Two years on, what’s next in Ukraine? Eight thinkers shed light on state of war

As Russia’s war in Ukraine enters its third year, the apparent impasse on the battlefield masks decisive shifts. The war’s main front is now political, with Russian President Vladimir Putin betting that divisions and hesitations in the West will hand him the victory he has failed to achieve on the ground.

Worried about the consequences for their continent’s security if Washington disengages and Ukraine falls, European governments have increased aid in recent months. Collectively, they have now supplied or pledged more weapons to Kyiv than Washington—and more than double the assistance if economic aid is included. That marks a significant change from the war’s early days, but it hasn’t been enough to turn the tide for Ukraine, Foreign Policy magazine reports.

When and how will this war end? The Kremlin has made it abundantly clear that the only negotiated end it will accept is Ukraine’s surrender, while the Ukrainians have made it equally plain that they will continue to resist being subsumed into Moscow’s empire. Two years on, peace in Europe is nowhere in sight.

To shed light on these and other shifts in the war, Foreign Policy asked eight prominent thinkers what comes next.

Bracing for a Long War

By Angela Stent, author of Putin’s World: Russia Against the West and With the Rest

As Russia’s war in Ukraine enters its third year, the current dynamic stalemate looks set to continue. Neither side is winning or losing. The Russians are making incremental territorial gains at the cost of enormous casualties and lost equipment. The Ukrainians, having failed to achieve the objectives of their 2023 counteroffensive, are on the defensive and also experiencing significant casualties. This war of attrition is taking its toll on Ukraine, where President Volodymyr Zelensky recently parted ways with his top military commander, Gen. Valerii Zaluzhnyi, after fissures between the two became public. Both countries need to mobilize more troops, but there will be no Russian mobilization before Russian President Vladimir Putin’s sham reelection next month. For Ukraine, whose population is less than a third the size of Russia’s, it will be more difficult for to mobilize the forces it needs.

The war is not only about troops but also about the continued supply of weapons. Russia is purchasing drones from Iran and increasing amounts of artillery ammunition and some missiles from North Korea. Ukraine is dependent on weapons supplies and financial support from Europe and the United States. The European Union’s recent approval of $54 billion in financial assistance will enable the Ukrainian state to continue functioning, and European NATO members will supply some additional weapons. But the United States remains key: It is the most important supplier of advanced weaponry, and its dysfunctional domestic politics may jeopardize Ukraine’s ability to continue to fight Russia. If Congress does not approve the requested $60 billion in assistance to Ukraine and if the US government does not speed up the supply of advanced weapons, then the outlook for Ukraine’s ability to push back against Russia in 2024 is much bleaker.

There is little prospect of negotiations to end the war in 2024, nor can either side achieve a decisive victory. The Kremlin has made clear that it has no interest in negotiations that do not lead to Ukraine’s surrender, including the permanent loss of the four territories illegally annexed by Russia in 2022. The stated Russian goal remains the so-called “de-Nazification”—Russian lingo for regime change—and demilitarization of Ukraine. No Ukrainian leader would ever agree to such terms. Putin is awaiting the result of this year’s US election and hoping that the next US president will eschew support for Ukraine and return to business as usual with Russia. In that case, Ukraine’s ability to survive as an independent, sovereign state would be in question, with all the knock-on effects on the security of Europe and beyond.

Proposals for how the war might end—including the Korean model, which would involve an armistice, no peace treaty, and Western security guarantees for Ukraine—presuppose that Russia would ever accept an independent Ukraine. As long as Putin or a successor who shares his worldview is in power, that is unlikely to happen.

Like It or Not, We Are Now in Cold War II

By Jo Inge Bekkevold, senior China fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies

When Russian troops crossed into Ukraine in February 2022, it was immediately clear that the invasion would accelerate the geopolitical divide between the United States and its allies on one side and the emerging Sino-Russian axis on the other. In 2024, we are now significantly closer to a bipolar global divide reminiscent of the Cold War than only two years ago.

For one, the war has fostered the Sino-Russian embrace by increasing Beijing’s sway over Moscow. Largely isolated from the West as a result of the war, Moscow now increasingly depends on China as a market for its oil and gas exports, as a provider of a wide range of consumer goods, and as a partner for developing new technologies. Beijing’s support of Russia’s war effort has also widened divisions between China and Europe. This is evident in Europe’s rejection of China’s so-called peace plan for Ukraine, Beijing’s remarkable loss of influence in Central and Eastern Europe (with the high-profile 16+1 dialogue largely dead and buried), and the inclusion of China in NATO’s latest Strategic Concept.

