Israeli expert sees no moral limits to reintegration of Karabakh Armenians into Azerbaijan Caliber.Az talks to Ze'ev Khanin

 Caliber.Az had a conversation with Israeli political analyst Vladimir (Ze'ev) Khanin.

Vladimir (Ze'ev) Khanin (born 1959 in Zaporizhzhia) is an Israeli sociologist and political scientist. He has lived in Israel since 1992. He was a lecturer at the Department of Middle Eastern and African History and a researcher at the Cummings Centre for Russian and East European Studies in Tel Aviv, collaborating with a number of other educational and research institutions. Since 1998 he has taught political science at Bar-Ilan University. From 2010 to 2020 he taught (since 2013 at the rank of professor) at Ariel University in Samaria. From 2009 to 2022 he was also Chief Scientist (Head of Departmental Science) at the Ministry of Aliyah and Integration in Israel. As a visiting lecturer, he has taught courses and lecture series in universities in the UK, Germany, and the former Soviet Union. He is the author of numerous academic publications on social and political issues in Israel, the Middle East, Africa, Eastern Europe, and contemporary Jewish communities.

- The first question that obviously worries the international community and Israel in particular. How close is Iran today to developing nuclear weapons?

- Iran has practically announced that it has reached a uranium enrichment level of 84 per cent (just below the 90 per cent required for weapons-grade uranium). However, according to informed sources, Iran can already produce three to five nuclear warheads today. Understandably, that worries everyone, and above all Israel, which the Ayatollah regime has repeatedly threatened to "wipe off the political map of the world". I'd like to stress that Jerusalem, without counting on the rationality of the behaviour of Iranian leaders, takes such statements quite seriously. Especially in a situation where earlier efforts - the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the 5+1 agreement with Iran) designed to prevent Iran from having atomic weapons, and, as the practice has shown, fairly moderate economic sanctions - have not stopped Iran's nuclear programme. As a result, in May 2018, the Trump administration announced that the US would withdraw from the Iran nuclear agreement and re-impose previously lifted economic sanctions - a move welcomed in Jerusalem and Riyadh, but condemned by the rest of the 5+1.

The line of the current US administration is ambiguous: on the one hand, they are trying to return to the nuclear agreement, showing some gestures of goodwill. For example, as experts have reasonably suggested, the IAEA's statement that some sections of the Iranian "nuclear file" were closed due to Iran's compliance with some aspects of the agreement was clearly agreed with Washington. There is not much reason to believe this statement, but it seems that the Americans are either willing to give a chance to an "improved" version of the nuclear agreement, compared to the 2015 version, which would contain more substantial guarantees that Iran will not develop nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Or, at the very least, to create a situation in which, should negotiations on this topic fail (which now seems a likely scenario), responsibility would fall solely on Tehran.

As for many Israeli experts, from their point of view, which coincides with that of our American colleagues, if a year ago the implementation of the renewed agreement on Tehran's nuclear programme was measured at a negative value, today it is somewhere around zero, that is, no one has any illusions.

By and large, Iran's obtaining nuclear weapons is no longer a technical problem, but only the result of a political decision. And even if there is no immediate threat of nuclear attack against Israel and/or countries of Saudi bloc which oppose Iran, Teheran will have a "nuclear umbrella" to cover activities of its proxy radical Islamist and other terrorist organizations in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza Strip, Persian Gulf region and other places.

- What leverage does Israel have to contain Iran's nuclear program? And can it rely on the US in that case?

- As of now, Israel has no option but to regularly provide the international community with solid evidence, including intelligence and other information that contradicts the appeasing statements of Iran's leaders. And by arguing that Iran, in fact, already potentially possesses nuclear weapons, rather than merely being on the verge of doing so, demand that international partners understand that both options - peaceful and military - must remain on the table.

The first involves large-scale economic pressure, i.e. a package of sanctions significantly more powerful than the current system - at least at the level currently applied to Russia and North Korea. So far, not only have Iranian oil exports not stopped, but over the past two years (since the Biden administration came to power) they have dramatically increased in volume, despite the US sanctions still formally in place. Iran today trades quite freely not only with a number of Asian countries but also, in part, with Europeans. The latter, of course, are interested in returning the level of trade and economic cooperation to pre-sanction levels. Formally, it is believed that this is not yet happening, but de facto Iran, although it is suffering considerable economic losses, continues to function, operate and secure its nuclear and geopolitical ambitions in the Middle East and South Caucasus regions.

