Role of rocket, artillery troops in second Karabakh war Mammad Valimammadov’s analytical article

Proceeding from the recent wars and military conflicts, rocket and artillery troops are mainly used by the enemy in combat operations. We also see that artillery is mainly used against the enemy during the war in Ukraine. The artillery was also mainly used in the second Karabakh war.

According to the previous article, Armenia was mainly attacked by missile troops and artillery, army and tactical aviation, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and loitering munition during Azerbaijan’s military operation to liberate the occupied territories.

Most of the researchers in their work on the second Karabakh war focus on the use of UAVs and loitering munition. Little attention is paid to other types of troops. In this work, we will try to analyze the Azerbaijani and Armenian rocket artillery troops in the second Karabakh war.

Two circumstances were difficult for the Azerbaijani Armed Forces in the military operation to liberate the occupied districts:

• the need to break through the enemy's fortified and echelon formation (former Defence Minister Seyran Ohanyan’s defence line), which the Armenian troops have been building for more than two decades;
• it was necessary to counterattack from the positions on the plain to the fortified positions of the enemy in mountainous terrain.

Therefore, in the interwar period, the Azerbaijani military and political leadership, headed by President Ilham Aliyev, paid special attention to strengthening the ground forces.

The strengthening of rocket and artillery troops was one of the main directions in the building of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces.

During the withdrawal of troops from the former Soviet Army, the Azerbaijani Armed Forces received 388 artillery systems (more than 100mm caliber) in 1992-1993. Most of them were BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, D-20 and D-30 howitzers, as well as D-44 guns.

According to the official data as of 1995, Azerbaijan possessed 343 artillery systems with more than 100 mm caliber (including 43 self-propelled artillery mounts and 63 multiple-launch rocket systems).

During the interwar period, Azerbaijan bought numerous artillery, rocket systems, and ammunition:

• Some 18 pieces of 300-mm BM-30 "Smerch" multiple rocket launchers (2012), 24 pieces of TOS-1A "Solntsepek" multi-barrel rocket launch systems (2013, 2014, 2017), 24 pieces of "Chrysanthemum - S" anti-tank missile system (2015, 2017, 2018), 18 pieces of 152-mm 2S-19 "Msta-S" self-propelled howitzers (2013), 18 pieces of 120-mm 2S31 "Vienna" self-propelled guns (2013), six pieces of 152-mm 2A65 "Msta-B" towed howitzers (2007), 100 pieces of 9K129 "Kornet-E" anti-tank guided missiles (2010) were bought in Russia; 

• Some 18 pieces of 107-mm T-107 "Boran" multiple rocket launchers (2011), six pieces of 122/302-mm T-122/300 multiple rocket launchers (2013), 18 pieces of 122 T-122 "Sakarya" multiple launch rocket systems (2011), 18 pieces of 302-mm TR-300 "Kasirga" multiple launch rocket systems (2011, 2017), as well as 120-mm HY1-12 mortars were purchased in Türkiye. There were components for 122-mm corrected air missiles with a range of up to 40 km and 302-mm corrected air missiles with a range of up to 90-110 km for multiple rocket launchers in 2016;

• Around nine pieces of multi-purpose modular Lynx system were purchased in Israel (2007, 2008). Lynx systems use 122mm BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, Israeli Military Industries (IMI) LAR-160 Mk 4 or ACCULAR 160mm rockets with a maximum range of up to 45km, or Israeli IMI 306mm EXTRA artillery rocket systems with a maximum range of 150 km;

• Azerbaijan demonstrated all three options for equipping the Lynx system, calling them Doly-1, Leysan and Shimshek, respectively. Some 18 pieces of 120-mm CARDOM mortar systems (2011), four pieces of Lora tactical missiles (2018) and 50 ballistic missiles for them were bought;

