Can US airstrikes stop Iran’s nuclear ambitions?

On June 22, the United States carried out a high-impact airstrike campaign against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, following Israeli strikes nine days earlier. Codenamed Operation Midnight Hammer, the U.S. mission saw seven B-2 stealth bombers deploy Massive Ordnance Penetrator bombs against Iran’s deeply buried facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. While President Donald Trump declared the operation a “complete success,” closer analysis suggests that its strategic impact is far more limited.

According to David M. Allison, a nuclear policy analyst at Harvard’s Belfer Center, the strike may have achieved a temporary delay, but little else. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been denied access to the targeted areas, making verification of the damage impossible. Satellite imagery showed heightened activity at Fordow in the days before the attack, suggesting Iran may have evacuated key equipment and materials. Moreover, the absence of increased radiation levels post-strike indicates that the uranium stockpile likely survived intact.

This pattern mirrors past attempts at offensive counterproliferation. Historical precedent shows that airstrikes can set back nuclear programmes, but they rarely prevent eventual progress. Israel’s 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osirak reactor, for instance, pushed Iraq’s nuclear work further underground. It wasn’t airpower but the post-Gulf War inspection regime and sanctions that ultimately dismantled Iraq’s programme. Conversely, Israel’s 2007 attack on Syria’s al-Kibar reactor succeeded primarily because Syria lacked the capacity to rebuild and was already on the brink of collapse.

Iran, by contrast, possesses indigenous technical capabilities and a hardened, decentralised nuclear infrastructure. Having previously withstood cyberattacks (like Stuxnet), assassinations, and sabotage, Tehran has built resilience into its programme. Facilities such as Fordow were designed to withstand precisely the sort of strike seen in Midnight Hammer.

Allison notes that the most profound effect of such strikes may be political. Iranian leaders have labelled the operation a “barbaric violation” of international law and are now openly discussing withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Such a move would strip away the final layer of international oversight and could prompt regional powers—including Saudi Arabia and the UAE—to accelerate their own nuclear ambitions.

Estimates from the U.S. Department of Defense suggest the bombing may have delayed Iran’s programme by one to two years. Other assessments are less optimistic, citing Iran’s ability to disperse assets and rebuild. Allison warns that interpreting this delay as a strategic win would be a dangerous miscalculation.

Ultimately, Operation Midnight Hammer has created a fleeting window for diplomacy. If the U.S. fails to use this moment to re-engage Tehran in negotiations—perhaps trading sanctions relief for tighter IAEA access—then the strikes will have achieved little more than fuelling Iran’s determination to secure a nuclear deterrent. As Allison concludes, “Bombs can buy time, but only diplomacy can secure peace.”

By Aghakazim Guliyev