Rising biothreats expose gaps in global health funding

The growing risk of bioweapons developed by non-state actors is injecting new urgency into global pandemic preparedness. Yet just as artificial intelligence is making such threats more dangerous and accessible, experts warn that the funding systems that underpin global health security are beginning to collapse.

While the timing and origin of the next epidemic remain unknown, the nature of infectious threats is clearly evolving. As highlighted in an analysis by Project Syndicate, the world must prepare for deeper uncertainty—not only about when and where outbreaks will occur, but also whether they are natural or engineered, accidental or deliberate.

According to the analysis author, one of the most striking warnings to emerge from this year’s Munich Security Conference was the role of AI in lowering the barrier to creating genetically engineered bioweapons. A forum typically focused on geopolitical conflict instead turned its attention to the underexamined risks facing global health security.

This shift reflects a broader realization among policymakers: regardless of how a pathogen emerges, the priority must be the ability to detect and respond to infectious threats effectively. From a public health perspective, the distinction between natural and man-made threats may ultimately matter less than readiness itself.

There has been some progress since the COVID-19 pandemic. Nearly a year ago, member states of the World Health Organization adopted the WHO Pandemic Agreement, signalling continued—if incomplete—commitment to multilateral cooperation.

Key institutions have also evolved, as the article recalls. Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance founded by the author and Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) now work in tandem to strengthen global defences. She describes that CEPI focuses on identifying emerging threats and accelerating the development of vaccines and treatments, while Gavi works to ensure equitable access, manages emergency stockpiles, provides surge financing, and supports regional vaccine manufacturing.

These capabilities are essential global public goods. Yet at a time when biological threats are intensifying, the financial model sustaining them is weakening. Donor countries are cutting back on official development assistance (ODA), redirecting funds toward traditional defence priorities instead.

The article argues that significantly greater investment is needed to address emerging and re-emerging infections, as well as the growing risk of bioterrorism. It also outlines practical steps that can be taken immediately to strengthen preparedness.

One key priority is improving coordination across response systems. "I know this because one of my first experiences as CEO of Gavi was tackling the Mpox emergency in 2024, and because I served as a cabinet member in Pakistan during the COVID-19 response. In both cases, it was clear that only an extensive multi-stakeholder response would be effective," the author writes.

However, such coordination cannot be improvised in the middle of a crisis. "But such responses can be mobilized in a timely manner only if the relevant stakeholders have been fully prepared through periodic simulation exercises. Readiness is a muscle that requires regular exercise at all levels – national, regional, and international. Our preparations must encompass everything from emergency supply chains, logistics, and stockpile management to international borders and trade," the article states.

A second priority is the creation of a formal, regularly tested joint-planning mechanism that brings together researchers, funders, regulators, and manufacturers. This would ensure that medical countermeasures are not only developed quickly, but also tested, approved, distributed, and scaled up without delay—something that requires dedicated and reliable financing.

Ultimately, the question of funding is part of a broader rethink of how ODA is used in a changing world. The article argues that development assistance should serve a dual purpose: supporting poverty reduction and economic growth, while also financing global public goods and strengthening resilience.

In an era of evolving biological threats, collective health security depends on collective responsibility—backed by stronger coordination and a funding model that is predictable, sustainable, and fit for purpose.

By Nazrin Sadigova