• Rafael Spike-MR / LR anti-tank missile systems (portable and transportable) and IAI LAHAT, Rafael Spike-NLOS tactical missile systems were also purchased in Israel. New 120-mm SPEAR Mk 2 automated mortars manufactured by Elbit Systems were delivered to Azerbaijan in 2016-2017;

• Some 12 pieces of 203-mm 2S7 "Pion" self-propelled guns (2008, 2009), 30 pieces of 122-mm D-30 howitzers (2010), 26 pieces of 152-mm 2A36 "Hyacinth-B" towed gun (2017), 10 pieces of 301-mm "Polonaise" multiple launch rocket systems (2018) and 300 A-200 guided missiles for them were bought in Belarus;

• About 54 pieces of 122-mm 2S1 "Gvozdika" self-propelled howitzers (2008 - 2010), 16 pieces of 152-mm 2S3 "Akatsiya" self-propelled guns (2009, 2010), 72 pieces of 100-mm MT-12 anti-tank guns (2002), 55 pieces of 122-mm D-30 howitzers (2007), 144 pieces of 120-mm PM-38 mortars (2005, 2006), 12 pieces of 300-mm BM-30 "Smerch" multiple rocket launchers (2004, 2005) were purchased in Ukraine;

• Some 36 pieces of 152 mm DANA M1CZ self-propelled artillery guns (2017, 2018), 30 pieces of 122 mm RM-70 rocket launchers were purchased in the Czech Republic (2017, 2018);
  Around 36 pieces of 130-mm M-46 field artillery guns were purchased in Bulgaria (2002);

• Some 10 pieces of 128-mm RAK-12 Plamen multiple rocket launchers were purchased in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2010).

Thus, during the interwar period, Azerbaijan did a lot of work to strengthen its rocket and artillery troops.

The Azerbaijani army’s artillery systems with more than 100 mm caliber are estimated at up to 1,000 systems of cannon and rocket artillery, as well as tactical missile systems by the beginning of the second Karabakh war.

Besides the artillery and rocket systems, numerous artillery ammunition, in particular, guided artillery shells, were bought.

As for the development of the rocket and artillery troops in the Armenian Armed Forces, during the withdrawal of troops of the former Soviet Army in 1992-1993, Armenia received 259 artillery systems with over 100 mm caliber.

Russia additionally provided the Republic of Armenia with weapons over the next three years.

Yerevan received eight launchers of the 9K72 tactical missile system and 32 pieces of R-17 (8K14) guided ballistic missiles for them, 36 pieces of 122 mm D-30 howitzers, 18 pieces of 152 mm D-20 towed howitzers, 18 pieces of 152 mm D-1 towed howitzers, 18 pieces of 122-mm BM-21 "Grad" multiple rocket launchers.

Armenia purchased from four to eight pieces of 273-mm WM-80 multiple rocket launchers from China in 1999. Afterward, there were no reports of the acquisition of artillery or missile systems by Armenia for a very long period.

Some 10 pieces of 122-mm D-30 howitzers were bought in Belarus in 2007. Some 16 pieces of 122-mm D-30 howitzers were purchased in Montenegro in 2010. Six pieces of 300-mm AR1A multiple rocket launcher systems were purchased in China in 2011.

In general, said experience following the "April War" forced the Armenian leadership to intensify the technical re-equipment and modernization of the armed forces.

The Republic of Armenia agreed with the Russian Federation to receive two concessional loans for the purchase of weapons and military equipment in 2015 and 2017.

Armenia also purchased six pieces of 300-mm BM-30 "Smerch" multiple launch rocket system and ammunition for this system, six pieces of TOS-1A flamethrower systems with a launcher mounted on tank chassis, 50 pieces of "Kornet-E" anti-tank guided missiles, four pieces of "Iskander-E" tactical missile systems within these loans.

However, all these numerous artillery and missile systems could not affect Azerbaijan’s advantage.

Some 15 years were lost, and Azerbaijan was competently and purposefully arming all these years, while Armenia, resting after the first Karabakh war, had no chance to catch up with it.

