Saudi Arabia’s strategic restraint in fragmenting Middle East Analysis based on Foreign Affairs

A recent Foreign Affairs piece offers a sharp and nuanced reading of Saudi Arabia’s seemingly cautious posture during a six-week war involving Iran, Israel, and the United States. What might appear as indecision is, in fact, a calculated strategy shaped by hard lessons, shifting threat perceptions, and a desire to preserve long-term autonomy.

At the heart of the analysis lies a key argument: Riyadh is no longer willing to anchor its security solely to Washington. The memory of the muted U.S. response to the 2019 attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure—combined with the current administration’s perceived lack of a coherent regional strategy—has entrenched doubts about American reliability. This has driven Saudi Arabia toward a hedging strategy, diversifying both its security partnerships and diplomatic options.

The article convincingly shows that Saudi Arabia now views both Iran and Israel as potential sources of regional imbalance. While Iran remains a direct security threat—through proxies like the Houthis and its demonstrated willingness to target Gulf infrastructure—Israel’s growing military assertiveness and ambitions for regional dominance are seen as equally destabilising in the long term. Riyadh’s refusal to fully align with the U.S.-Israeli campaign reflects this dual concern: it does not want to replace one hegemonic threat with another.

Equally important is the economic dimension. Saudi Arabia’s restraint is deeply tied to its vulnerability: critical infrastructure, oil exports, and maritime routes remain exposed, particularly in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz. Direct involvement in the war would almost certainly invite escalation from Iranian proxies, jeopardising not only national security but also the kingdom’s economic transformation agenda. In this sense, caution is less a sign of weakness than a rational prioritisation of stability.

One of the article’s more compelling insights is Riyadh’s effort to build a broader strategic framework beyond the Gulf. The emerging alignment with Egypt, Pakistan, and Türkiye signals an attempt to create a more flexible, multi-polar security architecture. This “quartet” is not yet a formal alliance, but it reflects Saudi Arabia’s ambition to amplify its influence and avoid isolation in a rapidly evolving regional order. Pakistan’s mediation role in the current conflict underscores how these relationships can translate into diplomatic leverage.

However, the analysis also highlights the limits of this strategy. Saudi Arabia is navigating between deeply unpalatable options: an emboldened Iran capable of disrupting regional security, or an Israel whose dominance could marginalise Arab states politically and strategically. Neither outcome aligns with Riyadh’s vision of a balanced regional order. This explains its continued interest in maintaining at least a functional relationship with Tehran, despite profound mistrust.

The article ultimately suggests that the war has accelerated a structural shift in Middle Eastern geopolitics. The old U.S.-centric security paradigm is eroding, replaced by a more fluid and uncertain landscape in which regional powers must take greater responsibility for their own security. Saudi Arabia’s approach—cautious, pragmatic, and multi-vector—is presented as an attempt to adapt to this new reality.

In conclusion, the piece offers a persuasive argument that Riyadh’s restraint is strategic, not passive. By avoiding premature entanglement, diversifying alliances, and keeping diplomatic channels open, Saudi Arabia is positioning itself not just to survive the current crisis, but to shape the postwar order. Whether this delicate balancing act can hold amid intensifying rivalries remains the central question.

By Vugar Khalilov