairs notes, this outcome not only weakens Europe economically but also corrodes public faith in the EU itself.

Perhaps most damaging has been Europe’s retreat on democratic values. Despite open US interference in European elections and escalating illiberalism in Washington, EU leaders largely chose silence. Investigations into disinformation and election manipulation were softened in the name of “dialogue.” This transactional diplomacy normalises democratic erosion abroad while shrinking Europe’s ability to defend liberal norms at home. Predictably, far-right leaders across the continent have embraced the rhetoric coming from Washington, portraying themselves as part of a broader Western counter-elite.

The article’s core warning is stark: Europe’s strategy toward Trump is not buying stability—it is accelerating fragmentation. Appeasement may avoid short-term shocks, but it erodes agency, empowers illiberal actors, and undermines the rationale for the EU itself. The way out, Foreign Affairs argues, lies not in waiting for a change in Washington, but in rebuilding European sovereignty where it is still politically possible—through coalitions of the willing on defence, diversified trade partnerships, an autonomous China policy, and genuine energy independence.

In essence, Europe’s crisis is less about Trump than about Europe’s unwillingness to act as the main character in its own story. Until that changes, submission will continue to masquerade as pragmatism—at an ever higher political cost.

By Vugar Khalilov