If we compare the information from available sources, we see that during the interwar period Azerbaijan acquired 722 artillery systems over 100 mm caliber, while Armenia bought 138-142 artillery systems over 100 mm caliber.

Thus, by the beginning of the second Karabakh war, Azerbaijan had an overwhelming advantage over Armenia in firepower and salvo weight. The main task was to skillfully use this advantage in firepower.

Proceeding from the above-mentioned information, the Azerbaijani Armed Forces faced two difficult tasks, namely, the need to break through the fortified and echelon formation "Ohanyan’s defence line" and to counterattack from positions on the plain to the fortified positions of the enemy in mountainous terrain.

To solve these problems, the Azerbaijani command made a decision to use the tactics of a barrage fire during the operation to liberate the occupied territories.

From a tactical point of view, the barrage method was a massive use of artillery on enemy positions, together with the mobile divisions.

As opposed to the artillery attack, which traditionally precedes each attack, in this case the enemy’s battle formations were "processed" by using artillery.

Afterward, tanks and infantry were used. The purposes were to demoralize the enemy and to break through defence lines thanks to the scale and suddenness of such an assault.

The intensity of fire and coverage areas were specified in real-time. If the infantry got stuck, the shelling was stopped, if the infantry broke through, the servicemen were moving further. The shelling was coordinated and discussed in advance not to kill their own servicemen.

The barrage fire, as a rule, was preceded by artillery attacks on reconnoitered targets. There was also shelling to suppress resistance after the first attack.

Such an offensive tactic is a very complex process. Before each such attack, a planned table of interaction was drawn up, in which all the elements for tasks, positions and artillery were agreed upon.

This required a very high qualification of officers, a reliable combat command and control system, and highly trained units. Therefore, this tactic was constantly practiced during the exercises of the Azerbaijani army.

During the training of artillery units, the main attention was paid to:

• full provision with necessary items,
• high professional training of personnel,
• technical readiness of weapons and military equipment,
• knowledge of the calculations of the material part of artillery systems,
• full preparation for shelling and control measures, meteorological and ballistic preparation for shelling,
  control over the fulfillment of missions for shelling.

It was easier to control the situation through the introduction of automated systems and the active use of unmanned aerial vehicles.

The latest artillery and tactical missile systems used by the Azerbaijani army made it possible to strike faster, more accurately and farther.

The most important role was assigned to the artillery reconnaissance. Not only optical reconnaissance means, but also sound and radar reconnaissance means were used.

The targets which were chosen earlier were attacked. Proper artillery reconnaissance allowed:

• To promptly plan and inflict an attack in a timely manner;
• To destroy highly mobile targets in short-term stops and during holding certain positions.

A system was created in the Azerbaijani army in a single reconnaissance zone, planning for making an attack, transmitting data and destroying the enemy: in the far zone – by using long-range multiple rocket launch system and missile troops, in the near zone – by using artillery, with the ability to quickly redistribute targets and shell the targets through UAVs, radar and optical intelligence.

A peculiarity of the tactics of the units of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces was the widespread use of reconnaissance and strike complexes, created on the basis of unmanned aircraft.

The UAVs were in the air, as a rule, as part of mixed groups. A new tactic of unmanned aviation operations, which envisaged the massive use of light and relatively cheap reconnaissance and combat UAVs and loitering munition, together with heavier reconnaissance drones equipped with radar, and optoelectronic reconnaissance, was developed as part of solving the tasks of destroying the enemy’s artillery.

The Armenian troops suffered big losses as a result of numerous constant strikes by UAVs and loitering munition on motorized rifle, tank and artillery units. The moral and psychological state of the personnel was ruined even before entering the battle.

The Azerbaijani Armed Forces created the conditions for the successful operations of unmanned aircraft. This greatly increased the effectiveness of the use of long-range weapons (cannon artillery, multiple launch rocket systems and tactical missile systems). As a result, while involving few servicemen and using few combat aircraft for these purposes, the enemy’s targets were hit.