In the end, if it becomes definitively clear that economic and diplomatic sanctions cannot halt the development of Iran's nuclear programme, a military option remains. There is quite a lot of talk in Israel that if nothing else can stop Iran, then Jerusalem will have to move to a military solution to the problem. It is clear that Israel is unlikely to be able to do this without some kind of agreement with the US. At the moment, Washington is not ready to give the military option the green light, but there are some indications that if Israel says there is no other way out, Washington will not prevent the actions of the Israeli army. Another thing is that it is not yet clear whether this "tentative understanding" means that if Israel takes the first, successful step on its own, the US "will have no choice" but to give its closest regional ally the necessary diplomatic, organisational, and military support.

In this situation, much will depend on how relations will develop between the US and the Arab bloc countries, above all Saudi Arabia, whose support in the event that Jerusalem and Washington decide on a forceful option will also be very important.

For now, the position of the SA looks ambivalent, so to speak. Observing some US withdrawal from the Middle East in order to focus on domestic issues and on China, which is the main challenge to US global, political, and economic interests, the Saudis have apparently decided that they need not put "all their eggs in one basket". This is evidenced by their normalisation of relations with Iran and its satellites, and partners - Syria, Qatar, and the radical Islamist Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip. At the same time, the Saudis are not stopping their informal defence partnership with Israel either, although there is still a long way to go before Riyadh joins the "Abrahamic agreements" that a number of Arab countries have already signed with Israel.

Thus, for the time being, it is too early to say how events with the Iranian nuclear programme will unfold.

- Lately, Iran has been openly opposing Azerbaijan. What do you think is the reason behind its actions?

- I do not think I will say anything new on this issue. In my opinion, there are 4 or 5 such reasons, and any of them is enough to explain the reason for the current harsh level of confrontation between Tehran and Baku.

The first reason is the geopolitical interests of Iran, which I have already mentioned above. It is clear that the Ayatollahs have a double interest in this case. They see themselves as leaders of the global Islamic revolution, and therefore any country, such as Azerbaijan, which on the one hand is Muslim, and on the other secular and pro-Western, and has civil society, is seen by Tehran as a challenge. In this sense, ideologically Azerbaijan is becoming an adversary of Iran.

The second reason is Azerbaijan's multi-vector policy. Baku is not interested in establishing that level of partnership and cooperation with Tehran, which is determined by IRI itself - they see such partnership with any entity solely as the latter's willingness to be a client state or a satellite of Iran. Since Azerbaijan is not ready for anything of this kind, respectively, it is more likely to pass into the category of the enemy.

The third reason is the 30 million ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran itself, who are discriminated against as an ethnic minority. Looking to the north, i.e. to the current Republic of Azerbaijan, ethnic Azerbaijani leaders in Iran occasionally ask a quite correct question: why are they being deprived of their legal rights? In this sense, the very existence of independent Azerbaijan looks like a barely tolerable challenge to the imperial Islamist regime of the Iranian ayatollahs.

Hence, there is probably a fourth reason. Against the backdrop of social, political, and ethnic conflicts within Iran itself, of which the South Azerbaijan national liberation movement is a part, the authorities see a way out by mobilising Persian ethnic nationalism in order to transfer internal conflicts outside the country. The traditional main "scarecrow" - Israel, the official symbol of the "collective enemy" of the Islamic revolution - does not seem to be enough for the Ayatollahs today, and a confrontation with Azerbaijan could not have come at a better time.

The fifth reason is Azerbaijan's solidarity with Türkiye in the Turkic bloc. Iranian hegemonism sees this as a challenge and a tough obstacle to their global and regional plans. Unable and unwilling to shift to an open confrontation with Türkiye, Tehran turns its gaze to Azerbaijan. In addition, Azerbaijan is in conflict with Armenia, and the latter has been declared by Iran as not just its closest ally, but as a country, whose security is also the security of Iran. In other words, Azerbaijan is already practically a de facto-declared enemy.

Last but not least, is Azerbaijan's strategic partnership with Israel. Azerbaijan supplies two-thirds of the oil products Israel needs. It is also one of the largest markets for Israeli civil and military technologies, and this partnership shows that Israel may not be a problem for Muslim countries, but a solution. And that, of course, is the toughest challenge for Iranians.

- How far can Iran go in its anti-Azerbaijani rhetoric?

- As for the anti-Azerbaijani rhetoric, I think there is no limit there. Another thing is whether they will turn rhetoric into action. At this stage, such a development is not visible yet, but we are well aware that in international politics, especially in the East, words also play a big role. So at some point, increasingly harsh rhetoric may lead to the loss of control. For example, another manoeuvre by the IRGC or Iranian army on the border with Azerbaijan, such as in the Nakhchivan direction, could result in fighting with the Azerbaijani army. So I would not rule out the possibility of a direct armed clash, but I think this is not the case at the moment.

- What is Israel's position on the Russian-Ukrainian war? I mean both on the state level and on the public level.

- Israel's position in the Russian-Ukrainian war is unchanged, regardless of who is in power. Israel is entirely on the side of Ukraine and considers the Russian invasion an aggression, which is hard to justify. Israel supports the Ukrainians with humanitarian aid, diplomatic and political support, some non-lethal defence weapons, and some other assistance that is not commonly spoken about.

