Why China increasingly finds itself in al-Qaeda's radar

Could China replace the United States as the primary target of transnational jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda? A recent statement by Sheikh Saad bin Atef al Awlaqi, leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), has intensified that debate by directly threatening Beijing and accusing it of persecuting Uyghur Muslims.

In the statement, Awlaqi labelled China’s government a “pagan, infidel” enemy and framed its policies toward Uyghurs as justification for potential future attacks. The remarks represent a marked escalation in AQAP’s anti-China rhetoric, with an analysis published by War on the Rocks examines whether this signals a broader strategic shift.

Awlaqi began by praising “heroic operations” against Jews and Americans before pivoting to China, embedding Beijing into AQAP’s ideological narrative. He accused China of persecuting “our Uyghur Muslim brothers,” portraying the country not as a distant non-Muslim power but as an active oppressor of Muslims. He warned that AQAP would “go beyond targeting interests on land and sea” if China failed to change its “behavior and practices,” language broad enough to include diplomatic facilities, shipping, overseas workers or infrastructure linked to Chinese projects abroad.

While references to Jews and Americans as the “Crusader-Zionist Alliance” and a “dual evil” remain central to AQAP propaganda, China is no longer treated as peripheral. Instead, Beijing is singled out as a regime whose “every move” is being monitored and that will be “held accountable” for abuses in Xinjiang.

According to the analysis, this reflects a wider trend among al-Qaeda affiliates, which increasingly cite China’s domestic repression and expanding presence in Muslim-majority regions as grounds for legitimizing jihadist violence.

In practice, attacks on Chinese targets have been sporadic and opportunistic. Unlike Western countries, China maintains extensive internal security and surveillance systems, making attacks on its territory rare and often tightly controlled in media reporting.

Even if AQAP’s operational reach remains limited, the rhetorical shift is significant. Historically, its messaging focused on local adversaries such as the Yemeni government. Turning toward China allows the group to energize recruits, assert relevance and position itself within broader anti-great-power narratives — alongside actors such as the Baluchistan Liberation Army and Islamic State Khorasan Province, which have targeted Chinese interests in South Asia.

Awlaqi’s language frames any future violence as retaliation rather than ideological aggression, emphasizing “accountability” for China’s “behaviour and practices” toward Uyghurs. From a counterterrorism standpoint, this suggests that Chinese nationals and infrastructure abroad may increasingly be viewed as legitimate symbolic targets.

The analysis concludes that Beijing may need to strengthen its global counterterrorism posture. However, a more visible and forceful Chinese security presence in regions such as the Middle East, South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa could also heighten the risk of further attacks.

By Nazrin Sadigova