As a result, a unified reconnaissance information space, based on the "found-and-hit" principle, was created. It included reconnaissance equipment (UAVs and ground artillery reconnaissance systems) and weapons of destruction (mortars, cannon and rocket artillery, tactical missiles).

The reconnaissance equipment was used in the reconnaissance command post of the combined arms formation. The reconnaissance complex is integrated into a single reconnaissance and information center through an automated control system.

The "found-and-hit" principle was implemented, and the reconnaissance and combat operations (reconnaissance systems) were carried out in real-time.

The combat capabilities of the rocket and artillery troops in the operation were used, and superiority over the enemy was gained.

In general, the creation of unified reconnaissance and information spaces, based on the "found-and-hit" principle, is already a well-known practice that was used by a number of armies of the countries, but in the post-Soviet area. The Azerbaijani Armed Forces first used the unified intelligence and information spaces on such a scale and with such high efficiency.

Another feature of using artillery batteries was the creation of artillery groups designed to attack the enemy in the direction of the main attacks of combined arms formations.

Thus, all available Czech-made DANA self-propelled gun-howitzers were combined into a separate artillery brigade, which supported the motorized rifle formations advancing in the direction of the Jabrayil district.

As a rule, artillery batteries carried out the tasks assigned to them from positions located at a greater distance from the front line far beyond the enemy’s motorized rifle and tank batteries.

After the beginning of the military operation to liberate the occupied territories, the main tasks of the rocket forces and artillery groups of the Azerbaijani army were the destruction of the enemy’s positions, military bases, support for the advancing ground forces, counter-battery combat, disruption of communications services and supply of advanced units of the enemy’s army.

Modern means of destruction and the increased combat capabilities of the troops allowed the Azerbaijani troops to strike at a long-range, destroy the most important enemy’s targets sequentially and simultaneously throughout the battles.

Ex-secretary of the NKR Security Council Samvel Babayan said that the infliction of the sudden first strike and numerous subsequent massive strikes made it possible on the very first day of the war to hit up to 40 percent of the Armenian artillery groups.

During the first days of the second Karabakh war, the Armenian artillery groups tried to combat, then during the counter-battery fight and the destruction of the weapons, the capabilities of the Armenian artillery began to sharply decline.

The work on counter-battery combat was organized.

The success of the actions of the Azerbaijani side at the tactical level was also stipulated by the use of artillery reconnaissance systems and UAVs, rocket and artillery troops, which actively used guided artillery shells.

The combat UAVs and loitering munition were massively used. Correction and target designation was supported both by satellite navigation and reconnaissance UAVs, which provided the command of the Azerbaijani army with real-time information, and by sabotage and reconnaissance groups.

The targets in the area of responsibility of a unit or formation were hit online as they were detected.

Azerbaijani troops used the following main methods for counter-battery combat and suppression of the enemy’s artillery:

• the work of UAVs that detected the enemy’s positions and hit them with weapons or gave target designation to artillery crews or army aviation helicopters armed with LAHAT and SPIKE anti-tank guided missiles, which attacked the targets;
• the use of loitering munition in the "free operation" mode, when the enemy’s positions, which were immediately hit, were revealed;
• the use of ground artillery reconnaissance;
• the activity of the sabotage and reconnaissance groups behind the enemy’s lines, which revealed the enemy’s positions and transmitted targets to artillery crews.

The rocket forces and artillery groups of the Azerbaijani army had taken full advantage over the enemy by the end of the second week of the second Karabakh war. It was possible to destroy the enemy’s military bases.

The war in Ukraine showed the importance of counter-battery combat and the suppression of the enemy’s artillery batteries. So, the Azerbaijani army brilliantly solved this problem in the second Karabakh war.

