Ukraine's post-war scenarios after Washington summit Territorial loss in exchange for survival?

The question of how the war in Ukraine will end—especially following the recent summit in Washington—remains one of the key issues in global politics. The Wall Street Journal outlines two main scenarios being discussed by experts and Western officials.

The first scenario involves a partial loss of territory but the preservation of the state. In this scenario, Ukraine would maintain its independence but lose control over roughly 20% of its territory. These lands would effectively come under Russian control, even if formal international recognition of this status remains uncertain. In return, Kyiv would receive security guarantees and Western support, allowing the country to continue existing as an independent, though weakened, state.

The second scenario envisions Ukraine becoming a Russian protectorate. Here, the risks for Kyiv are far greater. Ukraine could lose a much larger portion of its territory, while the remaining areas would be subject to strict control from Moscow. This scenario would not represent a partial settlement but a complete revision of the country’s status, transforming it into a dependent entity without autonomous policymaking.

The author emphasises that both scenarios represent extremely unfavourable outcomes for Ukraine. The first option at least allows the country to retain independence, albeit at the cost of territorial losses. The second would effectively mean the end of Ukrainian statehood in its current form.

How likely is either of these scenarios for Ukraine? Is one of them already inevitable? Or is this outlook overly pessimistic?

Caliber.Az spoke to prominent Ukrainian experts to address these questions.

As a political strategist and head of the analytical centre “Third Sector,” Andrei Zolotarev notes, unfortunately, the situation is such that even the first scenario does not guarantee that Putin will refrain from trying to turn Ukraine into a protectorate.

“His goal is a complete and final resolution of the Ukrainian question—all of Ukraine under control. Regarding the war scenarios, yes, it is possible to lose 20% of the territory, but still remain a fully self-sufficient and viable state, much like Finland did. Yes, it is a tragedy, but not a fatal one.”

What is truly fatal, he says, is something else: the fact that the Ukrainian authorities lack a clear understanding—after such colossal economic losses—of how to carry out an economic reboot of the state so that the country can sustain itself. After all, it is impossible to live in debt indefinitely.

Second, society is deeply divided—saturated with aggression and intolerance. Under these conditions, the implementation of Putin’s plans becomes more than likely. Even the crude peace being proposed now would, in effect, only intensify internal conflict. Naturally, people will target Zelenskyy and his team, blaming them for all imaginable faults, but the real problem lies in the system of social, economic, and societal relations that has developed in Ukraine—one in which victory was nearly impossible. The Ukrainian soldier did not lose on the battlefield; he fought honorably and bravely. Yet in a system where society is artificially divided along lines of language and religion, compounded by enormous corruption—up to 30% kickbacks—winning under such circumstances is impossible,” the expert explained.

According to him, even if the United States did not scale back its aid or seek an exit from the war, these underlying problems would still catch up with Ukraine.

“The main issue lies in what comes after the war. We must avoid a situation like Germany on the eve of the Third Reich’s collapse, when people said, ‘Enjoy the war; the peace will be terrible.’ Indeed, the first seven years of peace in Germany were awful. But later, with Konrad Adenauer and Erhard taking the reins of the economy, Germany managed to find its model. For Ukraine, the central question is what kind of peace will follow.

If the same people remain in charge, using the same methods, there is a high likelihood that Putin will ultimately achieve his goals.

On August 22—when the U.S. president hopes to hold a trilateral summit with the leaders of Russia and Ukraine—Zelenskyy will face an extremely difficult choice: between very bad and catastrophic outcomes, between defeat and destruction. Yet it is unlikely that Zelenskyy and European leaders will be able to convince Trump otherwise.

Still, in any case, this is the best possible outcome compared to the fate of South Vietnam,” the centre head noted.

Military analyst and former Ukrainian Security Service officer (2004–2015) Ivan Stupak stated that, of course, the scenarios outlined are not exactly pleasant for their country, but journalists need materials—different perspectives, ranging from the most optimistic to the most negative.

“I am more inclined toward the Finnish scenario, where Ukraine loses roughly 20% of its territory. Legally, we do not recognise these territories as under Russian occupation. We consider them Ukrainian, but acknowledge that, de facto, we cannot currently regain them. Russia is too large, too elongated, with too many people. We lack the resources to retake these lands, but we reserve the right to continue pursuing them diplomatically. And, of course, to maintain sanctions.”

“The issue of sanctions also heavily depends on Ukraine. If Ukraine were to, for example, recognise Crimea as Russian, then Western European countries and the U.S. would automatically lift all previously imposed sanctions, since there would be no dispute. If Ukraine does not contest these territories and acknowledges them as Russian, Russia could remove most, if not all, sanctions. But I see that Ukraine will not do this. Ukraine will stand its ground.

Regarding the 20%—unfortunately, we physically cannot reclaim it. Again, the only viable option for us is the Finnish scenario: accept reality and move forward. By ‘moving forward,’ I mean developing our economy, advancing our defence industry in cooperation with Europeans and Americans, attracting investments, banks, and companies—essentially improving people’s standard of living far beyond what it was before,” the analyst explained.

However, he added, there is a significant nuance here.

“All these occupied territories weigh heavily like a massive concrete slab on Russia’s shoulders. We’re talking about tens of thousands of square kilometres that are utterly uninhabitable. Millions of cubic metres of concrete ruins are mixed with the bodies of Ukrainian soldiers, Russian soldiers, civilians, and even pets, all decomposing. There are hundreds of thousands of unexploded munitions, hundreds of thousands of landmines. Bringing all of this back to order would take decades. I estimate at least $10–20 billion in investment—and the Russian Federation simply doesn’t have that money or the resources. These territories are a dead weight dragging down the Russian economy.

So I see a scenario where we freeze the front line. Unfortunately, we must accept that we cannot reclaim these territories for now, but life goes on. Meanwhile, the occupied territories continue to pull the Russian Federation down,” Stupak outlined.