How Japan is redrawing Indo-Pacific security lines with aid, not arms

Japan’s shift from pacifist donor to proactive security partner is steadily reshaping the strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific, as detailed in a recent Diplomat article. Through its Official Security Assistance (OSA) programme, Tokyo is expanding security cooperation with countries caught in the crosshairs of U.S.-China rivalry—projecting influence not through coercion or confrontation, but by offering maritime patrol boats, radar systems, and air traffic infrastructure.

Though modest in budget—roughly $56 million in 2025—OSA represents a quiet revolution in Japan’s foreign policy. Unlike traditional Official Development Assistance, which avoided military entanglements, OSA directly supports foreign armed forces with non-lethal equipment for surveillance, maritime security, and disaster relief. By doing so, Japan is offering a “third way” to countries that, as The Diplomat notes, “don’t want to have to choose” between Washington and Beijing.

The scope of Tokyo’s ambition is evident in its expanding list of recipients: from initial partners like the Philippines and Malaysia to first-time candidates such as Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, and Tonga. These nations sit near vital sea lanes and are increasingly vulnerable to geopolitical competition and Chinese outreach. With Japan already holding deep economic ties in the region—ASEAN ranked it the most trusted major power in the 2025 State of Southeast Asia survey—OSA reinforces Japan’s image as a reliable, non-imperial partner.

The article rightly places OSA within the broader framework of Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy, which also introduced counterstrike missile capabilities. But it’s OSA’s low-profile, capacity-building approach that may prove more consequential in the long term. “It’s non-kinetic,” explains expert Saya Kiba of Kobe City University. “It’s more for capacity-building.” In effect, Japan is building trust and influence not by escalating tensions, but by helping countries stand on their own feet.

There are, of course, limits. Japan’s post-WWII legal constraints—such as the “Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment”—still restrict the export of lethal weapons. Even the current aid packages, while symbolically significant, pale in comparison to large-scale U.S. military assistance or China’s Belt and Road investments. Still, as the article notes, OSA may serve as a stepping stone toward future arms deals, softening the ground for countries to adopt Japanese defence systems.

Criticism from Beijing, which accuses Japan of “militarising aid,” signals that Tokyo’s efforts are not going unnoticed. But countries like Papua New Guinea and the Philippines appear receptive, especially in light of diminishing Western aid and growing unease about China’s strategic intentions. As Defence Minister Billy Joseph of PNG noted, Japan has long been a development partner—and is now becoming a security one as well.

In essence, The Diplomat paints a picture of Japan as a cautious yet deliberate security actor—one that seeks to fill regional gaps not with dominance, but with diplomacy, equipment, and trust. If this trajectory continues, OSA could become a defining tool of Japan’s Indo-Pacific strategy, providing an alternative to coercion and a bridge between rival powers.

By Vugar Khalilov