Rebirth of Egyptian diplomacy in midst of Gaza crisis

In the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring, few believed Egypt could reclaim a strong diplomatic role. The brief rule of the Muslim Brotherhood, followed by a military takeover, seemed to trap the country in a cycle of internal crises and geopolitical passivity. Coupled with a $16 billion economic blow from the COVID-19 pandemic and looming grain shortages due to the war in Ukraine, Egypt’s outlook appeared bleak. Yet, as an article published by GIS Report reflects, Egypt has since demonstrated a surprising degree of strategic resilience and diplomatic resurgence.

A central pillar of this comeback has been Egypt’s assertiveness over the Nile River. The situation grew tense when Ethiopia began constructing the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in 2011, threatening Egypt’s access to over 90% of its freshwater. President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi’s declaration that “the waters of Egypt are untouchable” marked the start of what has come to be called the “fellah” policy—named for the farmers who rely on the Nile. Though unresolved, this dispute underscored Cairo’s shift from a reactive to a proactive foreign policy posture.

Another key component has been Egypt’s counterterrorism campaign in the Sinai Peninsula. Since 2015, Cairo has battled Wilayat Sinai, an ISIS-affiliated group. The 2018 launch of a military offensive was accompanied by social development initiatives aimed at stabilizing the region. While remnants of ISIS remain, this strategy has delivered tangible results, combining military suppression with economic investment.

Egyptian role after October 7

Egypt’s diplomatic relevance was further highlighted after the Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023. With historic ties to both Israel and the Palestinians, Egypt was expected to act as a mediator. However, as argued in this article, few anticipated that Cairo would use the recent crisis as a strategic opportunity to reclaim regional influence.

While relations between Egypt and Israel have rarely been warm, they have remained steady and pragmatic, with moments of tactical alignment. One of the clearest examples of this cooperation emerged in their joint efforts against ISIS in the Sinai Peninsula. Though these operations technically contravened the demilitarisation clauses of the 1979 peace treaty, both sides deemed them necessary to neutralise the threat of Islamist insurgents destabilising the region.

Under the treaty, Egypt agreed to cap its military presence in Sinai at 22,000 troops. However, according to Israeli news outlet Nziv, Egypt has significantly exceeded that limit, now stationing an estimated 42,000 troops in the area, according to GIS Report. In addition to increasing troop numbers, Cairo has undertaken substantial infrastructure upgrades: modernising the Bir Gifgafa airbase, deploying M60 Patton and M1A1 Abrams tanks near the Rafah crossing, building new road networks, and developing underground facilities for ammunition and fuel storage.

These expanded military activities have raised alarms in Tel Aviv, which, according to the article, sees them as a breach of the long-standing peace agreement. Yet Egypt appears largely unfazed by the criticism. It recognises that, despite Israeli concerns, Jerusalem continues to rely heavily on Egyptian cooperation—particularly in counterterrorism efforts and regional diplomacy. Israeli officials frequently engage Cairo’s mediation services, counting on Egypt’s deep understanding of the armed factions operating in Gaza and Nablus.

Adding to Egypt’s leverage is its longstanding diplomatic capital with global powers. From the legacy of the Camp David Accords signed in 1978 between Egypt and Israel under Washington's mediation to ongoing ties with the United States and Russia, Egypt remains a significant player. It is currently promoting a $53 billion Gaza reconstruction plan featuring neutral governance and transparency safeguards—a proposal rejected by both Washington and Tel Aviv but still being advanced by Cairo.

According to the article, Egypt’s leadership now sees the Gaza crisis as an opportunity to build domestic and regional momentum. Driven by a desire to restore its historical influence in the Arab world, Cairo is reasserting itself on the diplomatic stage. Whether this reemergence will be sustained remains to be seen, but what is clear—at least from the perspective of the author—is that Egypt is no longer merely reacting to the region’s chaos but actively shaping its trajectory.

By Nazrin Sadigova