On the other hand, Israel understands that Russia is a factor in the Middle East and is interested in maintaining the understanding that has been reached since 2015 regarding the Russian and Iranian presence in Syria.

Of course, the fact that Russia is getting closer at a strategic level to Iran and making room for it by transferring its resources from Syria and the South Caucasus to the Ukrainian front is of serious concern to Israel. But Israel is not interested in a confrontation with Russia, at least as long as Moscow acts as some deterrent in Syria or at least does not prevent the Israeli army from acting against the Iranian military and pro-Iranian proxies. And also given Russia's half-a-million-strong Jewish community, whose fate for the Jewish State is important.

So the view both on the political level and on the public level is support for Ukraine, but support on a scale that Israel can afford without direct confrontation with Moscow.

One must also bear in mind that by and large Ukraine and Israel now have a common enemy - Iran itself.

- In one of your interviews, even before the Second Karabakh War, you said that Israel unequivocally accepts the idea of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan within the Soviet-era borders and the return of all lands within these borders. "Any other solution to the Karabakh conflict is extremely dangerous for both Israel and the whole world," you said. First of all, thank you for this position. Secondly, could you explain how this was dangerous for Israel?

It is generally accepted that the modern international order, the whole concept of international security after the Second World War, is built on the idea of the inviolability of post-war and post-colonial borders. The colonial empires of European countries in Asia and Africa, then the Soviet Union, as well as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, collapsed along these boundaries. Further, the mere fact that these borders have been redrawn means an endless protracted conflict that is a threat to peace. The fact that, for example, there is Transnistria, which is de facto integrated with Moldova, is nevertheless a destabilising factor. The change of Georgia's borders, and the situation that takes place in the Balkans, create time bombs that can remain dormant for a long time and then explode. So in that sense, maintaining the traditional internationally recognised borders, everything that is also written in the 1975 Helsinki Accords, the final UN agreements and declarations, and so on, all of that would be the best way for humanity and should be taken as a basis for any negotiations and settlements at any level.

Why is this dangerous for Israel? Israel proceeds from the fact that, contrary to the mandate Britain received for the establishment of a Jewish State, which applied to the territory of the historical land of Israel on both sides of the Jordan river, this did not prevent London from first severing four-fifths of the historical territory of the ancient Jewish State and establishing the Jordan Kingdom and then splitting western Palestine into two parts so as to set up a Jewish and an Arab state there. The Jewish national movement agreed to the first model and by and large there is a state of cold peace and defence cooperation between Israel and Jordan. The leaders of the Zionist movement agreed to the partition of West Palestine, but the Arabs did not and accordingly lost the right to demand a return to that scheme to date.

More to the point, the situation is that so far as any settlement in the West of the Jordan River is concerned, the only sovereign state there is Israel. The mere fact that Israel is demanded to share this territory, or presented claims that the Palestinian Arabs have an immanent right to this territory outside of Israel's position, is in itself more than dubious from the point of view of Israeli society. Just as it is very doubtful to demand from Azerbaijan that it shares its territories - unless, for their own interests and considerations, Jerusalem and Baku are willing to take that step. Incidentally, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's recent statement that Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan suggests that many in Yerevan are also aware of this reality.

- Baku offers the Karabakh Armenians reintegration into Azerbaijani society and the state, which promises them development and higher living standards. What do you think prevents Karabakh Armenians from accepting this proposal from Baku?

- I believe that the desire of the population of a certain territory to be part of a certain state depends on where they are better off. Azerbaijan is today the most economically powerful state in the South Caucasus, able to provide the most favorable living standards and security to its citizens, so in the long run there is not even a moral barrier to reintegrating Karabakh and its population - Azerbaijani, Armenian or of any other ethnic group - inside the historical borders of the Azerbaijan SSR.

- The negotiation process between Baku and Yerevan has intensified recently. Pashinyan has at an official level, as you also mentioned, recognized Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. Will he find the strength to sign the final peace treaty, overcoming the resistance of internal and external forces not interested in peace?

- By and large, I think that Pashinyan, as a national leader, has no other option but to agree to Karabakh's reintegration into Azerbaijan, if he wants to be reputable and not sanctioned by the West. There are important issues, given that Armenia is becoming a hub for the transportation of weapons and materials capable of creating weapons for the Russian Federation. That is, as a leader, Pashinyan is doing the right thing. If he is willing to act not as a leader, but as a politician trying to catch public sentiment instead of thinking about the future, then the process may take a different vector. But I think by and large he has made up his mind. Another issue is whether the Armenian elites will be ready to accept this decision, and what level of support he will receive within Armenia itself. We will find out very soon.