Europe’s prewar dependence on Russian energy was the kind of vulnerability that the West now wants to avoid vis-à-vis China. Washington and Brussels are taking steps to de-risk their close economic ties with China; Beijing, for its part, is increasing its own self-sufficiency. Finally, Russia’s aggression has enhanced trans-Atlantic unity, prompted European NATO members to increase their defense budgets, pushed Finland and Sweden into NATO’s arms, and forced the United States to boost its military presence in Europe again.

Nonetheless, the current situation is different from the original Cold War. Today, the Sino-Russian partnership rests on a stronger geopolitical foundation than the Sino-Soviet one. At the same time, the trans-Atlantic unity created by Russia’s attack on Ukraine is fragile. Some European states are dragging their feet on defense spending, prolonging Sweden’s accession to NATO, advocating autonomy from the United States, or disagreeing with efforts to de-risk from China. Each case on its own may not be a threat to Western unity, but seen together, they matter. The most visible and important sign of Western fractures, though, is former US President Donald Trump questioning the role of NATO and the US security guarantee to its alliance partners during his presidential campaign.

Russia’s war has thus exposed the increased frailty of the Western bloc. Europe still suffers from its post-Cold War dreams and delusions. Accustomed to three decades of peace and globalization, many European politicians seem to be reluctant to face up to the realities of war, whether it comes in the form of an ongoing Russian invasion or it takes shape as a new cold war. Russian aggression also casts another spotlight on the rise of nationalism, populism, and polarization in the United States and a number of European countries. During the US-Soviet Cold War, Washington was able to exploit the differences between Beijing and Moscow, whereas today, Beijing and Moscow are in a stronger position to exploit the differences within the Western bloc.

Can Europe Go It Alone?

By Kristi Raik, deputy director of the Estonia-based International Centre for Defence and Security

If Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014 were wake-up calls reminding the West about Russia’s aggressive great-power ambitions, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was an electric shock for Europe’s continuously decaying defense. If that wasn’t enough, presumptive Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump has now openly invited Russia to attack European NATO members.

Now that Ukraine is entering the third year of a massive land, sea, air, and information war, there is a real threat that Russia will gain the upper hand on the battlefield. Already, US military aid to Ukraine has dwindled to a trickle, and the prospect of Trump’s election victory in November means that European leaders face the gravest strategic challenge to their continent in generations. If Europe fails this test, Moscow would be emboldened to go further in restoring its sphere of influence and undermining its main enemy, which it has clearly said is NATO.

European leaders openly acknowledge the need to prepare for Europe being abandoned by the United States, but big words by French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz have yet to be matched with deeds. The actual steps Europe has taken to increase defense spending, boost arms production, and help Ukraine win the war are falling short. Western debates on Russia keep signaling a lack of strategic clarity and resolve. A Russian defeat is feared so much that many in the West would rather have it both ways: Russia shouldn’t win and neither should Ukraine. For Russia, such wavering is an invitation to continue fighting until victory. As we’ve heard many times, Russian President Vladimir Putin believes that time is on his side.

Both the United States and Europe have much at stake. Ukraine’s defeat would likely do more damage to Washington’s credibility around the world than the US departure from Afghanistan. It would mean losing a conflict that was eminently winnable—but that Washington did not choose or dare to win.

2024 is a critical year for proving Putin wrong and paving the way for Ukraine’s victory. According to calculations by the Estonian Defense Ministry, Western countries would need to invest just 0.25 percent of their GDP in military assistance to Ukraine in order to enable the country to continue defending itself in 2024 and prepare for a new counteroffensive in 2025. This investment would be crucial for changing Russia’s calculus regarding not just Ukraine but European security architecture at large. A long-term Western commitment would force the Kremlin to draw the conclusion that it cannot achieve its goals in Ukraine by waging war. It would also send the message that Europe is committed to its defense—and that Russia has no chance of gaining anything by attacking its neighbors.

Looking beyond 2024, Ukraine can win the war if the West steps up support and makes the cost of war unbearable for Russia. Moscow can win if the West fails to mobilize the necessary resources and, more importantly, will.

Should Russia win in Ukraine, there is a chance that this would finally be the effective shock to compel Europe and the United States to get serious about stopping Russian expansion. I’d rather avoid that test.