As an example of a successful counter-battery fight, it is possible to mention the destruction of the Armenian Smerch multiple rocket launchers near Aliagaly village, which were used to shell the Azerbaijani civilians.

There are at least a hundred such examples of the destruction of Armenian artillery batteries during the second Karabakh war.

The work was also carried out to disrupt the communications services and supply lines of the enemy. One of the first targeted attacks on key rear facilities was Azerbaijan’s shelling of a strategically important bridge in the Lachin corridor on October 2 morning.

Its destruction would interrupt traffic along one of the two routes connecting Armenia and Karabakh. An Israeli-made LORA ballistic missile was used for the strike, which demonstrated excellent accuracy, hitting a small object from a distance of at least a hundred kilometers.

However, having broken through the bridge, the ammunition exploded under it, and one of the two lanes remained suitable for traffic. The Zod - Agdere northern route was also attacked through Smerch multiple launch rocket systems.

The enemy’s communications services were destroyed and the ammunition supply of the advanced units of the Armenian troops was disrupted.

Over time, the cumulative effect of systematic attacks on the rear and communications services of the enemy has sharply reduced the combat capability of its advanced units.

The disruption of the ammunition supply of the advanced enemy units and the attacks on its positions, and military bases, allowed the Azerbaijani ground forces to break through the echelon formations and fortified line of defence of the Armenian troops.

Numerous self-propelled guns and multiple rocket launchers allowed the Azerbaijani artillery to be mobile. After breaking through the enemy’s defence line in the southwestern direction, the ground troops, focusing on fighting the enemy’s armoured and mechanized units, artillery batteries that prevented the successful advance of the Azerbaijani troops, used self-propelled guns and multiple rocket launchers.

The task that the Armenian troops were solving was to redeploy their forces and prepare to repel the strike of the Azerbaijani troops from the southwestern direction.

It was not difficult to detect the positions and movements of the Armenian troops through UAVs, sabotage and reconnaissance groups, and electronic intelligence. What is found can be destroyed. This is the reality of modern warfare.

The aforementioned unified reconnaissance and information space, based on the "found-hit" principle, made it possible to quickly detect and destroy the enemy’s forces and means.

Thus, the necessary artillery support for the advancing ground forces was ensured, without losing the pace of the offensive.

Therefore, the attempts of conducting counterattacks by the tank units of the Armenian army in the Zangelan district (October 20-21) resulted in high losses of counterattacking units and the loss of territory, but the pace of the offensive of the Azerbaijani army remained almost at the same level.

Taking into account that the hostilities were to be carried out in mountainous areas and forests, numerous mortars with more than 100 mm caliber were bought.

The mortar, due to its hinged trajectory, was of great value for shelling manpower in nearby areas, as well as hiding behind shelters.
The advancing troops were destroyed in mountainous wooded areas thanks to numerous mortars.

According to available data, Azerbaijani troops destroyed 425 enemy artillery and missile systems, 250 towed artillery units (including 106 pieces of 122-mm D-30 howitzers, 18 pieces of 152-mm D-1 guns, 75 pieces of 152-mm D howitzers-20, 15 pieces of 152-mm 2A36 "Giatsint" guns), 29 self-propelled guns (24 self-propelled guns 122 2S1 "Gvozdika" and five self-propelled guns 152-mm 2S3 "Akatsiya"), 85 multiple launch rocket systems (including 75 BM-21 122-mm Grad, four BM-20 300 mm Smerch, one TOS-1 220 mm Solntsepek), two ballistic missile launchers (R-17 Scud), 59 mortars during the second Karabakh war.

The second Karabakh war showed that even during the high "intellectualization" of weapons, artillery is still the "God of War" and did not lose its significance in the 21st century.

From the first days of hostilities, the Azerbaijani army gained superiority over the enemy on the battlefield, which turned out to be one of the decisive factors for victory.

The skillful use of the "severe God of War" is an important condition for achieving victory, which was clearly demonstrated by the Azerbaijani troops.